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Abstract 
This study adopts the structural-functional perspective to study the Hong Kong 
Ombudsman in three senses. First of all, by understanding an institution as a structure 
in a political system, it tries to study the Ombudsman Office by its roles. Secondly, it 
assumes that the development of the Ombudsman was a response to the changes in the 
internal and external environment of the Hong Kong political system. This 
background together with the complainants and the Ombudsman itself forges the 
Office's roles. Finally, during the process of development, the Ombudsman as a 
mechanism for control and redress further specialize and differentiate in its goals and 
internal structure to better perform political functions. The Office seeks to play a role 
in bringing about changes in law and policy, as well as to enhance the openness, 
accountability, fairness and responsiveness of Government by actively recommending 












Chapter I Research Bacl^round, Research Question and Organization 
A. Background of the research 
The ombudsman has become a widespread institution over the past forty years. The 
contemporary model of the institution was first introduced in Sweden in 1809. The 
ancient version of the institution was found in the Roman Empire and ancient China. This 
contemporary model is different in the way that its function of grievance redress is 
emphasized instead of being a mere governmental mechanism to control the abuse of 
power by the civil servants in vast empires like China and the Roman Empire.! The 
Swedish model evolved from such mechanism together with the growth of democracies 
in the country. The institution spread into the Scandinavian countries such as Finland and 
Denmark in the early twentieth century. The second wave of the movement happened in 
the 1960s and the 1970s，which took off in the Commonwealth countries in Africa and 
the Asia Pacific like the New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Tanzania. The New 
Zealand Ombudsman was then regarded as the "model ombudsman" that became a 
demonstration to other countries in the design of the institution. The idea was affecting 
Hong Kong at that time and an ombudsman office was nearly established. The idea was 
attractive to some of the Hong Kong people mainly due to the changing social and 
political environment, but not to the Hong Kong Government, that means the civil 
servants. The 1980s through the 1990s marks the apex of the spread of the institution, 
WHEN about 27 percent of the ombudsman institutions in the world were set up in the 
The Second Annual Report of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints (COMAC)，paragraph 
LM.5，1990 June. 
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period after 1990.2 丁卜巳 institution was transformed and a wide variety of the models 
were developed. These developments show that the ombudsman is a very "personal 
office". The institutions vary from one another in terms of their jurisdiction, power, and 
relations with other institutions. These elements rely heavily on the legal and political 
framework wherein the ombudsman exists as well as on the person holding the office. 
The relationship between the socio-political background, and the roles as well as 
functions of the institution in a particular society becomes an interesting question. By 
comparing this relationship between different societies, we may even able to find out how 
structural characteristics of different political systems affect the roles and functions of 
ombudsman institution. 
Functionalism provides a useful perspective to look at the phenomenon. The 
approach understands an institution as one of the structures in a political system. It 
provides a way to analyze a political structure by its roles, which are measured in terms 
of its regularized pattern of behaviour and its influence in terms of the functions it 
performs in relation to the political system as a whole. The development of new role or 
structure is a process of differentiation and specialization. It is assumed in functionalism 
that there will be development in a self-regulative system when the existing structural 
arrangements are not sufficient to deal with the inputs in the environment or stresses 
within the system. As development is responding to these changes, these newly 
developed roles or structures should reflect the structural and environmental 
characteristics of a system. In this sense, the development of ombudsman institutions 
2 Calculated from the data given by Gregory & Giddings，"The Ombudsman Institution: Growth and 
Development", Annex 1 to 3，in Gregory & Giddings, 2000. 
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with different characteristics is a result of changes in the environment of or within the 
political system. This explains the variations in roles and functions between different 
models of ombudsmen across countries. 
B. The research question 
Given the variations between the ombudsman institutions, this study seeks to find 
out the roles and functions of the Hong Kong Ombudsman. The scholarship of the 
ombudsman research was mainly carried out during the institutionalization of the Office. 
The studies focus on the evaluation of the compliant and redress channels in Hong Kong, 
the debate on the establishment of the office and the normative debates on the designs of 
the institution. Since the Office had been running for about seventeen years, an empirical 
analysis OF the functioning and characteristics of the Ombudsman Office will be fruitful 
to enrich the ombudsman research in Hong Kong. By adopting the functional approach, 
this study is mainly divided into two parts. The first part tries to review the development 
of the Ombudsman Office by treating it as a product of role specialization. The Office 
was established in 1989 but its development should be traced back to 1969. This part 
describes how the changes in social and economic environment as well as those in the 
political system affect the debate and design of the institution, and analyzes roles and 
function of the Office as reflected in the Ombudsman Ordinance. The second part is an 
empirical study of the roles and functions of the Office after its establishment in 1989. 
The historical background and legislation of the Office define the role of the ombudsman 
by assigning it powers and imposing restrictions on its functioning but never tell how the 
ombudsman is really like. This is because the role of the ombudsman is largely 
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determined by itself and also its clients, if we understand that "a role is a regularized 
pattern of behaviour that is established by one's own expectation and actions and those of 
others"^ Therefore, this part tries to identify the roles of the ombudsman in the light of 
the general public's and the ombudsman's expectation and perception and the cases 
brought to the ombudsman by the complaints as well as the ombudsman's own initiatives. 
In this Light, understanding the behaviour and practice of the ombudsman should be a 
necessary prerequisite for conducting further comparative or explanatory researches. 
C. Organization of the study 
The research begins with reviewing the functional approach in the study of social 
phenomenon. The variations in the understanding of different authors on the approach, 
key concepts, underlying principles, applications, merits and criticisms of the approach 
will be discussed. There will be a discussion on Gabriel Almond's development of 
structural flinctionalism in comparative politics. These elements are the theoretical basis 
for the analysis of the Hong Kong Ombudsman. The literature review will also include an 
introduction to the possible variations of the ombudsman institution that are adopted in 
different countries, which are related to the characteristics of their political systems. Katja 
Heede developed five models of ombudsman that aim at theorizing these differences and 
provide a scheme of classification. So, there will be a discussion on Heede's models. 
There will also be a section on the design and methodology of the study, which 
conceptualizes and operationalizes the concepts and explains the method and sources of 
materials. 
« 
3 Almond and Powell, 1966，pp. 52-53. 
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The next part of the study focuses on the analysis of the Hong Kong Ombudsman. 
The analysis starts with a historical review on the development of the Ombudsman Office. 
The forces that helped to forge the roles and functions of the ombudsman in each stage of 
development will be identified. It follows by an analysis on the Ombudsman Ordinance 
that discusses the jurisdictions, powers of and restrictions on the ombudsman. The 
perception and expectation of the general public as well as of the ombudsman itself will 
be studied. Another section will be the analysis of the cases handled by the Ombudsman 
Office and the initiatives of the ombudsmen. The final part is the conclusion that 
summarized the functions of the ombudsman in the political system and questions for 
further discussion. 
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Chapter Two: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at reviewing the literatures related to the research questions 
raised at the beginning of this thesis, which would help to construct a framework and 
generate hypothesis to analyze the Hong Kong Ombudsman Office. 
The first part reviews the literature on functionalism. It will discuss its 
theoretical underpinning and how it can be a tool or theoretical perspective for the 
study of politics. It will critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of 
functionalist analysis and discuss the applicability of the approach. This part also 
reviews Gabriel Almond's structural- functional approach for comparative politics due 
to its relevance and importance to political science. 
The second part reviews the literatures about the Ombudsman. Scholars who 
study Ombudsman classify the institution into different types and developed 
theoretical models to describe and understand different aspects of the institution. The 
first session of this part is devoted to discuss the variations of the Ombudsman 
institutions by their mandates. The second part will introduce some models of 
Ombudsman plans. The remaining part discusses the roles and functions of the 
Ombudsman in different political systems as a political structure from the structural-
functional perspective. The relationship between the structural characteristics of 
‘political systems and the functional ones of Ombudsman institution will also be 
discussed. These discussions should lay down the foundation for the analysis of the 
Hong Kong Ombudsman Office. 
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2.2 Literature on Functionalism^ 
This section will review the literatures of functionalism and aim at achieving 
two aims: first, briefly introduce the framework as a tool for the study of political 
institutions and second, to discuss the concepts that I will adopt in this study of the 
development as well as the role and function of the Hong Kong Ombudsman. It will 
begin with introducing the scientific origin, objectives and theoretical underpinning of 
functionalism in general. The second part introduces the key concepts, especially 
those developed by Almond, for the description of institutions and explanation on 
their development. The final part will discuss the strengths, weaknesses and 
applicability of the approach. 
A. The scientific origin of functionalism 
The development of functionalism reveals the desires and efforts of the social 
and political scientists to study the society and politics by scientific methods when the 
discipline was shaken by the behavioral movement during the 1950s and 1960s^. The 
study of politics departed from normative theory and focuses on value-free empirical 
political behaviour. Flanigan and Fogelman's comment on structural- functionalism 
reveals this task of scientific theorizing: 
The premise of structural- functionalism is nothing less than to provide a 
consistent and integrated theory from which explanatory hypotheses 
relevant to all aspects of a political system can be derived.^ 
In this thesis functionalism is equivalent to structural- functionalism unless specified. The different 
between the two terms will be discussed in the following section. 
3 James and Hardgrave, 1973，p. 201. The authors refer the "discipline" to Political Science. 
Flanigan & Fogelman，1967，p. 76. 
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Generating a testable hypothesis and theory in order to explain or even to predict a 
phenomenon in the real world is the aim of scientific theory. Besides, the attempt of 
the functional approach to develop jargon also marks its scientific orientation. The 
approach borrowed concepts and terminology from biological sciences. Terms like 
function, system and system maintenance are such examples. James and Hardgrave 
suggested, "The use of jargon in a discipline may be a measure of its growth as a 
science". It is because jargon arises in response to the need for precision in any field 
of knowledge, which provides shorthand notations for whole concepts or basic 
elements of a scientific paradigm. It helps to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency 
in communication by reducing "the scope of communication to those familiar with its 
specialized concepts and to those who share a particular paradigm，,.4 
Scholars commonly adopted these concepts when they apply the approach to their 
study though they may understand these concepts differently. 
B. Approaches 
Functionalism is not a single approach in social science. In spite of its wide 
usage and influence, the approach "has been caught up in terminological confusion". 
James and Hardgrave further explain this by quoting Robert Merton that "a single 
term has been used to symbolize different concepts, just as the same concept has been 
symbolized by different terms''.^ The term function is the fundamental concept that 
leads to the difference between the authors' understanding and adoption of the 
approach. Flanigan and Fogelman classified the types of functional analysis into three 
’ categories: namely, eclectic functionalism, empirical functionalism and stmctural-
5 James and Hardgrave, 1973, p. 201. 
James and Hardgrave, 1973，p. 202. 
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functionalism, in which the theoretical implication of the concept of function varies in 
each approach. Eclectic functionalism has a commonsensical understanding of the 
concept and the approach treats function and other aspects of a phenomenon such as 
history and ideology with equal attention in political analysis. The concept is of 
higher theoretical importance in empirical functionalism and structural- functionalism, 
which makes them a distinctive functional approach. The assumption of the existence 
of functional requisite in structural- functionalism differentiates it from empirical 
functionalism. In empirical functionalism, functions are performed as activities that 
help to satisfy the demands of individuals within every social system.? However, the 
approach does not seek to prove that satisfaction of such demands is the necessary and 
sufficient condition to the maintenance of social system, whereas, functions are 
regarded as requisites that are vital to the proper functioning of a system in structural-
functionalism. Thus, the concept of functional requisites could help to establish 
explanatory and predictive hypotheses about how and why some activities or items 
exist in certain social systems. This study mainly adopts the ideas and concepts of 
Almond's structural- functional approach. Almond's application is not requisite 
analysis^ since he does not refer performing of certain functions to the fulfillment of 
requisites to the proper functioning of a system. 
7 Flanigan and Fogelman, p. 72. 
8 Flanigan and Fogelman, p. 73. 
Flanigan and Fogelman, 1967, p. 77. "Requisite analysis specifies a set of functions as necessary and 
sufficient for the persistence of a system." 
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Conception of “functions，， Theoretical implications of 
the concept of function 
Eclectic Function as a commonsensical Function as one among a 
Functionalism concept. It refers to any purpose number of equally significant 
that serves by a phenomenon (a aspects of a political machine, 
social or political item). The function of a phenomenon 
is rather trivial in explaining its 
occurrence or existence. 
Empirical Functions as purposes or Function as satisfaction of 
Functionalism consequences of activities that individuals' demands. 
satisfy the demands of Theoretical implication is 
individuals in a social system. limited since satisfaction of the 
demands is not vital to system 
maintenance. 
Structural Functions as some requisites to Fulfillment of functional 
Functionalism the system as a whole, which requisites is vital to system 
must be fulfilled for its maintenance. Can explain and 
maintenance. predict the existence of an item 
by postulating its functional 
vitality to a system. 
Table 1 Comparison between the three types of functional analysis 
C. Objectives and logic of structural- functional analysis 
"The origins of functionalism in the social sciences are linked most directly to 
organicism and, specifically, to homeostatic physiology"^. While functionalism in 
biological sciences studies how the vital or organic processes considered in the 
respects contribute to the maintenance of the organism^functional analysis in social 
sciences adopts the approach to analyze social systems. The principal objective is "to 
determine the contribution which a social item (a structure or process) make to the 
10 James and Hardgrave quoted Gregor, 1973, p. 202. 
James and Hardgrave quoted Merton, 1973, p.202. 
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persistence of the system in which it occurs，,." To use Hempel's words, "functional 
analysis seeks to understand a behavior pattern or a sociocultural institution in terms 
of the role it plays in keeping the given system in proper working order and thus 
maintaining it as a going concern.，“^ The object of functional analysis can be "a 
standardized (i.e., patterned and repetitive) item, such as social roles, institutional 
pattern, social processes, cultural pattern, culturally pattered emotions, social norms, 
group organization, social structure, devices for social control, etc."^^ 
Functional analysis in social sciences has two basic patterns. One is to 
investigate how the functional requirements are met by mechanisms or arrangements 
as it is reflected in Merton's illustration on the steps of functional analysis: 
First of all, certain functional requirements of the organism [or the social 
system] are established, requirements which must be satisfied if the 
organism is to survive, or to operate with some degree of effectiveness. 
Second, there is a concrete and detailed description of the arrangements 
(structure and processes) through which these requirements are typically 
met in ‘normal’ cases. Third, if some of the typical mechanism for 
meeting these requirements are destroyed, or are found to be functioning 
inadequately, the observer is sensitized to the need for detecting 
compensating mechanisms (if any) which fulfill the necessary function. 
Fourth, and implicit in all that precedes, there is a detailed account of the 
structure for which the functional requirements hold, as well as a 
detailed account of the arrangements through which the function is 
12 J啦es and Hardgrave, 1973, pp. 202-203. 
13 Hempel, 1959, p. 278. 
Hempel，1959, pp. 280. 
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腿 lied. 14 
The analysis starts with establishing the functional requirements and then studying 
what institutional arrangements and how they help to perform the functional 
requirements of a system. Another pattern of functional analysis starts with 
identifying the relatively persistent traits or disposition in a system and then shows 
how the trait has the effects of satisfying functional requirements. The meaning of 
traits is the same as the standardized items as listed above. Hempel explains this 
pattern of functional analysis: 
The object of the analysis is some "item" i, which is a relatively 
persistent trait or disposition occurring in a system s... and the analysis 
aims to show that 5 is in a state, or internal condition, a and in an 
environment presenting certain external conditions ce such that under 
condition a and ce (jointly to be referred to as c) the trait i has effects 
which satisfy some "need" or "functional requirement" of s, i.e. a 
condition n which is necessary for the system's remaining in adequate, 
or effective, or proper, working order/^ 
Both patterns aim at analyzing how the mechanisms or institutional arrangements 
have the effects of satisfying the functional requirement of a system but they are 
different in procedure of analysis. 
D. The key concepts of structural-functionalism 
Functional analysis seeks to study social reality in terms of system, structures 
and functions. This particular way of studying the selective aspects of social reality 
James and Hardgrave, 1973’ p. 203. 
15 Hempel, 1959，p. 280. 
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makes structural- functional analysis a distinguishable approach. This part elaborates 
the concepts of system, environment, structure, role, function and development. These 
concepts will be applied in the later analysis of the Hong Kong Ombudsman. 
System and environment 
System is a unit of analysis in functionalism. It is where institutional or 
behavioral patterns are found. The term is a comprehensive concept that is able to 
capture all possible forms of political activities including any newly emerged political 
structures. When the concept was introduced, it extended the scope of the study of 
politics from the classical one that focused on formal institutions, law and ideologies. 
Almond defined a system as follows: "A system implies some interdependence of 
parts and some kind of boundary between it and its environment."^^ The definition 
spells out the two dimensions of the concept of system in functional analysis. The first 
dimension is a system-environment perspective that concerns the interactions between 
a system and its environment. The second one is the structural-functional dimension 
that refers to the relationship between structures within a system. 
The system-environment approach was fully articulated by David Easton. 
Easton generated the basic processes making a political system able to persist in a 
world either of stability or of change. During an input-conversion-output process, a 
system regulates or copes with stress flowing from environmental as well as internal 
sources by its structures and processes. Inputs enter a political system in forms of 
demands or support of the public, which generate a stressful disturbance. Decisions 
and policies are made or actions are carried out as output or response. The capacity of 
16 Almond and Coleman, 1966, p. 19; Almond and Powell, 1978’ p. 5. 
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a system to respond to these stresses depends on the presence and nature of feedback 
flowing from the environment. The actors and decision makers obtain information 
about the past performance of the system and other influences from the environment. 
These feedbacks may then regulate the future behavior of the system and bring about 
transformations in structures and goals. ^ ^ According to Almond, political systems 
mold and molded by both domestic and international environment. The environments 
set limits on and provide opportunities for political choices at the same time. 18 
Examples of domestic environment include the economic system, the technological 
system as well as the ethnic and cultural system. Government of other countries and 
international organizations are examples of international environment.^^ The relative 
importance of the influence of these environments to the political system should be an 
empirical question. Some scholars like Talcott Parson argued on the supremacy of the 
cultural system. 
The structural-functional dimension focuses on the interactions between 
different parts or structures within a system, which refers to the conversion process in 
the system-environment approach. Political structures help to cope with stresses that 
generated both within the political system and in the environment through carrying 
out various processes and as a result fulfill the functional needs of a system. Political 
structures are interdependent to one another in the sense that "A change in one subset 
of interactions produces changes in all the other subsets." This means, "when the 
properties of one component in a system change, all other components and the system 
as a whole are a f fec ted ,?�For example, the rise of mass media influenced other 
“James and Hardgrave, 1973, pp. 218-220. 
18 Almond et al, 2001, p. 46. 
19 Almond et al, 2001, p. 16. 
Almond and Coleman, 1960, p. 8. 
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structures such as political parties as well as the functioning of the whole political 
system. In short, structural arrangements adapt themselves to the influence of the 
environment and other political structures in order to maintain the system's proper 
functioning. 
Role and structure 
The above section illustrated the interdependence of parts as the internal 
attribute of a system as well as the interactive relationship between a system and its 
external environment. This part discusses the political structures that help to perform 
various functions so as to fulfill the goals of political system. 
91 
A structure consists of a set or a pattern of interrelated roles. Individual role 
is thus the basic unit of a political structure. Almond defines role as a regularized 
pattern of behavior, established by one's own expectations and actions and those of 
others.22 In Parson's conceptualization, role is what the actor does in a particular 
structural position and this status-role complex is the basic unit of a system. 
Therefore, a role is characterized by its behaviour. A person who is said to play a 
certain role is expected to have certain behaviour pattern. A political structure 
comprises behaviour of a network of roles. Almond adopts the example of the 
judiciary to illustrate the concepts. A court is a political structure where there are 
interacting roles like judge, jury, prosecuting and defense attorneys, defendant and 
plaintiffs. When a judge is performing regularized judicial activities, we say that he is 
acting in his political role as judge. So, a judgeship is a role; a court is a structure of 
21 Almond, 1978，p. 12; Holt, 1967，p. 89. 
22 Almond，1978, p. 52-53. 
23 Ritzer and Goodman, 2004, p. 98. 
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roles.24 Almond identifies a six-fold classification of institutions in political system, 
they are: interest groups, political parties, legislatures, executives, bureaucracies and 
courts.25 These institutions involved in different processes and interacted with one 
another in order to carry out the policymaking goal of political systems. Almond 
stated that many modem structures are multifunctional. This means a structure may 
serve the system in more than one level of functioning. For instance, the House of 
Commons make authoritative public policy, recruiting leaders, articulating interests 
and communicating political messages.^^ 
Almond suggested two aspects to describe the interrelationships between roles 
within a structure, namely, influence relationship and regulative resources. Influence 
relationships describe roles according to the degree of influence and autonomy of the 
lower participants in a structure. The patterns of influence can be classified into 
equalitarian, hierarchic and polyarchic relationships. For regulative resources, three 
kinds of recourses namely, coercive，remunerative and normative, can be used to 
secure the compliance of the various participants in their roles in the structure.^^ The 
two aspects can also be applied to describe the relationships among political 
structures. 
Function 
One basic objective of functional analysis is to examine how structures are 
arranged to fulfill the functional requirements of a system and therefore contribute to 
24 Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 12. 
25 Almond, Powell and Mundt, 1993，p. 7. 
26 Almond and Powell, 1978, pp. 55-56. 
27 Almond and Powell, 1978，pp. 56-59. 
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the maintenance of a system. Although scholars have different conceptualization of 
the concept function, they intend to differentiate it from the concept of effect. Holt 
points out that function is a subtype of effect which refers to those system- relevant 
effects of structures. 28 This means only the effects that are relevant to the 
maintenance of system can be regarded as functions. Hempel uses the example of 
heartbeat to explain the difference. Heartbeat produce heart sounds but functionalists 
would not regard heart sounds as a function of heartbeat. It is because the effect of 
heart sounds itself is of no importance to the proper working of an organism. 
Therefore, heart sounds are merely effects while blood circulation is a function of 
heartbeat that helps to ensure the supply of nutriment and removal of waste.^^ 
There are three aspects to characterize the concept of function. Firstly, Merton 
introduced the concept of dysfunction. He defined dysfunctions as the "observed 
consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system".^® This means 
not every institutional or behavioural pattern in a system is functional that would 
contribute to the adaptation or survival of a system positively. This is because an item 
could have multiple functions that it is functional to the whole system but is 
dysfunctional to the subsystem or the vice versa. The concept also raises the possible 
conflicting relationship between structural items. Secondly, functions can either be 
manifest or latent. Latent functions are those functions that are neither intended nor 
recognized. Manifest functions are those intended and recognized by participants 
within the system. The final dimension is about the functional indispensability of 
structural item. The assumption assumes whenever an item exists, it performs some 
vital functions and its existence is thus necessary. However, some scholars argue 
28 Holt, 1967, p. 88. 
29 Hempel, 1959, p. 279; Holt quoted Hempel in, 1967，p. 88. 
30 Hempel quoted Merton, 1959, p. 294; James and Hardgrave quoted Merton, 1973, p. 206. 
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about the existence of functional equivalents. They believe that some structural items 
are of the same function or ability and therefore are replaceable. 
In short, functions are the set of conditions that are individually necessary and 
collectively sufficient to the survival of a system. However, Scholars have different 
conceptualization on the set of necessary functions for system. Parson developed the 
AGIL scheme that posits four functional imperatives to a system, they are: adaptation, 
goal attainment, integration, and latency (pattern maintenance).^^ The imperatives 
mean if a system is to survive, it has to adapt itself to the environment and adapt the 
environment to its needs; it should define and achieve its primary goals; it has to 
regulate the interrelationship of its component part; and also to sustain and create the 
motivation of individuals.^^ On the other hand, Almond classified the functions of 
political system into three levels where different structures and processes are involved 
in each level of functioning. Almond believes that all political systems must include 
the performance of these functions�； be it a primitive or a modem society though the 
structures that carry out the functions may vary in forms and styles. This postulation 
of the universality of political functions lies in empirical and historical observations. 
The three levels of functions are system functions, process functions and 
policy functions. The process functions play a direct and necessary role in the process 
of making policy.34 At this level, structures such as political parties, interest groups, 
legislature, executives, bureaucracy and the court interact with one another to perform 
the functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, policymaking, policy 
31 Ritzer and Goodman, 2004, p. 95. 
32 Ritzer and Goodman, 2004, p. 95，Holt, 1967，p. 93 & 94. 
33 Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 55. 
34 Almond, Powell and Mundt, 1993, p. 10. 
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implementation and adjudication. These processes transfer inputs from the 
environment to policies. The level of participation, compliance with and support for 
political directives, and procedural justice and equality before the law are the values 
that measure whether the functions are well performed. Another level is the policy 
functions. Public policies and actions of government are the outputs of political 
system, which provide the society with welfare and security which ensure liberty. 
"These functions include various forms of regulation of behavior, extractions of 
resources in the forms of taxes and the like, and distribution of benefits and services 
to various groups in the population.，，35 Individuals and groups in the society may 
respond to the policy outputs and feedback to the political system. The feedbacks in 
terms of demands or support will be the new inputs to the political system, which 
influence the system at various levels. Finally, system functions include socialization, 
recruitment and communication. In the process of political socialization, structures 
like families, schools, church and mass media develop, reinforce and transform 
attitudes of political significance in the society. Political recruitment refers to the 
selection of people for political activity and government offices. Political 
communication refers to the flow of information through the society and through 
various structures that make up the political system. At this level, order, stability as 
well as the ability to make creative adaptation to the changing conditions are the 
yardsticks by which performance of the functions is measured. These three levels of 
functions spell out the activities that need to be carried out in order to provide certain 
political goods to the system. However, Almond did not further establish a causal 
relationship between the fulfillment of these functions and political goods, and the 
ability of the system to persist or adapt to changes. 
Almond, Powell and Mundt, 1993, p. 11. 
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Political development: differentiation and secularization 
The concept of political development will be adopted in this study. The concept 
is defined as the results that the existing structures and culture of the political system 
are unable to cope with the problem or challenge without further structural 
differentiation and cultural secularization.^^ This study adopts the concept mainly in 
terms of structural differentiation. This developmental dimension is a more dynamic 
aspect of the structural-functional approach as it captures the processes that a system 
adapts itself in order to respond to the changes in the environment. Almond introduces 
the concept and aims at studying how political structures interact with one another 
and keep reorganizing. 
During the process of differentiation, roles will become more specialized and 
autonomous. New types of specialized role, structure or subsystem may also emerge 
or be created. Almond's assumption of specialization and differentiation rests upon 
historical experiences. Almond refers to the works of social scientists like Durkheim, 
Toennies and Weber and points out that the specialization of political organizations 
are purposively directed to better perform political functions, which contributed to the 
enhancement of the capability of political systems?^ Almond and Powell summarized 
from history that specializations of political structures usually take place when the 
size of political system increases: The development of bureaucracy was due to the 
increasingly complex decision-making and application process. When the 
bureaucratic empires continue to grow in size, ethnic groups as well as social and 
occupational strata become more differentiated, and therefore a more or less open and 
36 Almond and Powell, 1978，p. 21. 
37 Almond, and Powel, 1978, pp. 68-69. 
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legitimate process of struggle over political policy goals emerges. The development in 
political input structures for articulation of interests, aggregation of demands and 
making of policy decisions would be the result. The emergence of specialized input 
structure would also be accompanied by the specialization of policy and system 
O o 
structures. Political party is an example of modem political structure that manifests 
high level of internal structural differentiation and specialization in which individual 
roles are specialized to perform different tasks within the structure. In political parties, 
there are roles of members, activists and party officials and within the leadership role; 
there is much additional specialization such as special research analysis staffs, 
organizing agents and candidates.^^ According to Almond, size and complexity of 
tasks and issues are two of the variables internal to the political system that shape the 
form and degree of specialization. In short, the sake of efficiency and better 
performance or legitimacy under the challenges and stresses in both domestic and 
international environment lead to the internal structural change of a system. 
The advantage of differentiation is that each individual can then concentrate all 
his or her energy on doing one small task very well. The reward of specialization 
seems to increase with the size and complexity of the political structure,® In spite of 
the benefits, specialization may lead to the problem of coordination. It is because "the 
creation of specialized roles may mean that various subimits will be made up of 
individuals performing similar tasks". In Blau's study of the size and differentiation of 
welfare agencies, he points out that little differentiation would take place beyond a 
particular threshold because the costs of coordination between different roles may 
38 Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 71. 
39 Almond and Powell, 1978，p. 59. 
40 Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 60. 
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cancel out the benefits of differentiation."^^ Therefore, political systems are usually 
the mixture of undifferentiated roles and specialized roles in which undifferentiated 
roles help to overcome the problems of communication and coordination.^� 
The idea of development spells out the self-regulative propensity of political 
system. It assumes that political systems would adjust themselves structurally in order 
to deal with the changes and pressures in the internal and external environments 
though structural differentiation may not be an inevitable trend in political systems 
over time.43 
Application of structural-fimctionalism in this study 
In this study the key concepts of functionalism will be applied to analyze the 
Hong Kong Ombudsman. The Office will be treated as a political structure that 
performs certain functions, which helps the smooth operation of the political system. 
The differentiation and specialization of the Ombudsman institution as a response to 
the internal stresses and the changes in external environment will be examined. The 
roles and functions that the Ombudsman played since the formal establishment of the 
Office in 1986 will be discussed in the second part of this study. 
41 Almond and Powell, 1978，pp. 60-61. 
42 Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 71. 
43 Almond and Powell, 1978, p. 20. 
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2.3 Literature on the Ombudsman 
This section aims at reviewing two aspects of ombudsman institution by 
using the structural functional perspective. The first aspect is to introduce different 
types of ombudsman institution as a political structure. Political parties as a political 
structure is adopted in many countries but vary in forms. Some countries adopt two 
party system and some run multiparty system. Ombudsman institution is the same 
case that can be classified into different types and models. The second aspect is about 
the functions of ombudsman institutions. Almond suggests in his structural functional 
approach that the same structure can perform very different functions in different 
political systems because their structural characteristics and this can affect policy 
outputs and outcomes. This assumption applies to ombudsman institutions too. The 
functions of ombudsman institutions vary from system to system. This part tries to 
investigate the functions of different ombudsman institutions in the light of structural 
characteristics and environments of different political systems. 
A. Classification of ombudsman institutions bv mandates 
The International Bar Association defines the ombudsman institution as: 
“ a n office provided for by the constitution or by action of the Legislature 
or Parliament, who receives complaints from aggrieved persons against 
government agencies, officials, and who has the power to investigate, 
recommend corrective action, and issues reports.，，44 
Nilsson points out that this definition of the ombudsman, "like other good definition, 
is one of principle and is general". The ombudsman institution spread into different 
44 Nilsson, 1983，"The Ombudsman As Mediator, Reformer, And Righter?" in Caiden ed, 1983, p. 65. 
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countries through out the world over the past 40 years. It is not difficult to expect that 
the institution located in different countries should be different from the founding one 
in Sweden in 1809. One method to classify the institution as well as to understand the 
variations is by their mandates. 
The most conventional form of ombudsman is described as "governmental 
ombudsman with general jurisdiction over administrative conduct"'^^ The mandate of 
the classical ombudsman model is to supervise the general administrative conduct of 
the executive branch.46 The office is usually given the power to deal with complaints, 
to investigative on the ombudsman's own initiative, to recommend ways of 
improvement and corrective measures and to issue reports to the public. While the 
jurisdiction of ombudsman cover most of the administrative organs, the police, the 
military and the courts are usually excluded. Gottehrer and Hostina state that the 
ombudsman should possess some irreducible minimum characteristics of 
independence, impartiality and fairness, credibility of the review process and 
confidentiality.'^^ The ombudsman institution can operate at national and or local 
level or even at supranational level. Countries like Canada, Italy and America only 
have ombudsman institution operating at the state or local level to differing degree. 
The European Union has a classical ombudsman that focus on redress and control at 
the union level. 
A second category is the hybrid ombudsman and it is now a large and increasing 
important category. The mandates and roles of hybrid ombudsman are much wider 
then the classical ombudsman. In addition to the administrative audit function that 
45 Gregory & Giddings, 2000，p. 8. 
46 Reif，2004, p. 2. 
47 Gottehrer & Hostina, "The Classical Ombudsman" in Gregory and Giddings, 2000，p. 401. 
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classical ombudsmen perform, the institutions are given other mandates like human 
right protection, anti-corruption, leadership code enforcement, state audit and 
environmental protection. A broad scope of human rights are protected by these 
hybrid ombudsman included the first generation civil and political rights, the second 
general economic, social and cultural rights and a few offices cover the third 
generation collective rights too.48 The hybrid ombudsman institutions are commonly 
found in the third wave democracies in sub-Saharan African, Asian, East and Central 
European, Pacific and Caribbean regions.'^^ These institutions established in greater 
number in the 1990s. Linda Reif account for this development by the increased 
interest of the international community, especially development agencies and donor 
governments, in good governance and national human rights institutions^® and the 
prominent problems of human right violations and corruptions. Some ombudsmen 
with human right mandates, such as that in Ghana and Namibia, can investigate 
private persons or entities.^ ^  According to Reif, fifty percent of classical and hybrid 
ombudsman institutions can be categorized as human right ombudsmen. Although 
some classical ombudsmen do not express the human right protection mandate in 
related legislation and constitution, they do handle cases with human right aspects if it 
is related to maladministration. 
Another category of ombudsman institution is the "speciality", "single-purpose" 
or "single-sector" ombudsman that has a much narrower mandate. This kind of 
ombudsman confined to a particular field, activities or specialized subject matter, such 
as the environment, health service, housing, the armed forces, the police, or prison; or 
48 Gregory & Giddings，2000，p. 10. 
49 Reif, 2004, p. 10. Gregory & Giddings，2000, p. 9. 
Reif, 2004, p. 215. 
Reif, 2004，pp. 225-236. 
52 Reif, 2004, p. 11. 
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it may relate to the needs of particular groups such as ethnic minorities, indigenous 
peoples, the disabled or children. This kind of institution can be found in Sweden, 
Finland, Norway, Britain, and Canada and else. A great variety of Long-term Care and 
Prisons Ombudsman exist in the United States.^^ These ombudsman institutions may 
or may not have the powers investigation. But a few of them may even make binding 
decisions or impose sanctions. These institutions often have other functions such as 
education and advocating for law reform. ^ ^ The single purpose ombudsman is 
another direction of development, which contrast to the hybrid ombudsman. The 
former tends to further specialize to deal with one or two policy areas or departments 
but the later diversify their mandates to cover more than maladministration. 
The fourth ombudsman type is the executive organizational ombudsman created 
by government departments, agencies or state corporations. These "in-house 
complaints mechanisms" have mandates to address external disputes between the 
department and its public clients and/or settle employment-related disputes between 
the government body and its employees.^^ It is commented by Gregory and Giddings 
that these offices, unlike classical ombudsman, are not wholly independent of the 
agencies they investigate and can be seen as part of administrative apparatus of the 
authorities over which they exercise jurisdiction.^^ These office usually do not has 
strong powers to investigate and may be unable to keep their records confidential if it 
is demanded by courts, government bodies or laws to disclose. Moreover, there is a 
hierarchy between a general legislative ombudsman and a departmental one. 
Whenever the department falls within the jurisdiction of a legislative ombudsman, its 
“Gregory & Giddings, 2000，pp. 8-9. Reif，2004, pp. 34-38. 
54 Reif, 2004, pp. 34-35. 
55 Reif, 2004, p. 40. 
56 Gregory & Giddings，2000，p. 10. 
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departmental ombudsman will also under the jurisdiction of the legislative 
ombudsman. 
A final type of ombudsman institution is the private sector ombudsman. These 
ombudsman institutions in the private sector have the mandates in a specific industry 
or service sector can be divided into three main groups. One group is created by 
legislation that aimed to resolve complaints made by consumers against individual 
service providers. Although the institutions are mainly found in service areas such as 
financial services, pensions, insurance, telecommunication, public utilities and legal 
services, these institutions are public bodies regulated by statue. The second group of 
private sector ombudsman also has mandates in some entire industries or service and 
take complaints from consumers but is created by the representative body of those 
industries. Members of industry come together and draft rules governing the powers 
and functions of the self-regulatory ombudsman. A final type of private sector 
ombudsman found in individual institution or companies. These ombuds mechanisms 
may deal with both internal workplace complaints or disputes between employers and 
employees and complaints from external bodies such clients, customers or newspaper 
readers. 
There are variations on the ombudsman concept in regards of the mandates of the 
institutions. The variety of mandates can be the result of the needs, history and/or 
structural characteristics of different political systems. However, there are criticisms 
on the overuse of ombudsman title leading to the confusion of the public. There are 
some ombuds mechanisms lacking the powers of investigation and independence that 
a "genuine" ombudsman would require. The independence and power of some private 
sector ombudsmen and executive ombudsmen are being questioned. The following 
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section discusses other ways of classifying the ombudsman institution besides their 
mandates in order to have a more sophisticated understanding on the variations of the 
ombudsman concept and their political implications. The discuss will restricted to the 
study of the public sector ombudsman, that is the classical ombudsman and hybrid 
ombudsman operating in the national level. It is because the research concerns about 
the functions of ombudsman as a political structures. 
B. Models of ombudsman 
The various mandates of ombudsman that just discussed provide us with general 
knowledge on the possible tasks of ombudsman institutions. To further discuss how 
the ombudsman as a political structure is like, this part introduces the models that 
theorize the aspects that differentiate ombudsman institutions from one another. 
In a study of the ombudsman institutions in the European Union, Heede developed 
five theoretical models of ombudsman.^^ These models are ideal types that contain 
some clear-cut rules and regulations of different ombudsman plans. The models 
differentiate the ombudsman plans by seven aspects, namely: access, mandate in 
organizational sense, mandate in functional sense, review criterion, investigative 
powers, decision, and enforcing powers. For access, it refers to what kinds of 
individual or party have access to the ombudsman, whether the institution has its own 
initiative to investigate and if the decision of the ombudsman can be review by court^^ 
or the legislature. Mandates refer to the types of organization and the kinds of 
Heede, 2000, Ch. 4 Models of ombudsman. 
58 Heede points out in most occasions, it means positive review conduct by an administrative court that 
decide whether the decision comply legal duties instead of a negative review perform by a civil court 
unless the decision of the ombudsman led to quantifiable damage resulted from criticizing a civil 
servant. Heede, 2000, pp. 87 & 90. 
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elements or activities^^ of the organizations are investigable. Review criterion is 
about whether the institution is empowered to conduct legality review or non-legality 
review. 6G Powers of investigation concerns about the extent of power that the 
ombudsman has during the process,� As for decision, the ombudsmen should be 
empowered to mediate and to issue recommendation for correction, say request a new 
decision or request compensation for damages, if his function is to address grievances. 
On the other hand, the ombudsman may have the function to inform the public about 
the results of his inquiry, and be given the power to recommend alternative decisions 
or modification on laws to prevent the same problem from happening in the future. 
Finally, enforcing powers is about whether the ombudsman has judicial or political 
enforcing power.^^ Different ombudsman plans have a spectrum of choice for these 
five aspects. 
The choices of different ombudsman plan for each of the seven aspects are 
depending on two variables: the redress and control orientation of the ombudsman, 
and the institutional relations between the ombudsman institution and the exiting or 
other redress and control mechanisms. When a political system considers establishing 
am ombudsman institution, it implies something extra to the existing institutional 
59 The available choices are factual acts, individual decisions and general measures like legislative acts 
and policy decisions. Heede，2000, p. 88. 
Legal review is about the question of law. Ombudsman interprets and applies written (or judge-made) 
rules of positive or negative obligations when conducting a legality review. Non-legality review is a 
question about good administration derived from considerations of a common sense of fairness and 
justice and the expectations citizens are entitled to. It allows the ombudsman to have a more extensive 
review about the merits of decisions than a legality review does. Heede, 2000，pp. 90-91. 
61 The extent can vary from access to files to prosecute (order a prosecution of) a civil servant who 
hinders the investigation. Heede, 2000，P. 92. 
62 Judicial enforcing powers may include the power to start or request court proceeding or ruling 
during investigation or enforcing the ombudsman's recommendations. The power can be in indirect 
form like to decide on whether the complainant can have free legal aid. Political enforcing powers can 
be in form of reporting to and seeking enforcement for his finding and recommendations from the 
parliament. Heede, 2000，P. 92. 
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arrangements is needed.^^ The need can either be on an additional redress or control 
or both mechanism. This assumption reveals that the functions of ombudsman in 
Heede's models are only two fold. Heede believes that legislators of different 
countries need to decide on the two questions when designing the institution and 
points our a particular combination of answers for the two questions would lead to a 
corresponding choice on each of the seven aspects and as a result contributed to the 
five models of ombudsman plan. Take an example to illustrate how choice for the two 
questions affects the design of institution: if the ombudsman institution is designed to 
redress grievances of citizens, and assigned it with jurisdiction to cover the areas that 
are not cover by law of court or administrative tribunals, the legislator would then 
need to adjust the seven aspects concerning the powers, mandates and other rule and 
regulations of the ombudsman so as to make it performs the expected function and 
fulfills their purpose, in this case is to provide an additional redress channel to 
supplement courts. 
Heede clarifies that both the concept of control and redress are described as 
'powerless' supervisory mechanisms. Control is when the supervisor seeks to 
influence policy for the benefit of the citizens as a whole whereas redress is when the 
supervisor seeks to remedy an individual's g r i e v a n c e s . 6 4 It is points out in Hill's 
study that this powerlessness of reversing administrative decisions directly is found to 
be a common attribute of the ombudsman in the empirical studies of several authors. 
63 Heede, 2000，p. 79. 
64 The effect of control an ombudsman has "does not depend on a relationship of power between the 
supervisor and the supervised, but on a certain activity - scrutinizing and publicizing - which has the 
purpose of increasing the quality of the decision-making process and its outcome which - in turn 
increases its acceptability in the eyes of the citizens." As for redress it is remedy-less because a redress 
mechanism does not ensure a decision is modified or overruled. It might have the effect that the 
position of an individual is remedied through compensation for damages or other forms of remedies but 
such effect is on the authority's own motion instead of enforced upon by the ombudsman. 
Heede, 2000, pp. 93-96. 
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Ombudsman is empowered only to investigate, criticized, recommend and publicize 
and this finding echoes the definition made by the International Bar Association.^^ On 
the other hand, there are three possible forms of institutional relations with the 
existing supervising mechanisms. An ombudsman model can either operates in areas 
falling outside the competence of the existing supervising mechanisms, or has an 
overlapping mandates with them, or with mandate extend to supervise the activities of 
all public authorizes including those supervising authorities.^^ 
Five theoretical models of ombudsman are formed which indicate five different 
combinations of the institution's orientation toward redress or control and the 
institutional relationship with the existing means. Also, a matrix that combines the 
possible choices of an ombudsman's mandate and powers with the five different 
ombudsman models is formed, clarifying the relationship between the models and the 
rules and regulations governing specific ombudsman plans.^^ The first model is the 
extra-judicial ombudsman redress model that seeks to complement the court. It 
reviews the activities of public authorities that are either not subject to review under 
administrative law or do not lead to damage that can be quantifies by a court. The 
ombudsman enforces non-legally binding principles of good administrative behaviour 
but its decisions are not legally or politically enforceable. Decisions are in form of 
additional dispute resolution like mediation and recommendation for correction. 
Countries like Netherlands and Canada 
Another type of redress ombudsman is the discount alternative ombudsman 
65 Hill summarized Moore, Rowat and Anderson, "The Self-perceptions of Ombudsmen: A 
Comparative Survey", in Caiden ed., 1983，Ch. 4, pp. 43-44. 
66 Heede, 2000，p. 100. 
67 Heede, 2000, pp. 100-112. 
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redress model. It is created to supplement the courts in order to reduce threshold of 
access for addressees of administrative decisions. The complaints are in the nature of 
appeal, in which the complainants seeking a new administrative decision through the 
supervision of the ombudsman. The ombudsman act as a pre-administrative court that 
conducts legality review and his decisions are legally binding. His decision can be 
inform of mediation for recommendation for correction. He is able to bring court 
proceedings against an administrative authority if recommendations are not being 
followed or has indirect judicial power of granting free legal aid. The Danish 
ombudsman that regarded as a quasi-administrative court is similar to the model 
though with some elements that do not fit well into the model. 
The other three models are control ombudsman. Heede points out that there is 
relationship between a control ombudsman and a need for (additional) legitimacy. The 
first question should be asked regarding the relationship is whose legitimacy is the 
ombudsman should seek to improve. The Quango ombudsman control model help to 
improve the legitimacy of the executive by ensuring all state authorities are 
accountable to someone when political accountability to the parliament is not 
available. Quangos or other autonomous public authorities are found in modem 
democracies with executive power of which the legitimizing power is the expertise 
and the participatory way of decision-making.^^ A quango ombudsman enable a 
general supervision on the activities of all autonomous bodies enhance the legitimacy 
of the executive. The ombudsman can investigate both complaints and commenced on 
his own initiative and conduct both legality and non-legality review. However, the 
possibilities for judicial or political enforcement of the ombudsman are limited 
because the activities supervised by the ombudsman are outside the mandate of the 
68 Heed, 2000, pp. 101. 
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parliament and the judiciary is only competent with activities under the ombudsman 
jurisdiction. The ombudsman can recommend for prevention and bring a prosecution. 
The oldest Swedish Ombudsman who supervises the civil servants, which in the 
Swedish constitutional setting cannot be held accountable by the parliament, is similar 
to this type. 
The citizens' ombudsman control model is created not only because the executive 
public authorities need additional legitimacy but also the controllers (whether political 
or judicial). The task of the Citizens' ombudsman is to protect the State - its 
organization and its institutions - against general mistrust {mefiance) of its citizens, 
stimulating the legitimacy of the public authority. The most important way to ensure 
citizens' trust towards the state is to acknowledge them their fundamental human 
rights are being respected by public authorities.^^ So, the model is a designed as a 
super-ombudsman whose mandates extends to all the parts of the polity and may 
include supervising authorities such as the parliament and the courts, and focus on 
both general and individuals acts with an emphasis on protecting fundamental human 
rights.70 Recommendations of the ombudsman should receive political support and 
judicial review should be available for cases involving the breach of fundamental 
rights. Portugal, Spain, many African hybrid ombudsman have a resemblance to this 
model. 
Finally, the parliamentary ombudsman control model is to improve the legitimacy 
of the executive because the indirect legitimacy the executive received through 
parliament is no longer sufficient due to the extending executive powers. To assist the 
69 Heede, 2000，p. 108. 
70 Heede, 2000, p. 101 & 108-109. 
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parliament is the distinguish feature and the very purpose of the Parliamentary 
ombudsman model. So, the ombudsman has a restricted functional autonomy and 
forms parts of parliamentary control. 71 The ombudsman starts an inquiry at the 
request of the parliament excluding both own-initiative inquiries and direct access for 
citizens. The mandate is restricted to the area under parliamentary supervision. In 
functional sense, the mandates focused on general measures but may also include 
administrative decision that cannot be challenged in court. The ombudsman adopts 
non-legality review and does equity. A parliamentary ombudsman will report to the 
parliament on the outcome of an investigation and may also add suggestions on how 
to achieve a higher level of good administration. The Parliamentary Commission in 
the United Kingdom is largely in line with this model though with some deviations in 
mandates and the ombudsman activities can be review judicially. 
The five models developed by Heede are ideal types that classify different 
ombudsman plans by their redress or control orientation and their institutional 
relationship with the existing means. The benefits of the models are: first, they 
provide us with a more comprehensive understanding on how may ombudsmen 
differentiate from one another by comparing their different aspects. Secondly, it 
provides some clear-cut characteristics concerning the jurisdiction, powers, rules and 
regulations of an ombudsman that serve as possible models or blueprint of 
institutional designs. Finally, the characteristics of different ombudsman plans reflect 
the needs of different political systems and their influence on the design ombudsman 
institutions. Although ombudsman institutions in real life are usually deviated from 
the clear-cut theoretical models due the fact that the institutions are designed and set 
up for more then one purpose, it is not difficult to identify some close representations 
71 Heede, 2000，p. 110. 
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of each type. 
C. Roles and functions of ombudsman 
The models developed by Heede are some ideal types of organizational or 
institutional designs of ombudsman. The purpose, jurisdiction, powers and regulations 
of ombudsmen are clear cut enough for countries to refer to in the process of 
designing and installing an ombudsman institution. These models provide us with 
some theoretical understanding on the possible internal and external arrangements of 
an ombudsman. In this part, the actual roles and functions of ombudsman institutions 
of different political systems will be summarized and discussed. The discussion will 
start with generalizing the factors affecting the roles and functions of an ombudsman. 
Three factors can be summarized from Nilsson, Aufrecht and Hertogh, Nebenzahl 
and Hill, which determine the ombudsman institutions in reality. The first factor 
contributing to the variations is what the legislature or parliament has decided about 
his activities, what tasks and what functions have been assigned to Nilsson 
refers to the situation of Sweden and points out that administrative structure is an 
important factor affecting the content of legislation.^^ The setting, tradition and 
practice of political system can also affect the legislature's decision about the function 
of the ombudsman. Through the legislation, one may able to interpret the roles and 
functions of an ombudsman institution by analyzing its mandates and organizational 
design. However, Aufrecht and Hertogh state that although it is useful to begin an 
ombudsman study by reviewing the legislation that created the office and the 
72 Nilsson, "The Ombudsman As Mediator, Reformer, And Righter?" in Caiden ed., 1983，p. 65. 
73 Nilsson, "The Ombudsman As Mediator, Reformer, And Righter?" in Caiden ed., 1983, p. 66. 
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parliamentary debates that led to the ombudsman act, but this approach limited to the 
official goals of an ombudsman. They continue to point out ombudsman studies show 
that several essential features of a system have developed through practice and cannot 
be found in the official goals.？斗 Nilsson believes the legislation nevertheless depicts 
fairly correctly on the factual situation, he raises another factor that the person or 
persons exercising it undoubtedly determine both how it functions in practice and how 
it is regarded.75 When formal legislation gives the ombudsman considerable scope for 
personal initiative and action, whether the ombudsman utilize the room and how, will 
depend on the ombudsman's disposition and view of his task and on how he wishes to 
carry it out. The third factor determines an ombudsman is complaints he received. In a 
study on the New Zealand Ombudsman, Hill puts that "Although the Ombudsman has 
the power to be self-activating, nearly all of his investigations are initiated by citizens' 
complaints. Hence it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Ombudsman's role is 
largely determined by his complaints''.^^ In discussing the role of ombudsman by his 
direct and indirect impact, Nebenzahl also points out that it is not mainly the 
disposition of complaints, but at least as much the complaints themselves, determined 
what the direct impact of the ombudsman can be/^ The role of the ombudsman in 
this sense is rather passive that depends on the subject matters of his complaints. 
However, the ombudsman would be less passive if he is empowered to initiate his 
own investigation. After introducing the factors determining an ombudsman, the 
following parts discuss the possible roles and functions of ombudsman with reference 
to the mentioned sources. 
74 Aufrecht & Hertogh, "Evaluating Ombudsman Systems", in Gregory & Giddings ed.，2000, p. 398. 
75 Nilsson, "The Ombudsman As Mediator, Reformer, And Righter?" in Caiden ed., 1983，p. 65. 
76 Hill, 1977, p. 79. 
77 Nebenzahl, "The Direct And Indirect Impact Of The Ombudsman's Role", in Caiden ed., 1983, p. 
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Uphold accountability of government 
Ombudsmen play fours main roles in the political system of which they exist. 
The first role is to enhance the quality of democratic accountability. It is a common 
role and function of the ombudsmen with a longer history in mature liberal 
democracies since they were created to improve the accountability of the 
administration to people in the era of "big govemment".^^ The problem of democratic 
accountability originated from the rationalization and expansion of public 
administration. Hill points out that the growth of bureaucracy intensified the ancient 
tension between the Leviathan's demands for authority and administrative efficiency 
and the democrats' goals of executive accountability and responsiveness. ^^  
Bureaucracy expand in size and functional scope due to its expanded administrative 
functions like tax collection and provision of social welfare and security in modem 
governments. Although there has been creation of different institutions, such as courts, 
representative assemblies, political parties and free press, however, these mechanisms 
are still somehow insufficient to control arbitrary governmental act. It is due to the 
bureaucratic tendency of rigid, unresponsive, inefficient, dehumanizing and abusing 
power. Hill raises a more important reason that "bureaucracy enjoys strategic power 
advantages over the traditional governmental control devices" 8。，which accounts for 
the needs for the development of various control mechanisms. 
On the other hand, in the more recent trend of New Public Management (NPM), 
ombudsman plays the same role of enhancing democratic accountability but 
78 Gregory and Giddings, 2000，p. 1. 
79 Hill, 1977, p. 4. 
8�Hil l , 1977, p. 8. 
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confronting some new problems.^^ In order to maximize the efficiency, effectiveness 
and economy of public service provision, government extends market forces into the 
public domain, which implies its downsizing. The basic belief of NPM is that a 
market-based system can make public services become more responsive to the 
choices and preferences of individual users and is more efficient than bureaucratic 
forms of organization, which tend to be wasteful of public resources. The effect of 
NPM on the ombudsman is new types of complaint arise. Complaints on the drop in 
the quality of services and the disappearance of services due to the reduction in staff 
number and resources are brought to the ombudsman. However, there is the difficulty 
of finding the entity that is accountable because private service providers are outside 
the jurisdiction of ombudsman, so, the ombudsman does not has direct control over 
the service providers. Meanwhile, the introduction of citizens or clients' charter raises 
the expectation of citizens on the quality of public services tends to bring forth more 
complaints. Under the NPM ombudsman assumes more responsibility of ensuring the 
authority's accountability instead of less in spite of some new difficulties of holding 
the agencies accountable. 
Before proceeding to discuss how ombudsman help to uphold accountability, there 
should be some clarification on the concept. Schelder, Diamond and Plattner's divide 
the concept of accountability into vertical and horizontal. Horizontal accountability is 
defined as "the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public agencies 
and branches of government" while vertical accountability is imposed on 
ft) 
governments by voters through periodic free and fair election. For horizontal 
accountability, there are different forms, which include administrative accountability 
81 Gregory & Giddings, "The Ombudsman and the New Public Management", in Gregory & Giddings 
ed.，2000, pp. 425-440. 
82 Reif, 2004，p. 59. 
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that reviews the expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts; legal 
accountability that monitors the observance of legal rule; constitutional accountability 
that evaluates whether legislative acts are in accordance with constitutional rules; and 
financial accountability that subjects the use of public money by state officials to 
norms of austerity, efficiency, and propriety. ^ ^ Classical and hybrid ombudsman 
offices play a role in upholding administrative, legal and constitutional accountability 
through conducting impartial investigation, recommending changes to law, reporting 
to the legislature and the public, or even bringing court action. Some hybrid 
ombudsman with anti-corruption and leadership code mandates also supply financial 
accountability. Apart from forms, Schelder also classify political accountability into 
two levels: answerability and enforcement. The former refers to the power to hold the 
"accountable actors" give information to, and explain the facts and reason of their 
decisions, whereas the later is composed of punishment or other negative sanctions 
for inappropriate behaviour. It is pointed out by Reif that most classical and hybrid 
ombudsmen only possess the answerability element of accountability unless some 
"soft" types of sanctions such as making recommendations to correct poor 
administration and negative publicity in ombudsman reports. For vertical 
accountability, ombudsman institution is a mechanism for the populace to indicate 
their displeasure with the manner in which government is being administered. The 
ombudsmen give citizens a direct access of being heard in the government. Nebenzahl 
raise a point that "with the right to complain, the individual citizen is given a means 
of directly influencing the administration more specifically and, in its won time and 
place, more powerfully, them by casting his vote as one of many in an election.，，84 
This points out the possibility of how an individual holds the government accountable 
83 Reif quoted Schedler, Reif, 2004，p. 60. 
84 Nebenzahl, 1983，"The Direct And Indirect Impact Of The Ombudsman's Role", in Caiden ed., 1983, 
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directly apart from elections. Chandler also put emphasis on the availability of such a 
means for complain: "open government alone does not, however, ensure democratic 
accountability. This must also be secured by establishing means that enable citizens or 
organizations to secure redress against the bureaucracy through offices such as the 
ombudsman, the courts or tribunals.. 
Swedish Ombudsman acted as a prosecutor during the first one hundred year of 
the institution can prosecute an official who is considered to be guilty of a serious 
fault. In less serious cases, the ombudsman can commit an erring or remiss official to 
a disciplinary procedure. For ombudsmen who do not have enforcement power, they 
held the public administrator to accountable to their acts and decisions by 
investigating citizens' complaints, publicizing maladministration and providing 
remedies. Facing the problem of accountability led by the NPM, the New South Wales 
Ombudsman holding the principle that a public sector body which contracts out a 
service remains accountable for the way the service is provided and this remain the 
case even where the service is provided under contract. She emphasized that agency's 
contractual arrangements with the contractor should be adequate to ensure that if the 
service is defective, the agency can respond to fix the problem by remedial actions in 
terms of fines or penalties (possibly paid to the complainant), otherwise, "this clearly 
amount to poor administrative practice". There should also be proper monitoring of 
contract. 86 The British Ombudsman (Parliamentary Commissioner) pointed out, 
"Parliament had the foresight to provide that not just the administrative actions carried 
out by but also the administrative actions carried out on behalf of departments and 
public sector bodies should also be investigable by the Ombudsman." Besides, the 
85 Chandler ed., 2000, p. 11. 
86 Gregory & Giddings, "The Ombudsman and the New Public Management", in Gregory & Giddings 
ed, 2000, pp. 431-432. 
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British Ombudsman explained in a case that the targets expressed in the Charters are 
mandatory in which the citizen has an expectation to compensation should the 
promise not be met or be missed. 
Promoting good governance 
Good governance is not a distinct concept from accountability but a much 
broader one. Accountability is one element of good governance. By good governance, 
the government is not merely required to be responsible to the effects caused by their 
actions and decisions; it is expected to posses some other virtues. Both local and 
international community defines the components of good governance. The content of 
good governance is kept revising and expanding. 
Reif explained that the World Bank adopted the concept of "governance" in 1989 
to connote "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs". "Good 
governance" was considered to comprise efficient public service, reliable judicial 
Q Q 
system and an administration that is accountable to its public. The conception is 
further expanded to include its interconnection with democracy, human rights, and the 
interrelationship between civil society and the private sector and the public sector, as 
well as contains an economic dimension. The United Nations Development 
Programme addressed the concept as follows: 
participatory, transparent, accountable and efficient. It promotes the rule of law 
and equal justice under the law. It also recognizes that governance is exercised 
by the private sector and civil society, as well as the state... 
87 Gregory & Giddings, "The Ombudsman and the New Public Management", in Gregory & Giddings 
ed., 2000, pp. 434 & 436. 
88 Reif, 2004, p. 63. 
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The UN Commission on Human Rights defined the concept in a similar way but 
added the responsiveness of government to the needs and aspirations of the people. 
The definitions adopted by other international organizations and individual donor 
states are more or less the same but may include the efforts to prevent and combat 
corruption, and transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic 
and financial resources that ensure equitable and sustainable development. Economic 
dimension includes economic liberalization and access to information.^^ The content 
of the concept is inclusive but controversial. The UN Commission on Human Rights 
expressly recognized that good governance practices differ from country to country 
and the responsibility of defining the concept and mode of its implementation rests 
with individual countries. It is criticized by Nira Wickmarasinghe that the concept is 
"an essentialist and totalizing ideology, based on Western ideology". Van Boven also 
noted "the standard of good governance is typically unilaterally imposed by 
international agency and developed state donors on developing nations".^® 
The UNDP has suggested the establishment of ombudsman and human rights 
oversight bodies for strengthening human good governance. Ombudsmen are assigned 
a wide variety of mandates in the new democracies like Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia and many others. The role of ombudsman in building 
good governance is being expressly recognized at either the domestic level or 
constitutional and statue law governing hybrid ombudsmen.^^ Ombudsman play the 
role by enabling members of the public to participate in the regulation of the conduct 
of public administration by lodging complaints on maladministration and human 
rights breaches and/or financial impropriety. Giving the ombudsman an access to 
89 Reif，2004, pp. 62-77. 
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information, laws and procedural mechanism to review government conduct could 
enhance transparency, accountability and human right standards. Besides, an 
ombudsman is also mandated to investigate broad areas of administrative legality and 
injustice to improve procedural fairness. Despite of the wide mandates, the actual 
impact of an ombudsman on improving good governance is subjected to the 
availability of financial, human resources and judicial and democratic support of the 
individual country. The classical ombudsmen with a mandate restricted to auditing 
administrative practice promote good administration by identifying systematic faults 
and recommending ways to improve general administrative practice and procedures. 
Guidance is offered to governmental bodies. For example, the Ireland ombudsman 
issued a document titled "Ombudsman's Guide to Standards of Best Practice for 
Public Servants", the Ombudsman of British Columbia produced an "Administrative 
Fairness Checklist" and the Hong Kong Ombudsman produced an "Administrative 
Ethics Checklist". The Danish office helps to ensure performance by scrutinizing the 
merit of policies of administrative authorities.^^ Human rights perspective is brought 
when handling complaints and the intention of making the bureaucracy more humane 
and responsive making the ombudsman as "a catalyst in the redirection of public 
administration to a more public service oriented culture”.93 The classical ombudsman 
takes an adviser role of making recommendations. 
Citizens' protector 
Caiden, Macdermot & Sandler put that "a meaningful ombudsman office takes 
seriously its role of "citizen's defender, grievance man, or public watchdog" against 
92 Heede, 2000，p. 82. 
93 Gregory & Giddings, "The Ombudsman Institution: Growth and Development", in Gregory & 
Giddings ed., 2000, p. 2 & 12. 
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public bungling and abuses of power, particularly arbitrariness that allows "a citizen's 
right to be crushed by the vast juggernaut of the government administrative 
machinery.，,94 The ombudsman's role as a defender of citizens' democratic rights is 
not in contrast to role of promoting accountability and good governance. Due to the 
expansion of the overbearing bureaucratic states, the ombudsman was created to 
control the administration on one hand and to redress the aggrieved citizens who are 
caught in the interaction with the state and suffered from injustice or other kinds of 
maladministration on the other. To redress grievances or to defense citizens' rights can 
also be said as a kind of democratic control over bureaucracy. The main difference is 
the role as a protector is defined vis-a-vis individual citizen, which focus on redress 
and is more particularistic; while the role of enhancing accountability, especially the 
horizontal one, and promoting good governance is about exerting control on the 
administration as a whole. 
Ombudsman as the "citizen's defender, grievance man, or public watchdog" are 
pointing to the role of protecting citizens from being harmed by administrative 
wrongdoing and ensuring their right to receive remedy when they are suffered and 
when appropriate. The New Zealand Act takes this role of redressing grievance as the 
primary function of Ombudsman.^^ The New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
explained its suggestion on establishing an ombudsman that: "Any person adversely 
affected by an official action of a public authority should have the right to question 
that action simply, cheaply and quickly; and procedures should be available to him 
which are fair, impartial and open."^^ The suggestion should be rested upon the 
Caiden, Macdermot & Sandler quoted Rowat, "The Institution of Ombudsman", in Caiden ed., 1983， 
P. 6 
5 Gregory & Giddings quoted a former Swedish Ombudsman, "The Ombudsman Institution: Growth 
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premise of promoting responsible and good government and taking the protection of 
citizens' rights as a virtue of good administration. Therefore, how far can the 
ombudsman protect citizens from the effect of bad administration depends on the 
understanding of a particular country on good governance and the degree of 
responsibility assigned to the ombudsman. Basically, citizens can complain to the 
ombudsman about maladministration in the forms of rudeness, delay, partiality, 
harshness and failure to give reasons as listed by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission. The conception would vary from country to country and be amended 
from time to time. The hybrid ombudsman in new democracies and post-communist 
states may look at complaints for breaches of human rights as well. For some classical 
ombudsman who does not have a human rights jurisdiction, human rights standard 
could be incorporated within an assessment of the fairness and legality of the 
decisions of public authorities.^^ 
The ombudsman is a formal avenue for the redress of grievances against 
administrative wrongdoing. The role to right the wrong is performed by receiving 
complaints, conducting investigation, and providing remedies and recommendations. 
Caiden, Macdermot & Sandler point out if people avail themselves of the service 
more the more likely the ombudsman will influence the public bureaucracy. 
Administrative justice and disputed resolution 
Ombudsman plays a role as an instrument of seeking administrative justice for 
citizens who suffered from bad administrative actions or decisions. This role is similar 
to the role as a citizens' defender or protector, who receive and investigate complaints 
97 Philip 
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that made from the public, but stress on redress and remedy and the relationship 
between the ombudsman and other legal mechanisms. When citizens suffered from 
administrative wrongdoing, they may seek redress and maybe also remedy for justice 
through different ways. A conventional choice is to bring the case to court or tribunal, 
complain to the ombudsman is also one of the choices. The choice between these 
options reflects the characteristics and differences of these channels as a redress 
mechanism and helps to reveal the role and functions of the ombudsman in relations 
to other institutions. 
Ombudsman can be a replacement of administrative court. The Danish 
Ombudsman acts as a quasi-administrative court as he review not only the procedural 
aspects of administrative decision but also the merit of policies of the administrative 
authorities; and leave the scrutiny on the conduct of individual civil servant to the 
ministers. It is because administrative courts were never established in the country 
due to some historical reasons. The task of protecting citizen's right is the modem 
welfare state and in a sense to restore the equality between citizens and the State's 
authority is leave with the ombudsman. 
The Danish Ombudsman is an extreme case that plays the role of administrative 
court. In the other end of the spectrum of the relationship between the two, 
ombudsman can be a mere supplement to courts in pursuing administrative justice. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated "the powers granted to the Ombudsman 
allow him to address administrative problem that the courts, the legislature and the 
executive cannot effectively resolve.”卯 These problems usually include matters that 
are not covered by law so that citizens cannot seek a redress through legal procedures 
98 Reif, 2004，p. 2. 
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and the matters that are not appropriate to be solved either because they are trivial or 
the intention of the complainant is not to get a remedy. The British Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration (PCA) Act also states, the Commissioner cannot 
investigate "any action in respect of which the person aggrieved has or had a remedy 
by way of proceedings in any court of law."99 The Commissioner's jurisdiction is 
restricted to the incompetence of courts or tribunals. However, the Commissioner can 
exercise his discretion to investigate in practice, "if he is satisfied that in the particular 
circumstances it is not reasonable to expect him to resort to have resorted it (the court 
oflaw)”， 
Ombudsman has a complementary role to the administrative courts other than the 
supplementary one. Some ombudsmen have an overlapping jurisdiction with courts, 
which means the ombudsman can handle any case of administrative injustice 
whenever the complained authority is within the mandates of the ombudsman. Unlike 
Britain, where exists only civil court and civil law and a good many tribunals but of 
excessive informality, the French Ombudsman exists in system of well-developed 
administrative court system and administrative law.^ ®^ Same as the supplementary 
role that the British Commissioner plays, the creation of an ombudsman institution in 
France is not to replace courts. The main purpose of the institution is to reduce the 
caseload court and increase the speed of doing administrative justice to citizens. In 
some African states, the ombudsman supplemented the courts and even work closely 
in ways of transferring to and receiving case form courts or asking for a start of legal 
proceeding when necessary. 
99 Emery, 1999，p. 258. 
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The ombudsman is an instrument of administrative justice as the court does, yet, 
they have different characteristics in terms of jurisdictions, procedures and effects and 
this explains why they are supplement or complement instead of substitute to each 
other. The above discuss the possible differences in their jurisdiction. The remaining 
of this part discusses their other characteristics in terms of their procedures and effects. 
The procedure of ombudsman is less formal and is inquisitorial while court and 
tribunal procedures are more formal and is adversarial. However, this difference is 
more prominent in Anglo American court system than in countries like those in 
Continental Europe and Latin American where courts are operated in an inquisitorial 
• 102 
basis. Besides, court procedure is lengthy and requires legal representation but 
complaining to the ombudsman is much quicker and requires no representation. So, 
the court system incurs huge cost to users while accessing to the ombudsman is free 
of charge. Harris summarized form Patricia A. Thomas that "in so many cases of 
theoretical overlap the Ombudsman is a far more "user friendly" institution from the 
point of view of the ordinary citizen than a court". ^ ^^  Owen also points out that for 
the cases that need not be settled through "ponderous legalism" ombudsman is a more 
appropriate way.io^ 
The effect of ombudsman on administrative justice has three characteristics. The 
first characteristic is the mandate to conduct non-legality review. Heede accounts for 
the significance of this mandate: "While an ombudsman's mandate is rarely restricted 
to non-legality review it forms an integral part of most ombudsman plans as it is 
generally considered to be one of the main advantages an ombudsman institution has 
over existing review mechanisms. This is because it develops the principles of good 
102 Gregory, 2001, p. 102. 
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administration beyond the court's case Emery raises a similar point on the 
significance of non-legality review conducted by ombudsman. He points out that if 
maladministration is said to include bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, 
ineptitude, arbitrariness and so on, "it is plain, in any event, that not all 
maladministration as above defined will ground a legal remedy to a complainant who 
has suffered injustice as a result of Their points are clear enough to explain on 
the insufficiency of law to cover all forms of injustice that led by maladministration 
and the inability of court to deal with the injustice that does not infringe any legal 
procedures. Emery illustrates the point by an example: "Many cases of delay or 
discourtesy may give rise to legitimate grievance but to no legal remedy." A study by 
Paul Brown on the cases of misinformation handled by the British PCA shows that the 
ombudsman are more capable to provide "equitable relief against that injustice which 
may not be remediable at law but which in a particular case is shown to have flowed 
directly from the maladministrative act or omission f a government d e p a r t m e n t . ’ ， � 7 
In the cases of misinformation, the problem is not only due to the insufficient 
legislation on the area but due the application the doctrine of estoppel by court. The 
complaints are promise to some benefits, permissions, agreements or the like from the 
authority, which based on mistakes made by the authority. However, the complainants 
cannot obtain what is expected when the mistake is discovered. In this type of cases, 
the court is forced to choose between conflicting demands of justice for the public, 
and justice for the individual. The doctrine of estoppel prevents the representor (the 
authority) from going back on his word and this cause hardship to the complainants. 
Complainants of these cases get a redress that the PCA recommends compensation 
105 Heede, 2000, p. 91. 
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should be paid in accordance to the loss suffered by the complainants (instead of 
paying what the complainants expect). 
The second characteristic of the ombudsman as an instrument of administrative 
justice is the less coercive nature of his decision and the resulted better policy impact. 
The inquisitorial form of investigation that the ombudsman adopt, for cases either 
emanated from complaints or on the ombudsman's own initiative, and the 
recommendation made in order to right administrative wrongdoing or promote 
systemic reform on administrative procedures and practices tends to be more 
acceptable to the administrators. Also, from the experiences in many fields of 
regulatory control such as air or water pollution and health and safety work, "rules are 
often made and also enforced through conferring, bargaining and compromise 
between the regulator and regulated". Therefore, it is expected that a mainly 
cooperative and conciliatory style of this kind can be more effective in the long run 
than conventional ways that rely on sanctions and deterrence, compulsion and 
coercion. 108 For dispute resolution, the ombudsman is a channel of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR), which the complainants and the authority being 
complained can settle their disputes without going to court. The ombudsman acts as a 
conciliator or mediator in cases without offense of law by and do not involve serious 
misbehaviour of public servants. It is said, "the combat mentality and aggressive 
atmosphere associated with the adversarial system breeds conflict rather than 
encourage settlement." So, to settle disputes through mediation of the ombudsman 
tend to bring a win-win solution more easily. 
The final characteristic is about the non-enforceable recommendations and 
Gregory, 2001, p. 116. 
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decisions of the ombudsman. Unlike courts, ombudsman's recommendations and 
decision are not binding. The ombudsman "is not a judge or a tribunal, and he has no 
power to make order or to reverse administrative action...his authority and influence 
derive from the fact that he is appointed by and reports to one of the principal organs 
of state, usually either the parliament or the chief e x e c u t i v e . ” � 9 The realization of 
them depends on whether the authorities would accept the recommendations 
voluntarily and whether the "pressure" from source of the ombudsman's power, which 
includes the legislature or the executive and the publicity through mass media, is 
strong enough to make the authority comply. Therefore, it c组 be said that the 
enforcement of the decision of ombudsman is not as secured as court. Besides, 
regarding the form of remedy, ombudsman can only suggest compensation and 
recommend legislation or policy change but not to reserve an administrative decision 
with the threat of punishment. 
To conclude on the role of ombudsman as an instrument of administrative and 
dispute resolution, the ombudsman plays a role in administrative justice as courts. 
Although there may be overlapping jurisdiction, they have different focus or 
specialization. Ombudsman is more suitable to less serious case of maladministration 
that without a claim of substantial money compensation because of the weak 
enforcement power on his decision. It is a good to settlement disputes that only a 
"quick fix" is needed. The importance of the ombudsman lies mainly in the ability of 
non-legality review, which reviews from the standard of good governance. The 
accessibility of the office and the low cost to the complainants makes it "very 
“ valuable in the filed of dispute resolution between parties of an unequal economic and 
109 Gregory & Giddings, quoted Caiden, MacDermot & Sandler，in Gregory and Giddings eds.，2000, p. 
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organizational muscle"^ However, the cost effectiveness of the legal system and the 
ombudsman system can hardly be compared. 
Ombudsman is commonly understood as a person who receives complaints 
form the public and has the power to investigate, recommend corrective action and 
issue reports as concluded from various studies and the definition of the International 
Bar Association. As what Nilsson finds, this definition is too general that there are 
variations in different ombudsman institutions. This section aims at examining the 
variations on the roles and functions of ombudsman. The first part discusses the 
different mandates that can be assigned to an ombudsman. The second part of this 
reviews the models of ombudsman institution that different political systems may 
adopt. The last part points out the four possible actual roles and functions of 
individual ombudsman vary from enhancing accountability, promoting good 
governance, redressing grievances, and to doing administrative justice. These roles 
are not clear-cut and distinguish from each other, there are overlapping, however, 
different ombudsman perform theses role to a different degree according to the needs 
of individual political systems. 
D. Impacts of the ombudsman 
To conclude on the role of the ombudsman by its impact, Nebenzahl divide the 
concept into direct and indirect impact. The former refer to the benefit that accrues to 
his clients and the later refers to the benefits accruing to other, including the public at 
large.iii The direct impact to clients is having their grievance redressed or problem 
Gregory, 2001，quoted Lord Mackey, p. 102. 
in Nebenzahl, in Caiden ed, 1983，p. 59-64. 
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solved. The ombudsman will decide on their compliant is justified after investigation. 
If circumstance is possible, the clients who have their compliant justified will attain a 
remedy or a removal of doubts. The first indirect impact of the ombudsman is advise 
on the change to some administrative practice and even the regulation establishing 
that practice. The second impact is to bring about legislation to prevent the occurrence 
of future cases like those already complained about. The last indirect impact is the 
deterrent effect that ombudsman activity has on officialdom. 
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Chapter III Research Design and Methodology 
The basic aim of the research is to find out the roles that the Hong Kong 
Ombudsman Office plays as a political structure and the functions that it performs in 
the Hong Kong political system as a whole. The thesis pays less attention to explain 
what factors shape the role of the Ombudsman and how. This part begins with 
explaining how functionalism is adopted in the analysis and then introduce the design 
and methodology of the research. 
A. The structural-functional perspective 
The study on the roles and functions of the Ombudsman would have more 
significance and become more interesting by adopting structural functionalism. The 
approach provides a perspective of looking at political structures in relation to the 
political system in which they exist. The Ombudsman can be regarded as a political 
structure within a system. Its establishment indicates the development of the Hong 
Kong political system. Almond defined development as the result "when the existing 
structure and culture of the political system are unable to cope with the problem or 
challenge without further structural differentiation and cultural secularization."^ In 
this sense, the Ombudsman is the product of the process of role differentiation and 
specialization in a self-regulative system, which is created to adapt the system 
structurally to the change in internal and external environment. Since that the 
Ombudsman is a newly created role in response to systemic needs, it is expected to 
perform some unique functions that are not performed (sufficiently) by other political 
structures. This assumption should be refutable or it would be a tautology which is 
1 Almond & Powell，1978，p. 21. 
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either unable to tell how the creation of an institution is different from some others or 
is simply inaccurate in describing and explaining the reality. Therefore, the structural 
functional perspective is useful in the sense that it provides a view on a phenomenon 
and is directive for research. This research is a very first step that seeks primarily to 
find out the roles and functions of the Hong Kong Ombudsman by empirical study. 
Also, by tracing the course of its development, factors that contributed to its 
establishment will be discussed. These can then help to prove whether the 
development of the Ombudsman is responding to the change in the environment, that 
is, a result of role or structural differentiation in a self-regulative system as postulated 
by stmctural-functionalism. 
Secondly, it is discussed in the literature review that the roles of Ombudsman 
vary from country to country and even from time to time. The Ombudsman plays 
similar roles but has different emphases. In Heede's word, "An Ombudsman 
institution is a very personalized State office...different incumbents may well have 
different intentions and therefore interpret the same rules differently."^ Ombudsman 
can be different from one another in terms of organizational design and in practice 
and it is much affected by the characteristic of in individual political system. A more 
traditional view on the role of Ombudsman is, say, a "grievance man" but many 
ombudsmen are designed to achieve beyond that purpose. The phenomenon echoes an 
assumption of the structural-functional approach that the same structure can perform 
very different functions and relate to other political structures differently from system 
to system. This makes the study on the roles and functions of the Hong Kong 
Ombudsman more interesting since the institution should reflect the characteristics of 
the Hong Kong political system. Moreover, the findings can be used for comparative 
2 Heede, 2000, p. 86. 
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study about the relationship between the roles and functions of Ombudsman 
institutions and the structural characteristics of political systems. 
B. Research design 
The research is to find out the roles and functions of the Hong Kong Ombudsman 
since its establishment in 1989. There is the possibility that the role and function of 
the Ombudsman has been changing. This empirical study is divided into three main 
parts. The first part is a historical review on the development of the Ombudsman 
system since late 1960s through the formal establishment of the Commissioner of 
Administrative Complaints in 1989 and the Ombudsman in 1994. The main forces 
that drove and shaped the establishment of the Office will be identified. The second 
part is the description on the organizational design and institutional relationship of the 
Ombudsman by employing Heede's models. The last part is the evaluation of the role 
and function of the Ombudsman. The method of evaluation will be discussed in the 
following parts. 
C. Conceptualization and operationalization of concepts 
Role 
The most fundamental concepts of this research are roles and functions. Almond 
defines roles as "a regularized pattern of behaviour, established by one's own 
“ expectations and actions and those of others'? He continues to explain "the idea of a 
role comes originally from the stage: an actor is assigned to play, for example, the role 
3 Almond & Powell, 1978, pp. 52-53. 
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of Hamlet, which is characterized by certain actions and qualities." A role is the basic 
unit of political structure. By describing a political structure, it spells out a network of 
roles, which means "individuals have positions in which they are expected to act in 
certain ways and regularly do so". If Ombudsman is being understood as a political 
structure, it composes a network of roles that it is expected to play in some regular 
ways. The patterns of behaviour may involve other structures, so role may also be 
defined in relations to others. To operationalize the concept, it refers to the four 
typical roles of Ombudsman, which are discussed in the literature review. They are the 
role to ensure democratic accountability of the administrators like a controller or a 
supervisor; the role to promote good governance like an adviser; the role as the 
grievance man or the citizens' defender who protect citizens against the bad 
administrative actions and decisions as well as citizen's rights; and the role to promote 
administrative justice and right wrongs as a redresser, arbitrator or mediator. Although 
the role of ombudsmen is only divided into four types according to their redress and 
control orientation, there are further classifications among the four types because 
different Ombudsman plans perform the roles to different degree and in different ways. 
Besides, Ombudsman can perform all the four roles, but may have different 
emphases. 
Function 
There are two levels of understanding on the concept of function. The basic 
understanding refers functions to "the system relevant effects of structures"'^. Another 
level of understanding refers function to the "vital or organic processes considered in 
4 Hold, 1967, p. 88. 
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the respects in which they contribute to the maintenance of the organism"^ which is 
adopted in biological sciences. Or in requisite analysis, function is defined as the 
requirements or requisites of a system of which it means "those imperatives which 
must be fulfilled if the system is to persist"^. For both levels, functions can either be 
in forms of some processes, some operational conditions or the effects of political 
structures, which IS related to the maintenance of a system, however, to a different 
degree of relevance or necessity. In the first level, functions are relevant to system 
maintenance in the sense that demands of individuals within a system being satisfied 
to some extent by some activities or conditions.^ The second level equates system 
relevance with requiredness, which implies a system can be maintained or can 
continue to survive only when a particular set of conditions or activities are satisfied 
or performed. The performance of functions in the first level only satisfies the 
demands of individual but at the second level, it contributed to the system's survival. 
To put in another way, that particular set of function is the requisite and is necessary 
for the functioning of a system for the second level but not for the first level. The 
milder claim on the necessity of a particular function is due to the difficulty of 
PROVING its indispensability. 
To operationalize the concept of function, I will adopt Almond's classification of 
political functions. Almond classified political functions into three levels: system 
function, process function and policy function. System function includes recruitment 
function, communication function, and socialization function. Process function refers 
to interest articulation, interest aggregation, policymaking, policy implementation and 
adjudication. Policy function includes the regulative, distributive and extractive 
5 James & Hardgrave, 1973，p. 202. 
6 James & Hardgrave，1973, p. 210. 
7 Flanigan and Fogelman, 1967, pp. 73-74. 
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functions. Almond accounts for these functions by their empirical existence in every 
political system that the functioning of almost all political systems can be classified 
into the categories. For the conception of function, Almond would treat it as the 
effects brought by political structures and processes. Almond did not regard these 
functional categories as requisites of a system's proper functioning or survival. 
However, in the setting of an open system, the functions should be performed in order 
to transfer the input or demands from the domestic and international environment into 
policy outputs. Almond's approach of functional analysis is not requisite analysis. In 
this study, the function of the Ombudsman will be analyzed by and classified into 
these functional categories. There is one more point to note that political structures are 
usually multifunctional. 
Political system 
The Hong Kong political system will be treated as an open system that transfer 
inputs from the internal and external environment to policy outputs. Complaining to 
n 
the Ombudsman can be understood as a kind of demand behaviour. 
D. Evaluating roles and functions: method and the use of materials 
The main concern of this study is to evaluate the roles and functions of the Hong 
Kong Ombudsman Office. The above parts defined what is role and functions of a 
political structure and this part will discuss the method of evaluation. 
To evaluate the roles and functions of the Ombudsman, in a sense, is to identify 
8 Hill, 1977, p. 93. 
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the patterns of regularized behaviour of the Ombudsman and the effects of these 
activities to the political system as a whole. As a regularized pattern of behaviour that 
is established by one's own expectations and actions and those of others, the question 
of evaluations would mean to identify the Ombudsman's own expectations and 
actions as well as of those who interact with the Ombudsman. The complainants, the 
general public and the departments being investigated are also actors who interact 
with the Ombudsman. So, the expectation and actions of these actors also determine 
the roles and functions of the Ombudsman. The next question regarding evaluation 
become what kinds of material should we refer to in order to sort out the expectations 
and actions of actors so as to describe the regularized patterns of behaviour of the 
Ombudsman. 
Historical review and the Ombudsman Ordinance 
The evaluation begins with scrutinizing the historical background and legislation 
on which the Ombudsman IS based. There are different forces driving the 
development of the Ombudsman in each stage, which reflected the expectations of 
different parties on the Ombudsman. Supplementing with the debate of the members 
in the legislative council, we can know the legislative intentions. The legislation 
clearly outlines the mandates, power and jurisdictions of an Ombudsman as well as 
the rules and regulations that the institution has to follow. These define the range of 
activities as well as the roles and functions of the Ombudsman. 
Perception and expectation of public and the self-perception of the Ombudsmen 
The second step is to find out the perception and expectation of the public on the 
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Ombudsman after its establishment by analyzing some survey reports and newspaper 
articles. The self-perception of the Ombudsman will be reviewed through analyzing 
the annual reports of each Ombudsman, and the interview with the Assistant 
Ombudsman. This also serves as a control to the finding of the analysis of cases. 
Actions of the Ombudsman 
After studying the perception and expectations of both the public and the 
Ombudsmen on the Office, the next stage is to study the actions of the Ombudsman. 
The analysis includes the study on the caseload, the nature of complaints and the 
methods adopted by the Ombudsman in order to deal with the complaints. The 
legislation defines the range of the Ombudsman's activities but fails to predict how 
the Ombudsman practiced in reality. It is because the tasks and roles of Ombudsman 
largely depend on the types of complaint brought by the complainants. One the other 
hand, the response of government departments and statutory organizations to the 
Ombudsman's decisions also affects the Ombudsman's roles and functions. 
The initiative of the Ombudsman is a part of the Ombudsman. This also 
contributes to features of different Ombudsmen. Questions like what action had the 
Ombudsman taken to expand his or her jurisdiction, what are the new initiatives 
introduced by each Ombudsman, what kind of cases does the Ombudsman choose to 
scrutinize, what are his or her methods of handling case and what are his decisions 
will be investigated in order to find out how the Ombudsman defines its role by his or 
her actions. 
Finally, selected case studies will be presented in order to study the types of 
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decisions of the Ombudsman such as resolution and remedial actions. 
Conclusion on the functions of the Ombudsman 
The last part of the analysis will summarize the functions of the institution in the 
Hong Kong political system. There may be changes on the roles and functions of the 
Ombudsman through time. So, the analysis OF the Ombudsman's roles and functions 
involves trend analysis. There is a remark on the focus of this study. The focus of 
analysis is Ombudsman's roles and functions but not its' effectiveness. As 
effectiveness evaluation is beyond the mere description of the regularized behavioral 
patterns and institutional relationships of an Ombudsman and their impacts to the 
political system, another set of criteria will be needed for that purpose. 
Sources of materials 
The study is an empirical one that involves both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses. I will refer to the consultation documents, secondary readings, legislative 
council documents and the Ombudsman Ordinance for reviewing the development of 
the Ombudsman. There will be qualitative analysis on the annual reports of the Office 
and investigation reports so as to find out the self-perception of the ombudsmen. An 
interview with the Assistant Ombudsman was also conducted. For quantitative 
analysis, the household surveys on special topics conducted by the Census and 
Statistics Department on expectation of the public. The statistical data generated from 
the annual reports will be used for descriptive analysis OF the regularized activities of 
the Ombudsman. 
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Table 3 Method of analyzing the regularized pattern of behaviour of the 
Ombudsman 
Pattern of Indicators Sources of reference Method 
behaviour 
Expectations Public perception and Survey findings and Qualitative and 
expectation newspaper articles quantitative 
Self-perception of the Annual reports and Qualitative 
Ombudsmen interview 
Actions Caseload and case Annual reports and Quantitative 
nature secondary readings 
Complaint handling Annual Reports Quantitative 
methods 
Remedies and Cases in Annual Reports Qualitative 
recommendations 
New initiatives of Annual reports and Qualitative 
Ombudsmen other publications of the 
Office 
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Chapter IV A Case Study of the Hong Kong Ombudsman Office 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the roles and functions of the Hong 
Kong Ombudsman from the structural- functional perspective by finding out the 
regularized behavioral patterns of the institution. The analysis begins with a historical 
review of the establishment of the institution. The contending forces that contributed 
to the establishment of the Hong Kong Ombudsman Office in each stage will be 
identified. Section 4.2 studies the roles and functions of the Ombudsman by looking 
at the Ordinance and the Legislative Council Debates. Section 4.3 is a quantitative 
analysis of the nature and substances of cases, including both complaints and the 
Ombudsmen's direct investigations, and the public's perceptions and expectations of 
the institution. The self-perception of the Ombudsmen will be discussed in section 4.4. 
The final section will summarize various functions the Ombudsman serves in the 
Hong Kong political system. 
4.1 Historical review of the development of the Ombudsman 
This section traces the course of development of the Ombudsman Office from 
the structural- functional perspective by assuming its establishment as the outcome of 
role or structural differentiation. A self-regulative political system develops itself 
when the existing structures are unable to cope with problems or challenges. New 
roles or structures emerge, or the existing structures further specialize in order to deal 
with the newly arise demands in the environment or internal stress. The Ombudsman 
is a structure that emerged and further specialized to cope with complaints as a kind 
of demand behaviour. Due to the fact that the Ombudsman is only one of the complain 
handling and redress mechanisms either before and after its establishment, we may 
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assume the Ombudsman plays a specialized and unique role, which is different from 
other similar mechanisms, although there may be overlapping jurisdictions. The main 
concern of this section is to identify the driving forces leading to the establishment of 
the Office in spite of the existence of similar mechanisms. These forces help shaping 
the roles and functions of the Ombudsman and explaining why an additional 
mechanism is needed as well as how the Ombudsman differs from other complain and 
redress mechanisms in terms of roles and functions. 
Unlike other independent administrative monitoring institutions in Hong Kong 
such as the ICAC and the Audit Department, the establishment of the Ombudsman 
institution is a rather long process. The institutionalization process is slow that some 
30 years of time was taken to establish the "model Ombudsman"^ The process began 
with the installation of the Ombudsman-like function into the Office of the Unofficial 
Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (UMELCO)^ in 1970 and 
finished by gaining full independency to the Office of the Ombudsman in 2001. The 
course of development can be divided into three stages, where major changes in 
institutional arrangement took place in each of the stage that marks a new trend of 
development. However, I may refer to the period before what each stage covers when 
giving an account of the driving forces. The three stages are: 1969 to 1985, 1986 to 
1991，and 1992 till now. The illustration of the course of development serves two 
aims: firstly, to point out the most important institutional change of the Ombudsman 
in each stage. Secondly, by identifying the main driving forces as independent 
variables affecting the development of a particular stage, it seeks to find out their 
1 Scott, 1993, p. 27 
Scott stated the common view that the Ombudsman system is often regarded as an important part of 
administrative reform over the world. These Ombudsman systems share common characteristics in 
terms of independency, widely defined jurisdiction, publicity and efficiency etc., which represented a 
standard model of the Ombudsman system. 
2 Known as OMELCO since 1986. 
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implications in shaping the role of the Ombudsman. 
From 1969 to 1985: The Emergence of Ombudsman System 
The major development of the Ombudsman in this period is the installation of an 
Ombudsman-like institution by the government in 1970 in response to the 
Ombudsman Report drafted by the JUSTICE Hong Kong Branch�. The report was 
released in 1969. The report gives a review of the history, features and function of the 
system and points out that the system had been spread to countries of different 
constitutional structures. By appealing to the lack of complaint and grievance redress 
mechanism and the Chinese traditional censorial system, the Committee concludes 
that Hong Kong has "an urgent need" for an Ombudsman and recommends the 
government to appoint one. The Committee also suggest on the design, functioning, 
power and jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The report got the immediate support of 
the Hong Kong Bar Association and was supported by the press in general."^ In 
response to the report and the anticipated support from the public, the government 
drafted a Commissioner of Administration Bill which was mainly modeled on the 
New Zealand Ombudsman Act, in early 1969. However, this bill was never published 
or introduced in the Legislative Council due to the opposition of bureaucracy 
represented by the governor and the colonial secretary. 5 What the government did 
finally was to expand the UMELCO (Unofficial Members of the Executive and 
Legislative Councils) office by appointing an administrative secretary as a channel for 
the public to air grievances and complaints in 1970. The administrative secretary was 
directly responsible to the UMELCO instead of to the head of the civil service. The 
3 The full name of JUSTICE is the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists. 
4 Scott, 1983, p. 114. 
5 Scott, 1983, p. 114. 
66 
administrative secretary was granted certain degree of independence in this sense. 
Moreover, the UMELCO office was provided with power to perform the function of 
redressing grievances. They have three rights in investigating public complaints and 
representation: "the right to information, including government files and 
correspondence, policies, procedures, and instructions; the right of access to senior 
government officers and the right to challenge the action of public agencies. All heads 
of agencies and government officers are required to cooperate with UMELCO in 
operating the complaints system."^ The year 1970 marks the beginning of the 
Ombudsman system though an “office of Ombudsman" had not been set up. What 
should be noted are the power, functions and limitations of this early Ombudsman 
system. The system does have the function and power to perform as an Ombudsman, 
but it was not an independent institution. The system is only like a committee of the 
UMELCO. The officials are members of the Legislative Council (LegCo) and 
Executive Council (ExCo) who have multiple roles such as formulating and 
implementing policies. Besides the lack of full independence, another characteristic of 
the system is that it performs general functions instead of specializing in investigating 
complaints against maladministration as what classical Ombudsman does. There is no 
fine difference between the UMELCO and other complaint channels such as the 
Urban Council ward offices at the time. The UMELCO also serves to receive and 
investigate complaints, appeals, and requests for assistance from the public.^ 
The government's quick reaction to, but not a total acceptance of, the JUSTICE'S 
report was actually one among the many attempts to solve the problem of "the lack of 
communication between the government and the public" in order to pacify the public 
6 Scott, 1983，p. 115. 
7 Miners, 1998, p. 98. 
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and prevent future social and political instability in the aftermath of the 1966-67 Riots. 
A bundle of new institutions such as the City District Officers (CDO)，the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and the Complaints Against the 
Police Office (CAPO) were gradually set up for the public to voice their grievances 
since the late 1960s so as to enhance the communication between the government and 
the public and to maintain the government's legitimacy. Therefore, some of the 
underlying political and socio-economic factors that account for the 1966 to 1967 
social riots will be useful reference to understand the emergence of the Ombudsman 
idea in 1967 as well as the expansion of the UMELCO in 1969. Tang points out that 
the inappropriate government structure and functions for an industrial society are the 
n 
main causes of the 1966-67 Riot. The riots in forms of demonstration, confrontation 
with police on the streets, and even random bomber or terrorist attacks in 1966 and 
1967 respectively were believed to be the result of the lack of change in government 
structures and policies against the background of industrialization and population 
growth since 1950s. The change in economic structure and population growth brought 
about problems like bad working condition, inadequate hosing, insufficient education 
provision and labour disputes. In a slight economic recession in 1965 where Hong 
Kong's growth rate slowed down, the problems become more prominent, which 
"showed conclusively that the government could no longer be both unrepresentative 
and slow to improve living and working conditions，？ As a result, the commission of 
inquiry which was set up after the riots called for social and political reform after their 
investigation. 
The JUSTICE report was wrote under such a social and economic environment. 
8 Tang, 1998, p. 64. 
9 Tang, 1998, pp. 64-65. Tang quoted a figure that some 700’ 000 people were inadequately housed. 
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It pointed to the rapid industrialization and the increase in population since the 1950s 
and suggested: "Naturally, new circumstances give rise to new problems which call 
for new solutions."^® The underlying economic and social grievances explain why the 
JUSTICE commented in their report that there is a “lack of simple, inexpensive and 
effective machinery for safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms and for 
enabling those who have suffered from violation of their rights to receive assistance in 
obtaining redress" " and call for the establishment of the Ombudsman. Apart from 
the new institutional devices, including the expansion of the UMELCO, that were set 
up to communicate the public and the government, the colonial government adopted 
1 0 
the ‘Big Bang' social policy in 1970s and a legislative programme was introduced 
to improve working conditions as well as to reduce exploitation by employers. In 
short, the expansion of the UMELCO as one of the communication channels and other 
policies initiatives to enhance social condition are the responses of the political 
system to changes in economic and social environment. 
After the launch of the CDO scheme and the expansion of the UMELCO, 
together with other existing channels such as the Urban Council ward system, appeal 
or complaint to department, appeal to the Governor in Council (the Executive 
Council), as well as letter to the Governor or the Colonial Secretary, there were a 
good few institutions played the role as a quasi-Ombudsman. However, embedding 
the Ombudsman functions into the UMELCO only marks the beginning of the debate 
Justice (Society) Hong Kong Branch, 1969，pp. 14. 
11 Justice (Society) Hong Kong Branch, 1969, pp. 12. 
In the report, the committee's main arguments for the Ombudsman are twofold: one is the lack of 
avenue to complain and seek redress for administrative wrong doings. The other is to exert control on 
the administration in order to fill the gap of the lack of representation institutions for people. 
12 Tang, 1998, pp. 61-63. Examples of the 'Big Bang' are the increase in social welfare expenditure: 
for instance, the expenditure in 1974-75 was amounted to $212.5 million, which is 65% more than the 
previous year; the introduction of public housing; and the promise to provide 9-year compulsory 
education. 
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over the establishment of an Ombudsman. The idea to set up an independent 
Ombudsman Office was supported by "the major English language newspapers, the 
Bar Association, JUSTICE, some selected urban councilors, academics, including the 
editor of the Hong Kong Law Journal, and concerned citizens' groups such as the 
1 
Hong Kong Observer" according to Ian Scott. An interesting question becomes 
what makes the idea attractive and important to the proponents despite the existence 
of various complaint channels. An intuitive answer is that those arrangements are still 
not sufficient to deal with their concerns. 
The proponents of the Ombudsman system think that the UMELCO, the Ward 
System of the Urban Council and the City District Officers (CDO) are intermediary 
between the government and people rather than compliant mechanism. The only 
channel for complaint on the administration is the complaint mechanism within each 
department, however, grievances are not handled properly and investigations are 
rarely launched. The expansion of the UMELCO's power of investigation only 
provided partial solution to the problem because it failed to obtain trust and 
confidence from the public. Scott commented that "the UMELCO often seems to 
serve more as an intermediary between the bureaucracy and the public—as a 
facilitator of ac t ion than as a champion of the small man against an arbitrary 
bureaucracy" since the imofFicials are seen by the people as part of Government 
itself. 14 In the end of the 1970s the Hong Kong Observers, a pressure group, keeps 
urging the government to appoint an Ombudsman by pointing out the "obvious 
inadequacy of the present complaints systems, and the increasing awareness of the 
need to safeguard the individual rights of the people against abuse or misuse of 
13 Scott, 1983, p. 114. 
14 Scott, 1983，p. 116. 
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p o w e r ” 15 They also evaluated the channels of complaints and put that both the CDO 
and Urban Councilors have no executive authority, no power to conduct investigation, 
and no access to information. However, more people bring their complaints to the 
Urban Council ward offices "particularly to those councilors who have gained a 
reputation for reckless pugnacity" than to the UMELCO even though the UMELCO is 
lavishly staffed and is more powerful to investigate complaints when compared to the 
urban councilors. In the debate, an Ombudsman is viewed as fundamentally different 
from other institutions in the eyes of the proponents since the existing systems are 
organizationally dependent and partial and they are not ideal for controlling and 
correcting wrongs in nature.^^ In this stage of development we may understand that 
the public expect the Ombudsman to be assigned with sufficient power and is 
independent from administrative institutions and this makes it different from other 
channels of grievance redress. In the views of the supporters, one can recognize the 
drive and need for further specialization and differentiation of the complaint 
mechanisms. 
From 1986 to 1991: appointment of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints 
(COMAQ 
After a twenty-year debate, an important institutional development took place in 
1986. A consultative document titled 'Consultative Document: Redress of Grievances' 
15 Hong Kong Observers, "Ombudsman or Els(i)e", Jan 23，1978，in Hong Kong Observers, 1983, p. l l . 
16 Hong Kong Observers, "Why the case for an Ombudsman should be revived" July 10, 1978 & 
"Ombudsman a better bet than MPs" Sept 24,1979, in Hong Kong Observers, 1983, p. 13 & p. 16. 
They express the problem with UMELCO is that it is "run by people temporarily suspended from the 
civil service, and who one day may return to the civil service. This diminishes confidence in these 
bodies as being impartial and independent". And, they said “ we do not doubt the genuine intention of 
MPs who come out at their own expense and who want to help us, but we feel a local independent body 
can better Hong Kong's domestic problems... also be able to command the respect and trust of the 
public." 
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was issued by the government in August 1986, concerning the revision of the existing 
channels for making complaint against the public administration and estimating the 
need of establishing an independent organization to handle citizens' complaint. The 
government (the executive) conducted a review of the existing channels of complaints 
and raised three possibilities to improve the system. The first suggestion is not to 
change the existing system, the second is to have continuing improvements in the 
existing one and the third is to bring a possible addition. Subsequent to the 
consultation and legislative council debate, the third option was chosen. The 
Commissioner for Administrative Complaints Ordinance that was modeled on the 
British Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration was passed in 1988 and the 
office began functioning in 1989. 
There are three main forces driving the development of this stage. One force is 
about the under-supply of effective, efficient, easily accessible and trusted complaint 
mechanisms aforementioned in the previous session. Those existing mechanisms, 
particularly the UMELCO system, failed to function as efficient and effective means 
of complaint and redress either because they are not independent and specialized in 
receiving complaints and redressing, as a result, the public has little confidence in 
them or they do not have executive and investigation power/^ Scott quoted from the 
1976 ICAC annual report that "members of the public are increasingly coming to the 
Commission...to seek advice, to give information about non-corruption criminal 
17 This lack of complaint mechanisms that with independence and sufficient power reflected by the 
speech of a Legislative Councilor in the Legislative Council debate on the Consultation Document. 
"From the complaint letters and petitions that I regularly receive from members of the public, I have 
come to understand the frustration, anger and helplessness of the ordinary citizens who approach 
government departments, district boards, Urban Council and Regional Council wards to seek solutions 
to problems concerning government policies and malfeasance. Going through this labyrinth of redress 
mechanism manned largely by the Civil Service, and the invariably long time involved in the follow-up 
correspondence between government departments, they often come face with the original decision with 
being told the rationale behind." Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings, 1987. 
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offences and even to lodge general complaints about rudeness, inefficiency or 
1 n 
maladministration, as if with an all-purpose Ombudsman". In 1985, the ICAC 
referred 1483 non-corruption complaints concerning government departments or other 
public bodies to the relevant authority for their action^^, in 1986, the number of 
non-corruption reports was 2 9 1 1 T h e independent and effective image of the ICAC 
enables it to receive supports and confidence from the public. Scott believes a change 
in the role of the UMELCO is needed to make it act more as an Ombudsman instead 
of a quasi-govemment organ. 
The second force is the rise in demand for a better avenue to air complaints and 
to seek remedy, which also helps contributing to problem of inadequate channels. On 
one hand, Hong Kong became an increasingly administrative state since the 1970s 
that makes the interaction between the government and the public more intensive as 
well as more conflicting. The emergence of the administrative state is indicated by the 
increase in the number of judicial review of administrative decisions, number of 
litigations, number of ordinances and size of the civil servants.^^ As mentioned in the 
last part, there were more government interventions since the 1970s in response to the 
change in economic and social structure. The government had been intervening in 
promoting economic growth and providing social welfare through both direct and 
indirect measures. Examples include regulating different industries by legislations, 
setting up statutory bodies, licensing, inspection, direct intervention into the financial 
market, and direct provision of social welfares like housing and medical services. The 
possibility of affecting by wrong administrative actions and decisions would 
18 Scott, 1983，pp. 119. 
19 Consultative document: redress of grievances, 1986, p. 6, paragraph 11. 
2° Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings, 8 April 1987. 
21 Clark & McCoy, 1993，p.1-3. 
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inevitably increase in such a comprehensive administrative state and thus increase the 
demand for an efficient, specialized and focused compliant system. Despite these 
objective facts, the public was not as enthusiastic as expected during a four-month 
consultation. The government received only fifty written submissions, though a 
quarter of them opted for an additional institution? 
Besides the expansion of the public administration, on the other hand, the 
changing political environment in the 1980s plus the rise of a better-educated 
population, raise the demand for an effective control mechanism over the executive in 
order to protect citizens against bureaucratic aggression and to hold the government 
accountable and responsive to the public. Lui points out that, efficiency, neutrality and 
hierarchical loyalty are the distinguishing norms of administration in Hong Kong, 
while accountability and responsiveness were never the concerns of the colonial 
bureaucracy. Yet, people's expectation towards the bureaucracy and political 
awareness was changed by the uncertainty over the 1997 issue. The bureaucracy as 
the major player of forming public policy is expected to be more responsive to 
people's demands for more political participation and gradual democratization in 
order to realize the promise of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. Therefore, 
setting up an Ombudsman would be a significant step towards a more representative 
and open government and an institutional arrangement to check any abuse of the 
executive power after the handover. A legislative councilor emphasizes the 
importance of having an adequate and comprehensive system of redressing grievances 
in maintaining the autonomy of the SAR government during the debate over the 
Consultation Document. Since some complaint channels like petition to the Queen 
22 Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings, 8 April 1987. 
23 Lui, 1988, pp. 137-148. 
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will be abolished after the handover, only a self-sufficient system could prevent the 
possibility of frequent intervention by the Central Govemment.^'^ 
The final force comes from changes within the Hong Kong political system. 
District boards were established in 1982. Among 490 seats, about 27% of seats are 
filled by direct election and the members of the urban and regional councils filled 
about 11.6% of seats. The proportion of directly elected members increased to 55.6% 
in the 1985 session. The participation in local government stimulated further 
demands for political participation which subsequently led to indirect elections to the 
Q A 
legislative council in 1985. These elected legislative councilors who mainly 
represent the middle class spoke for the establishment of an Ombudsman. Besides, 
many of the counselors support the idea because of their heavy workload of handling 
complaints from the public. An independent and professional organ can maintain an 
equal standard of handling complaints and can also "release councilors and district 
board members from the charge of handling complaints and leave them more time to 
concentrate themselves on their various political tasks which affect the community at 
large，，.27 
The above forces together contributed to the establishment of the Commissioner 
for Administrative Complaints. The demand for an Ombudsman had been rising that 
is no longer the "dissatisfactions of an educated minority here than it does from any 
real shortage of effective channels for getting complaints investigated or airing 
24 Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings, 8 April 1987. 
25蔡子強，一九九七年’香港選舉制度透視’附錄一及二。 
Among the seats taken by the urban and regional councilors, some are elected and some are appointed. 
In the 1983 and 1986 elections, the seats under direct election is 50%. 
26 Clark, 1988, p. 169. According to Choi, the voting of franchise that composed of district council 
members filled 21.4% of seats (12 seats).蔡子強，一九九七年’香港選舉制度透視，附錄三。 
27 Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings, 8 April 1987. 
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grievances''^^ if it was really the case in the 1970s. However, in Scott's opinion, the 
changing political environment should be the most important factor accounting for the 
removal of the civil servants' long resistance. He states that, "in the changed political 
climate following the signing of the Sino-British agreement in 1984, the introduction 
of a modified version of an Ombudsman system had some attractions" since the 
promise of more representative government is one of the selling points of the 
agreement and the "establishment of an independent redress system could be seen as 
one means by which the administration might become more accountable". The 
government's concession was yet a limited one. This could be reflected in the 
proposal and the subsequent legislation. The government still thought that the existing 
channels are sufficient and reminded the public in the Document that "people would 
need to be reasonably sure that an additional system would add significantly enough 
to existing channels, or those channels as they may be strengthened, to justify the cost 
in money, manpower and legislative time which its introduction would require"^®. 
The Governor warned, "any new institution was likely to be a supplement to existing 
channels rather then a replacement" before the release of the consultative document. 
O 1 
Due to the restrictions upon the Ombudsman's jurisdiction and the referral system, 
Scott commented that, "In essence, the drafters envisaged that the Commissioner 
would spend most of his time investigating minor misdemeanors of civil servants”��. 
The 1988 Ordinance will be discussed in more detail in next section. To conclude 
28 Scott, 1983, quoted from John Walden, the director of home affairs, in a speech to the HK Observers 
in 1974. 
29 Scott, 1994，pp.28. 
Consultative document: redress of grievances, 1986，p. 7，paragraph 27. 
31 Examples of exclusion are "complaints of personal injustice suffered by persons lawfully present in 
Hong Kong... he would not be empowered to investigate actions of Departments in personnel matters 
or commercial relationships of Departments with customer or suppliers"; and "There would be certain 
exclusions from his field of investigation, such as where there are dominant considerations of public 
interest". 
Consultative document: redress of grievances, 1986，p. 6，paragraphs 23-25. 
32 Scott, 1994，pp. 28. 
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the expectation on role of the Ombudsman, it is assumed to act as an independent, 
impartial and specialized institution that supplement to serve as channel for complaint 
as well as to enhance the accountability of the administration. These expectations are 
similar to a classical Ombudsman. 
Through the 1970s till the establishment of the COMAC in 1986 the 
Ombudsman system went through a process of specialization. The system developed 
from an office under the UMELCO to handle general complaints against the 
administration to an impendent office that is responsible for investigating complaints 
against maladministration. The causes to this differentiation of function were still 
structural ones. Firstly, the changes in social and economic structure further 
encouraged Government interventions, which prompted to the need for more 
monitoring on Government's actions. Secondly, improved education level of the 
general public enhanced citizens' awareness of a more accountable and responsive 
government. Finally, the negotiation between the British and China government over 
the 1997 issue can be viewed as the international political environment that raised 
Hong Kong people's concern in protecting their democratic rights and promoting 
political participation. 
From 1992 to now: the reform of COMAC and the establishment of the Office of the 
Ombudsman 
There are two major changes in the institutional arrangements of the Office in 
“ this period. The first one is the review of the COMAC that started in 1992 and the 
resulting amendment on the Ordinance in June 1994. The review was planned in 1988 
when the legislative council enacted the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints 
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Bill. The result of the review was the deviation from the British model. The 
Commissioner's jurisdiction was expanded to cover more statutory bodies, the referral 
system was cancelled, and the Commissioner was assigned the power to initiate 
investigations of complaints on his own volition and to release investigation reports 
on a selective basis for public through the media. In the early years of its 
establishment, the Office failed to perform the expected functions. The number of 
complaints handled by the Office was very low. Between March and December1989， 
the total number of complaints handled by the Office is 162. The figures in 1990 and 
1991 were 167 and 187 respectively. ^^  One legislative councilor expected the 
COMAC can take over half of the UMELCO's cases during the legislation in 1987.34 
The UMELCO received 1408 cases in 1986. However, the COMAC received only a 
bit more than one tenth at the first year of its functioning. The small number of cases 
was mainly due to the referral system. The legislation intended to make the Office as 
a supplement to the existing channels so that all the complaints should be logged with 
legislative councilors. The councilors do the screening process for the Office and take 
the role of helping the complainants to exhaust other possible channels before 
referring the case to the office.^^ 
The second one is the complete removal of the Office from the civil service 
system as a declaration of its full independency in 2004. The Second Ombudsman, Mr. 
Andrew So, started to appoint non-civil servants as investigators in October 1994. The 
percentage of contract staff increased from 13.2% in 2000 to 100% in December 2004. 
The Commissioner was renamed as the Ombudsman and the COMAC was renamed 
Government Secretariat, June 1992，Review of the Office of the Commissioner for Administrative 
Complaints, p. 3，paragraph 3. 
34 Clark and McCoy, 1993, p. 91. 
35 Government Secretariat, June 1992，Review of the Office of the Commissioner for Administrative 
Complaints, p. 4，paragraph 11. 
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as the Office of Ombudsman in 1996. 
In this stage, the actors who involved in the legislative reform played a more 
important role in effecting the development of the Ombudsman than structural factors. 
The preference of the Governor, the initiative of the first Commissioner Mr. Arthur 
Garcia and the support of the Legislative Council are the three main factors 
contributing to the widening of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. Mr. Lee Wing-tat, a 
Legislative Councilor who participated in the legislative reform regarded the change 
as a top down one other than a bottom up one, which is led by the Governor Mr. Chris 
Patten.36 According to Mr. Lee, the will of the Governor to create a more open, 
transparent and responsible government was the chief driving force behind the 
progressive legislative reform proposal. In the Governor's Annual Address to the 
Legislative Council in October 1992, the reform of the COMAC was made one of the 
agenda in the last five years of British rule. The Governor put that "There is one 
additional element in our arrangements for ensuring that the Government is held 
accountable to the community for its decision and actions; it is an area which I think 
is underdeveloped." The Governor then proposed to introduce direct access of the 
public to COMAC, to let the Commissioner to publicize his investigation reports and 
to extend the Commissioner's jurisdiction to include some statutory bodies.�？ Mr. Lee 
added that the Governor also brought about other initiatives such as the Performance 
Pledges, which aimed at improving the quality of public services. 
The second force is the initiative of Mr. Arthur Garcia from the Ombudsman to 
“ extend the jurisdiction of his Office. Mr. Garcia is a former Higher Court judge who 
36 Interview with Mr. Lee Wing-tat on 17^ March 2007. 
37 Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings, 7 October 1992，Content and 
paragraph 100. 
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was regarded as bringing to the role of Ombudsman a tradition of independence from 
o n 
the executive and a very thorough style of administrative investigation. One 
example is that the Commissioner suggested meeting the community and the media in 
order to publicize the Office in his 1991 annual report, but the government did not 
adopt the idea finally.^^ Mr. Garcia was invited to recommend on the legislative 
review proposal and thus making the proposal progressive. Four areas of the COMAC 
system are identified, they are the referral system, the jurisdiction of COMAC, 
finality of COMAC's findings and recommendations, and publication of COMAC's 
investigation reports. Mr. Lee also pointed out that not only has G^cia discussed the 
proposal with higher government officials but also with District Board members, this 
kind of openness can rarely be found in other officials. In Scott's opinion, "the 
position taken by the Ombudsman in the reform process is clearly vital" to the success 
since he played an important role in shaping the agenda for reform.'^ ® Scott further 
explained that the Commissioner's contract was not renewed by the administration on 
the ground that he was ‘too old' while the proposed amendment was not yet passed. 
The press voiced their suspicions that it was because of the Commissioner's 
disagreements with the administration. 
The final force leading to the pass of the legislative proposal is the support of the 
Legislative Councilors. In Scott's view, the change in the composition of the 
legislative council makes the councilors support the idea of direct access.^i Directly 
elected members were first introduced in the 1991 legislative council election, which 
composed one-third of total number of seats. 42 Scott points out that "Previous 
38 Clark and McCoy, 1993, p. 85. 
39 Clark and McCoy, 1993，p. 91. Quoted from the third report of the COMAC, 1991. 
4G Scott, 1993, pp. 37-38. 
41 Scott, 1993, p. 37. 
42 In the 1988 Legco election, there was only indirectly elected seats of 12 that accounted 20.7% of the 
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legislative councils had been jealous of the privilege of handling complaints''^^. The 
government also stated in the 1992 Review document "The existing referral system by 
Non-official Members of the Legislative Council is to recognize the principle that the 
primary responsibility for protecting the public against any wrongful acts of the 
Executive should rest with the Legislature (and the courts)...，，44 The opening up of 
the access to the legislative council shifted the councilors' attention to their 
constituency work and legislative duties and they prefer to leave the over-flooding 
complaints with a specialized agent，the COMAC. However, Scott's explanation 
cannot account for why the Non-Officials Members were willing to accept the 
cancellation of the referral system in face of the potential reduction in contact with 
their constituency. The interview with Mr. Lee provides us with a better understanding 
of this seemingly conflict of interest. The reasons are mainly threefold. First of all, the 
Legislative Council still has the power to investigate issues that they are concerned 
with by setting up committees in order to check against the abuse of power by the 
Executive. Secondly, the complaints against maladministration are only a very small 
portion of the total complaints handled by Legislative Councilors. For instance, it is 
only about five percent of the total cases handled by Mr. Lee's district offices. As a 
result, granting the public direct access to the Ombudsman will not reduce Legislative 
Councilors' contact with their constituency. Finally, in Mr. Lee's perception, the 
public is willing to go the office of Legislative Councilors or District Board members 
because it is more convenient and closer to them in terms of longer office hours, more 
offices and better location. For most of the cases, their district offices are effective in 
providing a quick fix and in general, they are resourceful. So, in a word, there is no 
total seats. There were 18 directly elected seats in the 1991 election, which composed about one-third 
of the total seats. The number of directly elected seats were planned to increase. 
43 Scott, 1993, p. 32. 
44 Government Secretariat, June 1992, Review of the Office of the Commissioner for Administrative 
Complaints, p. 4, paragraph 11 • 
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conflict of interest between the Legislative Councilors and granting the public direct 
access to the Ombudsman. 
As for structural factors, Mr. Lee believed that the introduction of direct election 
in 1991 Legislative Council Election altered the perception and expectation of public 
towards the government. The election served as an empowerment to public 
participation in politics and educated the public about the responsibility of 
government. Therefore, the public was willing to accept such a legislative reform 
proposal though there was limited public discussion. 
Short Conclusion 
To conclude the development of the Hong Kong Ombudsman system, it is 
generally in line with the structural- functional perspective of the development of 
political structures. In each stage, where important changes in institutional 
development occurred they were driven by forces, in terms of demands or stresses, 
within the political system and in the surrounding environment. The development was 
led by and responding to these changes in the social and economic environment as 
well as within the political system. Of course, the stakeholders, who are the major 
political players, are also critical factors that shape substance, roles and functions of 
the institution especially in the third stage. The development of the Ombudsman went 
through the process of the expansion of the UMELCO together with the establishment 
of various multifunctional institutions, in which one of their roles is to listen to 
“ complaints and grievances, to the setting up of a specialized institution to handle 
complaints on maladministration. Specialization is not necessarily the replacement of 
one institution by another, it can be in a relative sense. An institution can focus on one 
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task more than others. For instance, the Legislative Councilors concentrate on their 
constituency and legislative work when direct election was introduced as well as to 
handle complaints that are not related to maladministration is a specialization. When 
some institutions required more attention for their primary task as the political system 
become increasingly sophisticated, they become less concerned over other tasks. 
Therefore, we could say the specialization of the government institutions is one of the 
factors contributing to the specialization of the compliant handling and redressing 
functions by a particular agent. Besides, government's intervention in people's life 
had increased with the expansion and modernization of the administration, thereby 
leading to a rise in the demand for a more efficient and effective complaint channel. 
These developments are changes that happened within the political system. Added to 
this, by making people recognize the need for an independent institution to protect 
their right and check the abuse of government power, changes in the economic and 
social environment serves as another factor contributing to the establishment of an 
Ombudsman. Higher education level and improvement in economic well-being 
changed Hong Kong people's attitude and expectation towards government and 
politics. Instead of efficiency, a higher priority was given to accountability, 
responsiveness and rights protections. Finally, changes in the wider political 
environment and the 1997 issues go hand in hand with the international environment. 
Without sovereignty, the fate of Hong Kong is largely dependent on the British and 
PRC governments. This uncertainty aroused the urges for a more comprehensive 
institutional development in order to protect right and freedoms. Gradual 
democratization, promoting transparent and open governance, and improving political 
representation of people were agenda of prime importance in the transitional period. 
In short, these changes that occurred in the environment of and within the political 
system, together with the major players in politics forged the roles and functions of 
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the Ombudsman institution in Hong Kong. 
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Table 2 Summary on the development of Ombudsman 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Institutional 1. Assigned the 1. Release of a 1. Review and 
development OUMELCO the consultation revision on the 
(In terms of power to investigate document in 1986 legislation 
specialization & complaints and call 2. Legislation and 1992-94 
differentiation of for documents. Establishment of 2. Cancellation of 
roles or COMAC in 1988 referral system, & 
development of & 1989. expanded 
new roles) jurisdiction. 
Driving forces - Poor social - Expansion of the - The Governor's will 
(In terms of conditions as well as administration & 
changing the lack of more interventions as - Ombudsman's 
demands & intermediary between a result of social initiative and the 
internal pressure) the public and the reforms. deficiency of the 
government led to the COMAC. 
1966-67 Riots. - Enhanced social 
economic & well - Support from the 
-The JUCTICE being altering directly elected 





-The 1997 issue & 
1984 Sino British 




-Impacts of election. 
Resistance The civil service - Some Legislative - The civil service 
•� Councilor - Regional Urban & 
-The civil service Councils & affected 
agencies. 
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4.2 The Ombudsman Ordinance 
Going through the Ombudsman legislation is a way to understand the roles and 
functions of an Ombudsman because the creation of an Ombudsman usually lies upon 
an act or a constitution provision. The Hong Kong Ombudsman'^^ is not resting upon 
the Basic Law but has a statutory position. The Ombudsman Ordinance"^^ specifies 
the range of activities that an Ombudsman may involve. The legislation spells out the 
jurisdiction, power, and privilege of the Ombudsman, the rules and procedures that he 
has to follow and the restrictions imposed on his office. This section analyzes the 
Ombudsman Ordinance in order to identify the range of possible behavioral and 
institutional patterns as expected in and permitted by law. There were amendments on 
the legislation over the past sixteen years concerning the operation of the office 
especially in the early years. I will also figure out the important changes in the 
Ombudsman mandates and organization. The models designed by Heede will also be 
applied to describe the Ombudsman's features and classification. 
A. Jurisdiction 
It is spelled out in the Ordinance that the appointment of the Ombudsman is for 
conducting investigations. There are two possibilities that lead the Ombudsman to 
start an investigation. The first possibility is to start an investigation after receiving a 
complaint from a person. Another possibility is to initiate an investigation on his 
volition (direct investigation). In the first five years of the Office，the Ombudsman 
45 The Ombudsman was named as the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints until 1996. In this 
thesis the title 'Commissioner' and 'Ombudsman' are of the same meaning and will be used 
interchangeably. 
46 The Ombudsman Ordinance was originally named as the Commissioner of Administrative 
Complaints (COMAC) Ordinance that was enacted in February 1989 until the year of 1996. 
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does not have the right to initiate a direct investigation nor can the public have direct 
access to the office. The access to the Ombudsman is limited that complainants have 
to lodge a complaint with a member of the legislative council. The councilors refer 
the case to the Ombudsman in writing if he or she finds suitable. This arrangement 
was adopted by the British Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration since 
1967 when the office came into operation. The Ombudsman was attributed both 
power in the 1994 amendment on the legislation. 
Nature of jurisdiction 
No matter an investigation is caused by a complaint or is started upon the 
Ombudsman's own initiative, the central, if not the only, premise is that a person 
"may have sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in connection with 
that action". Provided with this premise, "the Ombudsman may investigate any action 
taken by or on behalf o f ~ a n organization set out in Part I of Schedule 1 (of the 
Ordinance) in the exercise of its administrative functions’，.47 In this provision, three 
notions outlined the functions of the Ombudsman as well as the range of activities that 
his investigation may include: administrative functions, maladministration and the 
feeling of injustice. The Ombudsman is not entitled to investigate any injustice that is 
not caused by maladministration that occurs when an organization exercises its 
administrative functions. In other words, the Ombudsman's investigation activities are 
bound within the maladministration which are caused by administrative actions of a 
list of organizations. The boundary is far from clear unless the meaning of 
„ administration or administrative and maladministration is defined. 
47 Ombudsman Ordinance s 7. 
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Injustice is the feeling of a complainant or any person whom the Ombudsman 
thinks may have such a feeling. But we simply do not know whether there is really an 
injustice unless an investigation is carried out. According to the ordinance, the 
meaning of "action" should be interpreted to include "omission, recommendation or 
decision，，48. The meaning of "administrative" is, however, not as clear as the meaning 
of action. The Ordinance has not defined the realm of administration or administrative. 
Clark and McCoy refer the meaning of "in the exercise of administrative functions" to 
the judgment of Canadian and Australian courts, which means "anything that is 
outside judicial and legislative matters”.49 So, any government actions that are neither 
judicial nor legislative are administrative actions. This definition perceives a broad 
jurisdiction of an Ombudsman that may not be accepted by everyone particularly the 
administration. The difficulty of defining the nature and scope of administrative 
actions makes the jurisdiction of Ombudsman unclear and contributed to 
controversies over his competence. According to Cooray, the Hong Kong 
Administration differentiates 'administration' from 'policy' and holds the view that 
the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is in respect of 'administration' but not 'policy'. 
However, the (second) Ombudsman has rejected this argument saying that the 
ordinance draws no distinction between 'policy' and 'administration'. The 
Ombudsman continued to state that if an unfair administrative decision emanated 
from an unfair policy, no investigation would be complete without examining the 
validity of the policy itself. 5 � S o , the spectrum of administration is open to 
interpretation. 
48 Ombudsman Ordinance s 1. 
49 Clark and McCoy, 1993，p. 81. 
Cooray, quoted from the Ombudsman's 1995 Annual Report, "Ombudsman in Asia A Case-study of 
Hong Kong and Sri Lanka", in Gregory and Giddings ed., 2000, pp. 77- 78. 
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Without specifying the meaning of administration, the Ordinance does interpret 
the concept of maladministration. "Maladministration means inefficient，bad or 
improper administration", which includes unreasonable conduct, abuse of power 
(including discretionary power) or authority and unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or 
improperly discriminatory procedures. Examples of the unreasonable conduct are 
delay, discourtesy and lack of consideration for a person affected by any action. 
Power abuse can be in the forms of unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory actions and so forth. Maladministration concerns the conduct, the use 
of power or authority and the procedures of administration. Conduct is about the 
standard of behaviour that the practitioners should have such as the ways and attitude 
of treating a client. Power and authority is about whether the administrators use it 
properly. Procedure is about if the flows that lead to a decision is appropriate. These 
are examples of maladministration and are not meant to be an exhaustive list so that 
the space for the Ombudsman to have his own interpretation is reserved by this 
intentional ambiguity. ^^  Nevertheless, it does mean that jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman is much restricted. Maladministration is being understood as the 
violation of a set of proper attitudes, standard procedures or appropriate usage of 
power such as inefficiency，omission, discrimination, discourtesy, and so forth but 
never refers to the merits or desirability of a decision to the recipient of service if 
there is no maladministration in the process. In this sense, the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman is rather limited with its sole focus on maladministration. 
It is commented by Kuan that the limitations imposed on jurisdiction of the 
British Ombudsman's are the greatest one among others in the world because it can 
Interview, the Assistant Ombudsman, October 6，2006. 
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only investigate citizens' complaints that involved maladministration.^^ The situation 
in Hong Kong is similar. The nature of the Hong Kong Ombudsman is a classical 
Ombudsman whose jurisdiction is confined to investigate injustice caused by bad 
administrative actions. Unlike the hybrid Ombudsman of some countries, the function 
of combating corruption and human rights violation are not the duty of the Hong 
Kong Ombudsman, although the Ombudsman does bring in the human right 
perspective in judging if an administrative action is good or bad or discriminatory^^. 
The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is rather limited as it is restricted to the 
investigation of maladministration only. The lack of a clear conception of 
administration in the Ordinance, however, allows some flexibility in the domains of 
the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. The limit of the office's activities is subject to the 
Ombudsman's own initiative and progressiveness on one hand, as well as the 
administration's and maybe also the legislature's preferences on the other hand. 
Mandate in functional sense 
Having discussed the nature of the Ombudsman jurisdiction, I will further clarify 
the extent of his jurisdiction by using Heede's models. Mandate in functional sense 
concerns what the Ombudsman can review. Heede suggests that there are three 
possible choices of review: factual acts，individual decisions and general measures 
(legislative acts and policy decisions).54 According to the ordinance, the Ombudsman 
may exercise his power "notwithstanding any provision in any law to the effect that 
any decision shall be final, or that no appeal shall lie in respect thereof, or that no 
proceeding or decision of the organization whose decision it is shall be challenged, 
52 Kuan, 1981，p. 33. 
53 Interview, the Assistant Ombudsman, October 6, 2006. And also see "Ombudsman and the 
Protection of Human Rights in Hong Kong" that published by the Ombudsman Office in 1998. 
Heede, 2000, p. 88. 
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reviewed, quashed, or called in question"^^. This provision clearly states that any 
decision, no matter the action is made on behalf of the department or by an individual, 
is subject to the Ombudsman's investigation if there is evidence showing that decision 
may involve maladministration even if its finality is backed by other law. Of course, 
the decision must be made by an organization that is under the Ombudsman's 
jurisdiction and this will be discussed in next part. The Ombudsman can investigate 
and criticize the factual acts, say delay，discourtesy and any illegal acts, of civil 
servants. However, two rules should be followed. The Ombudsman shall not disclose 
the identity of "any officer of the organization whose action is the subject of the 
investigation or who is otherwise involved in the investigation" but it does not mean 
the name of an organization cannot be disclosed^^. Besides, if the Ombudsman found 
that "there may be sufficient grounds for him to make any report or recommendation 
that may criticize or adversely affect any officer，organization or person he shall give 
the officer，head or the organization affected or person an opportunity to be heard"^^. 
These two provisions are to ensure secrecy and fair procedure and judgment. As for 
investigating general measure that refers to legislative acts and policy decisions, since 
legislative acts are not in the domain of administration, it is not under the jurisdiction 
of the Ombudsman. Yet, it is ambiguous that whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction 
over policy decisions even if maladministrations are emanated from policy decisions. 
It is pointed out in the last part that the administration and the second Ombudsman do 
not have a consensus on whether administration should be distinguished from policy. 
Although one may argue that maladministrations caused by the merits of a policy are 
not the same as the result of exercising administrative functions, it is clear that 
’ ordinance has not addressed this question directly. Moreover, it is questionable that 
55 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 7 (2). 
56 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 16A(2c) & (3). 
57 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 12 (6). 
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whether maladministration should include merit of decision as the concept refers 
mainly to procedure taken in the course of decision-making, and the efficiency and 
conduct of administrators. 
There are four restrictions upon the actions that the Ombudsman can investigate. 
The first one is about the restrictions upon investigation of complaints. The 
Ombudsman shall not undertake or continue an investigation into a complaint if other 
channels of appeal or review are available in law. It is said in the Ordinance, if the 
complainant has or had "under any Ordinance, a right of appeal or objection, or a 
right to apply for a review, on the merits of the case, to the Chief Executive, the Chief 
Executive in Council, any tribunal constituted by or under any Ordinance, or any 
board or other authority so constituted;" or ‘‘a remedy by way of proceedings in a 
court, other than by way of judicial review, or in any tribunal constituted by or under 
any Ordinance" the Ombudsman should not investigate unless he is satisfied that it is 
not reasonable to expect the complainant to resort to or have resorted to that right or 
CO ^ ^ 
remedy in that particular circumstance. The other three restrictions refer to three 
kinds of actions. One is the action "taken in matters certified by the Chief Executive 
as affecting security, defence or international relations (including relations with any 
international organization) in respect of Hong Kong"^^ and the other type is "the 
commencement or conduct of any proceedings, whether civil or criminal, before a 
court of law or tribunal in Hong Kong..."^® The final type of actions are those 
contractual or commercial related actions and personnel or pension matters , 
58 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 10 (e). 
59 Ombudsman Ordinance, Schedule 2(1). 
6° Ombudsman Ordinance, Schedule 2 (2). 
61 Ombudsman Ordinance, Schedule 2 (4) & (5). 
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The Ombudsman can conduct both legality and non-legality review of the 
actions within his jurisdiction. The Ombudsman is entitled to investigating factual 
acts and individual decision by the Ordinance, while the possibility of investigating 
policy decisions is not prohibited or guaranteed. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman 
is clearly detached from the legislature and the courts. One provision also specifies 
that anything said or admitted in the process of mediation and any document prepared 
for the purposes "shall not be admissible in evidence against any person in any court 
or at any inquiry or in any other proceedings"^^. Given the ambiguity of the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction over policy decisions as well as the merit of administrative 
decisions, section 9 of the Ordinance allows the Ombudsman to determine whether to 
undertake, continue or discontinue an investigation in accordance with his own 
discretion. The Select Committee of the British Parliamentary Commissioner actually 
encourages the Ombudsman to question, by way of inference, the merits of a 
discretionary decision taken without procedural faults. Without such a select 
committee in Hong Kong, the Ombudsmen might still define the extent of 
administration in every case by his discretionary power to determine. 
Mandate in organizational sense 
Mandate in organizational sense refers to the categories of organizations that are 
under the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. As a classical Ombudsman, the mandate of the 
Hong Kong Ombudsman includes mainly administrative organs. Schedule 1 of the 
Ordinance lists out the organizations that the Ordinance covers. All government 
departments and agencies are under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman except the 
police and the ICAC. Some major statutory and independent organizations are also on 
62 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 11 (7b). 
63 Kuan, 1981, p. 37. 
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the list such as the Airport Authority and the Office of the Privacy Commission for 
Personal Data. With the trend of out-sourcing services by government departments, 
the Ombudsman can investigate any action taken on behalf of a listed organization. 
The coverage of the ordinance had been expanding. A major change happened in 1994 
after the reform of the Office and the subsequent amendment on the Ordinance. The 
"jurisdiction is extended to include six major statutory bodies established Government, 
viz the Mass Transit Railway Corporation, the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation, 
the Securities and Futures Commission, the Urban Council, the Regional Council and 
the Hong Kong Housing Authority，，.64 In 1996 amendment on the Ordinance, the 
Ombudsman was empowered to investigate complaints of non-compliance with the 
Code On Access to Information against all governments and agencies.^^ 
The legislature (except the Legislative Council Secretariat) and the judiciary are 
excluded from the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. We can expect the Ombudsman would 
interact mostly with the executive organizations. 
B. Beyond investigation of complaints 
The Ombudsman may involve in activities other than investigation of complaints. 
Mediation can be adopted by the Office to handle the complaints involving no or 
minor maladministration, if both the complainant and the complained party are 
willing to do so.66 Mediation is treated as a method of alternative disputes resolution 
by the office. This means, the Ombudsman not only arbitrates but also possesses the 
function of settling disputes when a complaint is not entirely about right or wrong 
64 The COMAC Annual Report 1995’ p. 3, paragraph 2.2 (b). 
65 Tai，inReif’2001,p. 80. 
66 Ombudsman Ordinance, s IIB. 
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behaviour or procedure. A provision of mediation was added into the Ordinance in 
1996 but it was practiced since the first Ombudsman. The Ombudsman cannot act as 
the mediator but the staffs in his office do the job. Mediation training is provided with 
the introduction of the service. Secondly, Ombudsman also refers cases to the 
complained departments or organizations for Internal Complaint Handling (INCH) or 
to seek explanation or suggest remedial actions from the complained organization 
through the process of Rendering Assistance/ Clarification (RAC) under the consent 
of the complainant. These methods are adopted by the Office to deal with simple 
cases for the sake of efficiency and to determine whether a full investigation should 
be conducted.67 These two methods are not mentioned in the Ordinance but are what 
section 11A of the Ordinance一"Preliminary Inquires" are about. So, other than an 
investigator and a mediator, the Ombudsman may act as a referrer who distributes 
cases or as a facilitator who collects and transfers information as well as suggests 
remedies. These methods suggest the possible roles of the Ombudsman, however, the 
relative importance of these roles, in terms of the actual proportion of the 
Ombudsman's works or their impact, is an empirical question that needs to be found 
out. 
C. Power of investigation 
To enable the Ombudsman to better perform his roles and functions, he is 
accorded some power during the course of investigation by the Ordinance. The 
Ombudsman "may obtain any information, document or thing from such persons, and 
make such enquiries, as he thinks fit" and is free to regulate his procedure of 
investigation. The Ombudsman can summon and examine any person who is able to 
67 Annual Report of the Ombudsman, 2004，paragraphs 4.4-4.7. 
68 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 12 (3). 
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give information relating to the action being investigated. The Ombudsman can also 
require the person being summoned "to furnish to him any information and to produce 
any document" if he or she possessed so, whether or not it is in the custody or under 
the control of any organization.^^ The access of the Ombudsman to information and 
document is further guaranteed by a provision mentioning that the disclosure of any 
information, document or other things for the purpose of investigation should not be 
restricted by the legally imposed obligation to maintain secrecy or other restriction. 
Also, it is said that the Ordinance shall be sufficient authority for the disclosure and 
production of such materials，However, the Ombudsman cannot access "any 
information or document is certified by the Chief Executive that it "might prejudice 
security, defense or international relations" or those certified by the Chief Secretary 
for Administration that might prejudice the investigation of crime or involve the 
disclosure of the deliberations of the Executive Council without the consent of the 
Chief Executive.” 
Besides the access to information and document, the Ombudsman can enter and 
inspect any premises occupied, managed or controlled by an organization. Witnesses 
are being protected like those engaged in civil proceeding in the Supreme Court. 
Non-compliance and hindering the Ombudsman from exercising his power under the 
Ordinance and the making of false statement are offences. Finally, The Ombudsman 
enjoys some privilege and protection in his conduction of investigation and 
publication as he and his staff are exempted from civil liability and the charge of 
defamation. 
69 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 13 (1). 
7° Ombudsman Ordinance, s 13 (3a,b). 
71 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 14 (a) (b). 
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D. Decisions and their enforcement 
The Ombudsman may adopt mediation, INCH or RAC to deal with a compliant 
before deciding to conduct a full investigation. So, he may be able to solve the 
complaint with any of these methods without making any decision. However, after an 
investigation being carried out, whether it is followed by a complaint or is a direct 
investigation, the Ombudsman can decide if the compliant is substantiated or partially 
substantiated or if there is any problem in the practice of an organization. The 
Ombudsman may report his opinion and reason to the department head of the affected 
department or if he finds it is not suitable, report to the Chief Executive. He may do 
so together with a statement of any remedy, a statement of any recommendation or the 
comment made by or on behalf of the head of the organization affected. The 
Ordinance listed the circumstances when the Ombudsman may find a list to issue a 
report, they included: if there is evidence of maladministration, any matter that should 
be referred to the head of the affected organization for further consideration, any 
omission should be rectified, the action should be cancelled or varied, any practice 
should be altered, any view of the law should be reconsidered, reasons should have 
been given or any other steps should be taken.72 
Regarding the enforcement of the Ombudsman's opinion, the affected head of 
organization is assumed to act upon the Ombudsman's opinion within a reasonable 
period of time. The decision of the Ombudsman is in form of opinion or 
recommendation that is not binding legally. So, the actualization of the opinion, on 
one hand, relies on the voluntary compliance of the organizations and on the other 
hand, relies on the direct access of the Ombudsman to the Chief Executive. It is 
72 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 16 (1) (a-h). 
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mentioned in Ordinance, if the Ombudsman finds that the report is not adequately 
acted upon, he "may submit the report and recommendations, together with such 
further observations" to the Chief Executive. Or, in the opinion of the Ombudsman 
that a serious irregularity or injustice has taken place, a further report can be made to 
the Chief Executive and "a copy of the report shall be laid before the legislative 
council". We may say that the enforcement of the Ombudsman's opinion is politically 
backed. The Ombudsman relies on the publicity of the mass media as well. The right 
to publish investigation report is one important reform of the office in 1992 review. 
Public pressure helps the enforcement of the Ombudsman's recommendation, but only 
indirectly. One thing to note is the decision of the Ombudsman is final but though it is 
subject to judicial review. 
E. Appointment and removal 
The Chief Executive or the Governor (before 1997) appoints the Ombudsman for 
a five-year term and the appointee is eligible to be reappointed. The appointment 
does not require the consent of the legislature. The Chief Executive also decides the 
salary and other terms and conditions of the Ombudsman. A member of the legislative 
council suggested in the legislative debate over the establishment of the Ombudsman 
in 1988 that the Ombudsman should be nominated by the legislative council and 
appointed by the Governor.^^ The suggestion was not accepted and the Ombudsman 
reports to the Chief Executive directly. A provision that is added into Ordinance in 
2001 specifying that the Ombudsman "shall not be regarded as servant or agent of 
government or as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Government", but 
73 Hong Kong Legislative Council, Official Report of Proceedings, 8 April 1987. 
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is a public servant within the meaning of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.?* This 
provision, together with other "delinking" measures taken since the late 1990s such as 
the gradual replacement of all civil servants with contract staff and empowering the 
Ombudsman to set terms and conditions of appointment for staff, aim at separating 
the Office from the Executive organizationally and symbolically. It should be noted 
that the linkage between the Ombudsman and the legislative council is much closer 
under the referral system since the Office can only react passively to the cases 
referred by the council. The Chief Executive can remove the Ombudsman from office 
with the approval by resolution of the legislative council on the ground of inability to 
discharge the functions of his office, or misbehaviour.^^ 
F. Conclusion: 
The Hong Kong Ombudsman followed the British model when it was established 
in 1988. The model has three characteristics, namely the jurisdiction of investigating 
maladministration, the referral system and cannot initiate investigation on the 
Ombudsman's volition. It is called the Parliamentary Ombudsman Model according to 
Heede's classification. The model is mainly a control Ombudsman plan that deals 
with individual complaint. The Ombudsman is controlled by the parliament and by 
the referral system. The main function is to enhance the legitimacy of the executive 
through supplementing the parliamentary control over the legislature. These elements 
can be found in the early year of the Ombudsman before the reform in 1994. A 
difference is that the function of redressing grievance was also emphasized during the 
process of legislation. It is due to the lack of specialized and independent channels for 
complaints. After the 1994 reform of the Office, the Hong Kong Ombudsman 
74 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 6B. 
75 Ombudsman Ordinance, s 3 (4b). 
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deviated from the Parliamentary Model and became a mixed one. The Ombudsman is 
empowered to initiate investigation without receiving a complaint and is given quite 
sufficient power of investigation. The Ombudsman can investigate almost all 
government departments and some major statutory bodies. In these aspects, the 
Ombudsman is as powerful as the Citizen's Ombudsman Model or is called a 
super-Ombudsman who oversees all public organizations. However, the Ombudsman 
is far less powerful than a super-Ombudsman in the sense that his mandate in 
functional sense is restricted to individual acts of civil servants or may include 
administrative decisions at most. The decisions and recommendations of the 
Ombudsman are not binding too. The Hong Kong Ombudsman is between a Discount 
Alternative Ombudsman and Parliamentary Ombudsman regarding his mandate in 
functional sense, criterion of review, types of decision and enforcing power. The 
Ombudsman is an alternative to court in the sense that it conducts mediation to less 
complex complaints. But his decisions are backed by the executive and legislature 
instead of court ruling. Also, the Ombudsman adopts both legality and non-legality 
review. The Hong Kong Ombudsman is different from the parliamentary model in a 
significant way that its relationship with the legislature is not as close as the 
parliamentary Ombudsman does. Although the Chief Executive appoints the 
Ombudsman, it is expected to act independently from the executive, the legislature 
and the executive. It is envisaged as an independent body to ensure the accountability 
of the administration and to enhance the legitimacy of the executive. The control 
functional of the Ombudsman is strengthened by his power to initiate direct 
investigation. 
Sufficient power was granted to the Ombudsman to conduct investigation on a not 
so large jurisdiction. Although the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is quite limited as it is 
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restricted to the investigation maladministration, there are still some rooms of 
expanding the range of maladministration by the Ombudsman. The meaning of 
maladministration can be interpreted as restricted and narrow as the maladministration 
found in administrative procedures; or as wide as covering the problems related to 
merits of administrative decision and policies. 
According to the Ordinance, the Ombudsman should interact most closely and 
intensively with government organizations especially those which are being 
frequently complained. In many occasions, the Ombudsman has to inform the head of 
the complained organizations such as to tell the head of organization about his 
intention to investigate and the results of an investigation. The Ombudsman may 
request information and production of document, refer cases to departments for 
internal handling, ask for responses from the head, ask for reasons, make a 
recommendation, comment or even criticize the practice of a department and so forth. 
The Ombudsman would also interact with the complainants and the mass media but to 
a lesser extent. In short, the Ordinance suggests the kinds of activities that the 
Ombudsman may involve in, the possible roles he may play and his relations with 
other institutions. Among these possibilities, the Ombudsman may have preference 
over any other choices, but the actual patterns of his behaviour are also subject to the 
cases that he receives and the public's expectations of the office. The next section is 
going to find out these. 
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Table 4 Summary on the powers and functions of the Hong Kong Ombudsman as 
specified in the Ombudsman Ordinance 
Ombudsman before 1994 Ombudsman after 1994 
1. Access Individual concerned who is 1. Direct access of 
referred by a Member of individual 
Legislative Council 2. On the Ombudsman's 
own initiative 
2. Mandate (organizational Almost all government Almost all government 
sense) departments departments 
Major statutory bodies 
3. Mandate (functional Maladministration Maladministration 
sense) 
4. Review criterion Legality and non-legality Legality and non-legality 
review review 
5. Investigative powers 1. Request for files 1. Request for files 
2. Inspect premises 2. Inspect premises 
3. Summon and 3. Summon and 
examination examination 
6. Decision Recommendation for 1. Mediation 
correction and prevention 2. Recommendation for 
correction and 
prevention 
7. Enforcing powers Political backup 1. Political backup 
2. Publication of reports 
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4.3 The perception and expectation on the Ombudsman 
Through reviewing the history of the development of the of Ombudsman, one 
would understand that the lack of independent channels for complaints and redress of 
grievances, the need for agency to ensure accountability of the executive in face of the 
political uncertainty brought by the issue of 1997, and the urges for more 
representation in governance are the factor contributing to the establishment of the 
Ombudsman. The establishment of the COMAC in 1989 is a response to these 
demands in the environment of and internal pressures within the Hong Kong political 
system. The Ombudsman Ordinance described how this solution is like such as the 
range of the Ombudsman's activities, the procedure of his work, the powers that he 
entitled to apply, and the actors who may involve in his activities. Although the 
Ombudsman is defined as a complaint channel of only maladministration, he is 
attributed with sufficient power to conduct investigations; a mechanism is set up to 
ensure the compliance of the public organizations under his jurisdiction and can 
operate independently. The Ordinance does outline the possibilities and restrictions of 
the Ombudsman, yet cannot tell the actual roles and function of the Ombudsman. It is 
pointed out in the last section that the mandate of the Ombudsman in functional sense 
still has some rooms for interpretation. Moreover, as the role of the Ombudsman is 
largely determined by the actors who participated in the process, one cannot find out 
the Ombudsman's role without looking at the case that his clients brought to the 
Office, the general public's, his potential clients', expectation and perception of his 
roles and function, the reactions of the departments, and of course the Ombudsmen's 
own perception of his or her roles. This section is going to discuss the expectations 
and perceptions of the general public and the Ombudsman's own perception of his 
roles and functions. The next section will scrutinize the cases brought by his clients 
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and the direct investigations conducted, the complaint handling methods and the 
responses of the public organizations in order to find out the Ombudsman's 
regularized behavioral patterns and interrelationships with the complainants and 
affected public organizations. 
A. Public perceptions and expectations 
This part analyzes the general public's expectation and perception of the roles and 
functions of the Ombudsman. Since the regularized pattern of behaviour of a political 
structure is established by one's own expectation and action as well as those of others, 
the general public's expectation should be one of the factors affecting the behavioral 
pattern of the Ombudsman apart from those of the complainants and the Ombudsman 
himself, although the degree of their influence may differ. The survey results of the 
Census and Statistics Department, other polling and articles in newspaper or on the 
websites of some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are adopted in the 
analysis. 
Awareness of and knowledge on the Ombudsman Office 
The Census and Statistics Department conducted three household surveys in 
1997, 2000 and 2004 respectively about the public awareness of and perception of the 
Ombudsman as requested by the Ombudsman Office. The target of the survey is the 
general public so that the respondents may have never used the services of the Office. 
“ In the 2004 survey, about 13.8% of the respondents have the experience of 
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complaining a government or public organization.^^ The surveys have samples about 
nine to ten thousands households. A person of twelve (in the 1997 survey) or 
fifteen-year old or above was selected from each household randomly. In the 1997 
survey77, the respondents were being asked of whether they had heard of the Office of 
The Ombudsman. About 51.3% of them heard of the Office and about 34% of these 
51.3% of people could tell that the work of the Office is to handle complaints against 
government departments. 23.4% of these 51.3% of respondents were partially correct 
that they answered the Office is to handle complaints but did not mention what types 
of complaint. The rest 40% had no idea about the work of the Ombudsman. The 
public was still not clear about the function or even the existence of such a complaint 
channel. This could be due to the short history and the referral system adopted in the 
early period of the Office. The Ombudsman Office had been running for about six 
years at the time of the survey but only two years for the direct complaint system^^. 
Publicity was regarded as a very important task by the first and second Ombudsmen. 
Another figure also shows that the Ombudsman is not well known to the public in this 
period. The first Ombudsman, Mr. Arthur Garcia, was a candidate in the first Chief 
Executive election. In a poll conducted by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion 
Programme at a similar time in November 1996^^ the recognition rate of him is the 
lowest among the five candidates. The rate was 36.3% and only 189 respondents in a 
total sample of 521 were counted as valid raters. While all the other candidates 
received over 60% recognition rate and the highest one was 79.9%. 
In the 2000 and 2004 surveys, the same question was not being asked. We may 
76 The Sixteenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 2004，Annex 13. 
77 The survey was actually conducted during February to April 1996. 




still interpret people's knowledge of and the popularity of the Office from another 
question. The respondents were being asked to choose the channel(s) that they would 
approach for lodging a complaint about the maladministration of a government 
department or public body from a list of ten organizations. The Ombudsman Office 
ranked third in 2000 that 22.3% of the respondents had chosen the option and ranked 
fin _ 
fourth in 2004 that 9.8% of the respondents had chosen Office. The figures did not 
show the proportion of people who know about the services of the Office but two 
things are reflected. Firstly, it shows that people were able to differentiate the 
Ombudsman from those institutions that are less suitable or specialized for 
complaining maladministration of the administration, such as the ICAC, the Equal 
Opportunities Commission and the Legislative Council or members of the Legislative 
Council. Secondly, it reflects the preferences of people in choosing the channels of 
complaint. The survey reports concluded that the level of education and age are the 
factors affecting their choice. A higher proportion of persons who had attained tertiary 
education tended to choose the departmental complaint channel, media and the 
Ombudsman when compared to the less educated persons.^^ In the 2004 survey, the 
respondents were asked to explain their choice of compliant channels. Convenient 
(44.5%), can handle complaints timely (27.2%) and can raise the public concern or 
can exert pressure on the concerned departments (23.3%) were the three most popular 
explanations of the respondents.^^ This question help us to understand what factors 
8G In 2000，the District Council/ members of District Council ranked first (45.9%), complaint channel 
of the department/ public body concerned ranked second (39.4%), The Office of the Ombudsman 
ranked third (25.7%) and Media ranked fourth (21.9%). 
In 2003，complaint channel of the department/ public body concerned ranked first (25.1%), the District 
Council/ members of District Council ranked second (19.8%), Media ranked third 04.7%) and The 
Office of the Ombudsman ranked fourth (9.8%). 
It should be noted that since the respondents were allowed to choose multiple answers, the percentage 
is only useful to compare the relative popularity between different channels in the same year but not 
suitable for doing cross year comparisons. 
81 Thematic Household Survey Report No. 4, paragraph 4.6 and No. 17，paragraph 4.6. 
82 The Sixteenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 2004, Annex 13. The percentage in bracket is 
the proportion of the respondents who chose the option. 
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affect the choice of complainants on the complaint channels but the report did not tell 
whether there exists a causal relationship between the ranking of the District Council 
and the Department concerned, the mass media or the Ombudsman and these three 
factors. 
Although the public is believed to have a better knowledge of complaint 
handling functions of the Ombudsman, they have little knowledge regarding the 
power of the Office to conduct direct investigation. Only 22.4% of the respondents in 
2000 and 20.6% of the respondents in 2004 told that they were aware of this function. 
Among these some 20% of people, they thought that "putting pressure on the 
department/ public body concerned to make improvements" are the most effective 
function of conducting own-motion direct investigations in the two years. Their 
ratings on other criteria used in measuring the effectiveness of direct investigation are 
quite random in the two surveys. 
Expectation towards the Ombudsman 
The 2000 and 2004 surveys asked the respondents about their "expectation of 
outcome would be achieved after lodging a complaint to the Office of The 
Ombudsman. The respondents can select more than one choice from seven options 
which includes: preventing recurrence of similar problems (this option is not available 
in 2000, another option of preventing abuse of power was provided instead), 
improving the efficiency and quality of service in the public sector, investigating the 
complaint and finding out whether it is substantiated, recommending specific 
remedial actions for the maladministration to the department, requesting apologies 
from the department concerned, and recommending monetary compensation form the 
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department concerned. The ranking of these options are quite different in these two 
years. However, asking for remedial actions, that is apologies or financial 
compensation from the concerned department or organization ranked the lowest in 
both years. It reflects that these two functions are the least important reasons when 
they considered lodging a complaint to the Ombudsman. The ranking of seeking 
arbitration, that is to find out whether the complaint is substantiated or not, are quite 
high in both years. It ranked second in 2000 and third in 2004. The ranking of 
improving efficiency and quality is similar to arbitration in the two year. 
Perception of the Ombudsman 
The perception of people towards the Ombudsman Office can be interpreted 
from how people score the different aspects for accessing the performance of the 
Ombudsman Office. The confidentiality and the impartiality of the Office received 
the highest score in both years. The provision of useful information and advice also 
ranked higher then other aspects in both years that in 2000, it ranked third in 2000 and 
ranked fourth in 2004. However, the ranking of the other eight aspects varied a lot in 
these two surveys. So, we may be able to conclude that confidentiality and 
impartiality are the strongest or clearest perceptions among people. However, it 
should be noted that the mean score^ "^  of these nine aspects are quite close to each 
83 The were a list of 10 aspects and the respondents were required to choose 5 criteria that they think 
are most important in assessing the Ombudsman. The survey reports have not listed out the frequency 
of each option being chosen by respondents. The criteria included: keeping information confidential 
and protecting the privacy of complainants. Objective and free from undue influence or interference. 
Helpful and courteous staff. Providing useful information and advice. Informing complainants of the 
progress regularly. Providing easily accessible complaint channels for complainants. Offering speedy 
action and resolution within pre-determined time limits. Identification of critical issues in complaints. 
Making scope of service conspicuous to the public. Clear explanation f reasons for making the relevant 
decisions. 
84 "Mean score of performance in respect of each criterion was calculated by assigning 3 marks to the 
option "good performance", 2 to "average performance" and 1 to "poor performance". Persons who 
answered "do not know" were not counted.", a note in the Thematic Reports. 
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other. The differences between the highest and the lowest score are in 0.37 in 2000 
and 0.35 in 2004. The assessment of some of these criteria, such as offering speedy 
action and resolution and providing clear explanation of reasons for making relevant 
decisions actually requires some knowledge on the Ombudsman Office or even 
firsthand experience of using the service. So, this may help to explain why the ratings 
of some aspects are indifferent to the respondents although they may think those are 
important assessment criteria. 
Perception of the Ombudsman vs. perception of the Ombudsman institution 
A distinction can be made between the perception of the Ombudsman and the 
perception of the Ombudsman as an institution in the Hong Kong political system. 
The mass media, pressure groups and some members of the legislative council 
questioned about the independence of the institution, which mainly due to the 
appointment system. The Ombudsman is appointed or reappointed by the Chief 
Executive or the Governor (in the past). The main problem of this method is that the 
executive has the power to choose between the two: being watched by a person he 
preferred or to avoid being watched by somebody who is stringent towards the 
administration. It is a common criticism that the system hampered the independence 
of the institution and may lead to the appointment of less progressive Ombudsman so 
that the functions of the Ombudsman to check maladministration of the administration 
suffered. 
The worry and suspicion of the lack of independence of the institution is both 
due to the design theoretically and the issues arose during the appointment of new 
Ombudsmen. "Over the past few years, there have been several controversies over the 
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failure to re-appoint those who perform their job properly, fairly and without fear and 
favour to anybody including the Government." The sudden departure of the second 
Ombudsman Mr. Andrew So Kwok-wing is an frequently quoted example in the 
critics. Before the termination of his tenure on 31 January 1999, So declared his 
intention to be reappointed but the government did not announce that he would not be 
reappointed until one month before the termination of his contract. At that time, the 
government still had not decided the successor to So and the new Ombudsman Ms. 
or 
Alice Tai Yuen-ying assumed her office in April. It is commonly believed that this 
was due to So's "tough stand in favour of the clients and the public against the 
Government on issues within their purview" . More importantly, it was due to his 
own-motion investigation on the chaotic operations in the opening of the new airport 
n o ^ ^ 
in Chek Lap Kok on 1 July 1997. The report was released in January 1999, shortly 
before the termination of his contract. 
The distinction is clear here: the public generally appreciates the thoroughness of 
So in performing his task of checking the government but at the same time is doubtful 
about the appointment system of the Ombudsman institution. Lo commented, "So 
adopted an aggressive attitude toward both the Pattern and Tung administrations, 
publicizing departmental mistakes and leading to follow-up action by legislators. 
Quite often, government departments were so alienated by So's high-profile criticisms 
that they had to respond immediately to his reports.”89 The Hong Kong Human 
Rights Monitor points out a risk that "there are no clear reasons as to why his contract 
85 "Eco appointment and independence of statutory watchdogs", The Hong Kong Voice of Democracy, 
29, July 2002. 
8
6何秀蘭’ 二零零三年五月二十一，《處理市民申訴的法定組織的獨立性》I� 
87 "Eco appointment and independence of statutory watchdogs", The Hong Kong Voice of Democracy, 
29, July 2002. 
88 Lo，2001，p. 92; Hong Kong human rights monitor，1998;何秀蘭 ’ 二零零二，二零零三. 
89 Lo, 2001, p. 92. 
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will not be continued" so that "the non-renewal of his contract will also exert pressure 
on his successor, Ms. Alice Tai, to “behave，，^ The suspicions on the independence of 
the Ombudsman further strengthened by Tai's connections with the Government. Tai 
was a civil servant before being appointed as the Ombudsman and her husband was 
the Commissioner for Transport at the time of her appointment. A conflict of interest 
is perceived and this curbs the role of the Ombudsman too. She was criticized of 
being relatively weak. Lo commented, "Overall, the COMAC remains a check against 
the bureaucracy's abuse of power, but its public profile and aggressiveness are 
conspicuously much weaker than the Ombudsman led by Andrew So." For instance, 
she did not take any initiative to look into the piling Scandal and the possible 
maladministration in universities and the UGC's internal operations.^^ In spite of 
these criticisms, Tai was reappointed in 2004 for the tenure of another five years. The 
distrust over the independence of the Ombudsman is originated from the appointment 
system. The Government was urged to reform the appointments of the human rights 
watchdogs according to the "Paris Principle" and establish a nomination committee in 
the legislation council that responsible for the nomination and enquiry work before 
the appointment by the Chief Executive in order to enhance the transparency and 
participation of the selection process so as the independence of the these institutions? 
The Government should also "refrain form doing anything that may actually 
undermine the independence of these bodies (statutory watchdogs) or create a public 
impression that their independence is being undermined".^^ 
9° Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, 1998，"Top ten human right issues, independence of the 
Ombudsman at Risk", http://hkhm.org.hk/english/reports/eng_10hri.html 
91 Lo, 2001, p. 93. So refer to the issue of "the call by the representatives of the eight higher education 
institutions to set up an independent body monitoring the performance of universities was rejected by 
the HKSAR government. The former Secretary for Education and Manpower Wong Wing-ping said the 
government would not step into the administration of universities due to their "autonomy"." 
92何秀蘭，二零零三年五月二十一，《處理市民申訴的法定組織的獨立性》I� 
93 Hong Kong Voice of Democracy, July 2001. 
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Conclusion 
To conclude the public's perception of the Ombudsman, the public is 
increasingly aware of the existence of the Office and its functions of dealing with 
complaints against maladministration of the Government. The public generally hopes 
that the Office can improve the quality and efficiency of the administration and 
prevent the occurrence of similar problems after receiving people's complaints instead 
of helping the complainants to seek financial compensation or apologies. The role to 
do arbitration is also expected by the public. The public is not very aware of the 
Office's function of conducting own-motion investigation. Among those who know 
this function, they think its most prominent effect is to exert pressure on the 
Government. The independence of the Office is being criticized. It is a problem 
associated with the design of the institution and the Ordinance fundamentally. It 
should be noted that the above are the perceptions and expectations of the general 
public, which should be differentiated from those of the complainants, the real users. 
The expectations of the complainants when lodging a complaint with the Ombudsman 
should be a more direct factor that determines the role and function of the 
Ombudsman. This will be discussed in next section about the actions of the 
Ombudsman. 
G. Self-perception of the Ombudsmen 
The works of the Ombudsman involve participations of different parties and the 
Ombudsman needs to react to his complainants and the departments or statutory 
organizations. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman can have his own initiative in defining 
his roles and tasks. Different Ombudsmen may have their own perception and 
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expectation on their roles and tasks, which may contribute to their different emphasis, 
attitudes and ways of interacting with the complaints and complained department or 
organizations, and the measures that they introduced in holding their office. There 
were three Ombudsmen since the inception of the Office. This part tries to find out 
how the Ombudsmen perceive their roles and see if there is any difference and the 
actions they taken will be discussed in the next part. The annual reports of the Office 
are an important reference of the Ombudsmen's self-perception. The analysis will also 
be referred to an interview of the Assistant Ombudsman Mr. Tony Ma, which 
conducted in October 6. 
A thorough investigator of complaints 
In order to wipe the image of ULMECO as a government agency and to rebuild 
the Ombudsman's image in order to obtain trust and confidence of the public, the first 
Ombudsman, Mr. Arthur Garcia was engaged in activities of defining the role of 
Ombudsman through publicity and responding to the public's quires during the early 
years of the Office. In his second annual report to the Governor, Garcia defined his 
role explicitly and identifies six characteristics of an effective Ombudsman. He 
defined the Ombudsman as: 
"Someone who holds a public office, who has responsibility for 
investigating complaints against actions of official authorities and who is 
vested with adequate powers to enable him to look at these complaints in 
depth.，，94 
“ In Garcia's perception, the role of the Ombudsman mainly focuses on the redress 
function, which is to investigate the complaint of the public. However, this role is 
94 The Second Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1990’ paragraph 1.6. 
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different from an advocate of the complainants. He continued to explain the purpose 
of the Ombudsman, "the Ombudsman institution is firmly rooted in the principles of 
equity and justice; the belief in the importance of the individual in democratic 
Government; faith in the basic integrity of Government officials; and the pursuit of 
fundamental faimess."^^ So his job is to arbitrate whenever there is a dispute between 
the government and citizen according to the democratic principles of equity, justice 
and fairness. Garcia identified six necessary characteristics of an effective 
Ombudsman in performing these functions, namely, impartiality, integrity, 
thoroughness, speed, reasonableness and tenacity. ^ ^ In order to provide speedy 
resolution to the complainants, Garcia began to adopt the method of mediation or 
informal resolution in 1993 for handling simple and less complicated cases, 
particularly in relation to those concerning delays, lack of substantial response to 
enquires or those arise from misunderstanding.^^ In response to public perception of 
the lack of power to enforce his recommendations, Garcia clarified that the essential 
character of an Ombudsman is advisory. This advisory role complements legal 
remedies in the sense that it allows him to make recommendations on any matter that 
comes to his attention during an investigation. This is much wider than the scope 
given to the court in hearing an application for judicial review.^^ Garcia also believes 
that the effectiveness of his recommendation lies in the reasonableness of his findings 
and recommendations. 
For the institutional position of the Ombudsman, Garcia intended to establish a 
closer relationship with the legislative council. He suggested establishing a select 
95 The Second Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1990, paragraph 1.7. 
96 The Second Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1990，paragraph 1.8-1.14. 
97 The Fifth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1993, paragraph 3.5. 
98 The Second Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1990, paragraph 1.18. 
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committee in the legislative council to monitor the work of COMAC since his first 
report and also in the review on the COMAC Ordinance in 1992. Some more 
important functions of the select committee are to investigate the non-compliance of 
the public organizations and to review the power of the Ombudsman as described in 
the Ordinance. The aim of this proposal should be understood as a measure to depart 
his Office from the executive by linking to the legislative council. By drawing closer 
to an elected body, it is not only to better ensure the effective enforcement of the 
Ombudsman's recommendation but also a symbol of independence of the 
Ombudsman. In a model of separation of power, it is more reasonable to impose 
check on the executive by the legislature rather than by a body that has a close linkage 
with the executive. Moreover，the select committee can initiate regular review of the 
power of the Ombudsman and to study the problems with its operation in order to 
maintain its effectiveness. Although this suggestion was not accepted finally in the 
1992 legislative review, it reflects Garcia's view on the suitable institutional position 
of the Office. 
Regarding the relationship with the public organizations or government 
departments and the complainants, Garcia stated, "one of the principal objectives of 
this Office is to help maintain a proper balance between the citizen and the 
Government, the ultimate aim being to contribute to the greater efficiency and 
humanity of the administrative process." This balance is to be achieved by 
encouraging "people with legitimate grievances...to come forward with their 
complaints and to have such complaints investigated so that any wrong doing may be 
swiftly rectified not only in relation to the complainants concerned but in relation to 
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other citizens who may be similarly affected in the longer term”.99 In real practice, 
Garcia thought the relationship between the majority of departments and his Office 
was cordial. These departments generally accepted the fact that his role is not to 
conduct witch-hunts but to assist members of the public who may have genuine 
problems.• However, there are a handful of departments who are "too defensive 
over matters where mistakes have clearly been made" or too reluctant to respond to 
his inquiries in a manner that would facilitate the easy disposal of complaints lodged 
against them. There was also a case that a department had doubts about his discretion 
in undertaking the investigation of complaints.^^^ One the other hand, his relationship 
with the complainants is similar to that with the departments. Some disgruntled 
complainants have been critical of his findings but some (including members of the 
legislative council) expressed their appreciation to his Office. Garcia pointed that as 
an office that provides services to the public, relationship with complainants is very 
important to his operations although it is difficult to a s s e s s . 102 
Garcia perceived that his role is to investigate the public's complaints against 
maladministration of the Government departments so as to maintain a proper balance 
between the Government and the citizens. He thought that the primary aim of the 
Ombudsman is to provide redress to complainants who have genuine grievances. But 
at the same time，he believed that the effectiveness of the COMAC should not be 
measured only by the ability to enforce his recommendations. It is because at another 
side of the balance, the COMAC has to assure a citizen that the department's action is 
fair after providing the citizen with an explanation when his or her complaint is not 
99 The Fourth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1992, paragraph 1.6. 
100 The Third Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1991, paragraph 3.15. 
� 1 The Second Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1990, paragraph 3.16. 
102 The Third Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1991，paragraph 3.18-3.20. 
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substantiated. Garcia believed his Office is a catalyst for the government since its 
presence makes the government officials more vigilant in discharging their functions. 
By encouraging more legitimate complaints against the administration, Garcia 
believed that investigation of complaints not only lead to redress of grievances of 
single individuals but also contribute to improvement in terms of the fairness of 
administrative procedures that would benefit other members of the public through 
recommendations. In short, being a thorough investigator, Garcia sake to arbitrate 
disputes, redress grievances and advise on administrative changes such as policies and 
1 H'i 
procedures. The self-perception of Garcia matched Clark's description on him as 
"a former High Court judge who brought to the role a traditional independence from 
the executive and a very thorough style of administrative investigation’，�^ 
A catalyst in bringing about administrative improvements, greater transparency and 
responsiveness 
It is already pointed out that the role of the Ombudsman is a result of the 
interaction between several factors. The legislative review and the subsequent 
amendment on the COMAC Ordinance in 1994 was one of the important factors in 
reshaping the role of Ombudsman. The year 1994 marked "a new era" of the COMAC 
as regarded by the second Ombudsman Mr. Andrew So Kwok-wing. So assumed his 
office in conjunction with the enactment of the legislative amendment of the 
Ordinance. He welcomed the change as it led to the widening of his role and a new 
relationship with the public. The legislative amendment extended the power and 
jurisdiction of the COMAC by allowing direct access of the public to the Office, 
如 The Third Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1991, paragraph 3.12. 
Clark & McCoy，1993, p. 85-86. 
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empowering the office to initiate own-motion investigation without receiving a 
complaint, extending the coverage of Ordinance to more statutory organizations, 
allowing the Office to publish investigation reports through the mass media and 
adding the responsibility to investigate any alleged violation of the Code of Practice 
on Access to Information. In So's view, the cancellation of the referral system brought 
him closer to the public. By publishing his investigation reports, the public will be 
better informed about their rights, the standard of public services they can expect and 
the anticipated improvements as a result of his investigations and recommendations. 
This enhances his accountability to the public and helps educate the public about their 
rights. So also believes that the efficiency and effectiveness of his Office would be 
improved through prompt investigation into maladministration especially on some 
structural one once identified and making recommendation to improve the situation to 
prevent grievances and sufferings. Besides, the Code of Practice on Access to 
Information is compatible with the responsibility of the Office to enhance transparent 
and open government. ^ ^^  
Apart from responding to the legislative change, So also had a clear idea on his 
role as an Ombudsman. He announced the vision and mission statements of COMAC 
shortly after his assumption of office and defined his role in his first annual report. He 
pointed out that there had been wide discussion on the role played by Ombudsmen by 
his counterparts all over the world and he understands his role is to — 
a. promote fairness in the Administration; 
b. ensure equity in individual complaints; and 
c. bring about improvements in policy and the law underlining such policy. 
105 The Seventh Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1995，paragraph 2.4-2.17. 
The Sixth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1994, paragraph 2.9. 
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So stated in his mission and vision statements, "serving the community by redressing 
grievances and addressing issues arising from maladministration in the public sector" 
and promoting efficiency and fairness in the Administration through the means of 
independent and impartial investigations (either initiated upon receipt of complaints 
or by his own volition) so that "it is permeated with a culture of dedication, 
commitment, quality service and performance as well as high intellectual skills" are 
1 
the missions of the COMAC. When compared to Garcia's Office So expressed 
more explicitly and was more emphasized on his role to promote fair Administration 
and bring about changes in law and policy. He raised the principles for fair 
Administration, equitable resolution and influencing changes in law and policy. For 
example, he stated "to demonstrate its commitment to fairness, the Administration 
should make decisions with impartiality and professional objectivity based on 
consistent and appropriate standards." He continued to point out public servants 
should be open-minded in seeking information, should correct mistakes voluntarily 
1 ^o 
and the need for consulting the public. So considered these are the important 
principles to his work, he believed: after identifying these principles "I shall then be 
able to map out my strategies accordingly to achieve the desired results". Besides 
laying the criteria for a desirable Administration, he argued against separating policy 
from administration and adopted a wide interpretation on "administration" to include 
all matters other than legislative and judiciary so as to address the fundamental 
problem related to maladministrations and recommend s o l u t i o n s . S o also pointed 
out that they were moving from a reactive approach to resolve complaints towards a 
proactive approach to the prevention of maladministration by the power to conduct 
107 The Seventh Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1995, paragraph 1.3. 
108 The Sixth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1994，paragraph 2.14. 
109 The Seventh Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1995’ paragraphs 4.34-4.36; The Eighth Annual 
Report of COMAC, June 1996，paragraph 2.2. 
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direct investigation and advise on changes to prevent repeated complaints, related 
problems and suffering of c i t i zens /� 
So used the word "catalyst" to describe his role to bring about administrative 
improvements, greater transparency and responsiveness, and making departments 
working together with him in improving the standards of administration and services 
to the community.iii This is done in two ways. The first way is to receive and 
investigate complaints of the public and then give recommendations on how to avoid 
the problems from happening again by addressing the fundamental problems in 
procedures, practices, policies or laws. The Ombudsman also suggests the concerned 
department carrying out remedial actions to complainants in order to put them "in the 
position that he or she would have been in had the maladministration not o c c u r r e d " . 
As a result, individual wrong can be righted. The second way is to set up standards for 
quality public services and then identifies suspected maladministration. The 
Ombudsman gives the concerned department feedbacks and advices for improvement 
after investigation. Figure One shows how this role of catalyst is to be performed. 
11° The Seventh Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1995, paragraphs 3.41-3.45. 
m The Sixth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1996，paragraphs 2.13. 
112 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 1998, paragraphs 5.2. 
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Figure 1 Ombudsman as a catalyst in bringing about improvements in the 
general quality of public administration^^^ 
Advice on changes in law and policy after \ 
‘ ^ ^ \ ( Departments and \ 
investigation / X V . ) 
/ / organizations 夕 
Setting standards for good Administration \ \ P 
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113 Figure generated from the information in the Annual Reports. 
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Towards multiple roles: 
The role as catalyst emphasized to bring about improvements in public 
administration, which is more than the "traditional role in redressing public 
grievances and protecting the people from unfair treatment" so that "the institution 
has afforded an administrative safeguard against possible excesses of bureaucracy". 
So pointed out that "today, Ombudsman Offices have become one of the key 
institutions to enhance good governance which is central to a fair and reasonable 
public administration，，. 114 The Ombudsman is expanding its role gradually from a 
grievance man to performing more control functions, which oversight any abuses and 
bad practices. Furthermore, the Ombudsman takes a more proactive role in seeking 
ways to prevent maladministration and enhance the general quality of public 
administration such as the accountability, responsiveness and transparency of the 
Government. 
Regarding the relationship with the government departments and statutory bodies, 
So projected himself as a mirror to reflect what and why the departments have done 
wrong, so that they can learn from their mistakes and make improvements accordingly, 
instead of being a thorn that makes people uncomfortable. He also hoped the 
departments could work together with him rather than afraid of him. in the actual 
interactions with the departments, So was satisfied with most of the department for 
being cooperative with his Office in providing the needed information and documents 
during the course of investigation, holding a positive attitude towards complaints, and 
willing to think of proper remedial actions together. However, there were a handful of 
114 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 1998，paragraph 3.1. 
115 The Sixth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1994，paragraph 2.13. 
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departments being not cooperative that they delay the submission of information 
without reasons. In the Annual Reports, So had openly criticized some departments 
for abusing the use of legal advice to delay his work but also praised some 
departments for actively reacting to complaints and improving their quality of 
services. So raised a comment by some people on his Office that he was too harsh in 
publicizing the maladministration committed by the concerned departments. 
As for the relationship with the public, So thought that there was a lack of 
channel for knowing their level of satisfaction to the Office. In his perception, some 
complainants were satisfied with the Office's work even their complaints were not 
substantiated but some are critical to the Office due to their points of view were not 
being accepted. So also pointed out that whether a problem resulted from 
maladministration can be solved was more important then if their complaints were 
substantiated to some complainants.n6 
So emphasized the multiple roles of the Ombudsman Office. It was raised in the 
Eighth Annual report of the Office that the Ombudsman is now responsible for 
redressing individual grievances against maladministration in the public sector, 
making bureaucracy more humane, lessening the gap between the Government and 
the public, acting as the people's watchdog, preventing abuses, right individual wrong, 
indicating the facts when public officers are unjustly accused, improving the 
efficiency and quality of service in the public sector and protecting human rights.夏口 
This definition on the Ombudsman's role is still adopted by his successor. Moreover, 
So put that the Office took an important role in referring callers to the appropriate 
"6 The Seventh Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1995, paragraph 4.42. 
117 The Eighth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1996，paragraph 2.1. 
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agencies or organizations due the calls they received in the receptionist counter. This 
trend of providing directional service to members of the public continues in recent 
years. In the fourteenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, Ms Alice Tai pointed out a 
fact that the Office is not only investigate complaints but also takes the role as 
counselor, social worker and arbitrator since they have to explain to the callers on 
how to obtain the needed service. 
In short, the Ombudsmen perceive themselves performing multiple functions, 
which including both the redress and control function and with the increasing 
emphasis on promoting good governance. Before the legislative amendment in 1994, 
the Ombudsman is restricted to reacting to individual complaints referred by the 
members of the Legislative Council. The Ombudsman is mainly a grievance man and 
a watchdog of abuse of power by the government. With the widening of the functions 
of the Ombudsman by legislation, the Ombudsman is allowed to be more active that it 
interacts more directly with the public and identify suspected administrative problems 
on its own. However, the emphasis on proactive prevention of maladministration by 
setting standards of fair administration, to improve quality of administration and 
promote good governance, to protect human rights in public administration as well as 
to suggest directly on policy related matters are the Ombudsman's own preference. 
The complainants are also affecting the role as well as the self-perception of the 
Ombudsman. The self-perception of the Ombudsmen should be read together with 
their initiatives, which are something related to concrete actions of the Ombudsman. 
Their initiatives and the complaints brought by the public will be discussed in the next 
“ section. The following part is an interview with the existing Assistant Ombudsman. 
The interview aims at exploring his self-perception of behalf of the Ombudsman 
Office in more detail and gathering information that are not available in the Annual 
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Reports. More importantly, it serves as a control to see whether the self-perception of 
the Assistant Ombudsman is compatible with my interpretation on the trend of 
development through the Annual Reports. 
H. An interview with the Assistant Ombudsman 
The interview was conducted on 6 October 2006 at the Ombudsman Office. The 
questionnaire of for the interview is at Appendix I of this thesis.^^^ The Assistant 
Ombudsman, Mr. Tong Ma Kai-loong, was being asked on questions regarding the 
roles and functions of the Office in according to his own perception. The following 
parts summarize his perception of the demographic profile of the complainants, the 
content and nature of cases, the relationship between the Office and other institutions 
like the executive and judiciary, and the roles and functions of the Ombudsman in the 
Hong Kong political system. 
Demographic background of clients 
The 2000 and 2004 household thematic survey pointed out the tendency for the 
young population and higher education level group to approach the Ombudsman 
when they want to complain about maladministration of a government department or 
statutory body when compare to the lower education group. In the actual operation of 
the Office this finding is quite contrary to the real users who approached the Office. 
Ma said, according to his colleagues and his observation, the complainants are come 
from different walks of life but a substantial proportion of the complainants are the 
118 The questionnaire is in English but the interview is in Cantonese. So, this report on the interview is 
a translation from Cantonese to English. 
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lower income group with lower education level. The Office had not done any survey 
by itself on the demographic backgrounds of the complainants but Ma thinks that one 
statistics may help to support this observation. Ma refers to last year's Annual Report 
that the service users of the most frequently complained departments should be the 
lower income group. He gives some examples of these departments: the Housing 
Department, the Food Environmental Hygiene Department, the Buildings Department, 
the Lands Department, the Correctional Services Department, and the Social Welfare 
Department. The percentage of complaints on the departments mentioned by Ma is 
about 43.2% of the number of total complaints received by the Office last year.^ ^^ 
Content and Nature of Complaints 
Ma agrees that social background of complainants is a factor affecting the 
content and nature of their complaints. There is a considerable proportion of 
complainants seeks to claim their personal interest through the Office and what they 
care about is only their own interest. For example, a complainant who received the 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) may accuse the Social Welfare 
Department for giving less then what he or she should receive. Some complainants 
may file a complaint out of their instinct instead of able to submit evidence or relevant 
information and documents. They may recognize that the view of some complainants 
can be superficial, biased or entirely wrong even without conducting any investigation. 
There are also malicious complaints. On the other hand, some complainants have in 
depth analysis on a problem and can raise some important concerns relating to the 
administrative system. Ma gives an example that the recently released Direct 
Investigation (DI) report on the implementation of the administrative measure on "the 
119 The Eighteenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 2006, Table 4. 
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restriction on the development in the M i d - L e v e l " i s led by a complaint from the 
public. The complaints can provide data to support to his view and what he raised out 
is important that the Office finally conducted a DI. However, these complaints with in 
depth observation are only very small in number. 
For the substance and nature of complaints, I adopted Hill's classifications of 
complaints into defensive or defensive, is requesting for investigation or for provision 
of services, and is about malfeasance or minor problems like inefficiency. Ma 
replies that the complaints are usually defensive in nature. The complainants usually 
think that some of their rights are breached for not being given some benefits, so, they 
are defending against their rights. However, these complaints can be understood as 
offensive that the complainants are usually claiming some welfare benefits for 
themselves. The substance of complaints seldom relates to malfeasance of civil 
servants. Many of them concern about delay, inefficiency, wrong decision of the 
administration, and the courtesy of staff. There are both request for providing a 
service and requesting for investigation. But the number of enquires on services is 
much larger than the number of complaints. Ma quoted the figure of last year that the 
number of enquiry is about fourteen thousand but the number of complaints is only 
four thousands. Besides, although small in number, there are some complaints 
concerns about more systematic problem about the administration. These complaints 
are usually brought by individuals who have higher education standard, and 
sometimes brought by a group or through the members of the Legislative Council or 
120 The report reviews the "restrictions on development" and points out the weaknesses of the measure 
as well as the coordination problem between different departments in implementing the restrictions. 
121 Hill, 1983, "The Self-perception of ombudsmen: a Comparative Survey", in Caiden ed., 1983. 
For offensive perspective, Hill defined it as "clients appeals for a review of administration's decision 
not to grant him something he wants e.g. a welfare benefit". For defensive perspective, it is defined as 
"protection asked against damaging actions, e.g. decisions to raise taxes, and to lower or eliminate a 
welfare benefit already being received". 
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District Council. 
Relationship with other institutions and the public 
The Assistant Ombudsman described the relationship between the Office and 
other institutions such as the Chief Executive (CE), the government departments and 
statutory organizations under the Office's jurisdiction and the judiciary as well as with 
the public. Ma thinks that the CE is supportive to the Ombudsman's work. When 
being asked of whether the independence of the Ombudsman will be affected by the 
appointment system, Ma believes that the Ombudsman's independence is protected by 
the monitoring of the legislature and the mass media. It is because the Executive has 
to report to Legislative Council on the implementation of the Ombudsman's 
recommendations every year. The members of the Legislative Council will criticize 
the department for not carrying the recommendations if they are reasonable. So, the 
CE can hardly manipulate the Ombudsman in the five-year term and the CE is 
actually giving a free hand to the Office without intervention in their work and 
judgment. 
Regarding the relationship with the departments, Ma says he can also feel that 
some departments are afraid of the Ombudsman but they are cooperative. Although a 
few departments are unwilling to cooperate with the Ombudsman in providing 
information sometimes, they are required to do so by law. Ma regarded the 
relationship with the departments are twofold, on one hand, the Ombudsman takes a 
role in monitoring the departments, on the other hand, they are in partnership. Ma 
puts that the Office is actually helping the departments if they hold a more positive 
view towards the Ombudsman's role. He explains that it is difficult for a department 
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to defense against a complaint and to explain to or persuade the complaints that they 
are not wrong even the department can provide relevant information in proving so. 
The public will believe in the judgment made by the Ombudsman after an 
investigation since it is a third party who is impartial, objective and credible in the 
eyes of the public. Moreover, some departments welcome the investigation of the 
Ombudsman. Ma uses an example to illustrate that if a department want to obtain 
more resources from the government in order to improve the quality of its service, it 
will be more convincing for the Ombudsman to point out to the higher Administration 
after an investigation that the administrative problem in that department is due to the 
lack of resources. Ma adds, there is a recent trend that the departments tend to not 
accepting the criticism made by the Ombudsman but accept the Office's 
recommendation for improvement. 
For the relationship with the public, Ma points out that they have spent quite a lot 
of efforts on publicity and successfully attracted many complaints. However, the 
quality of the complaint is low in the sense that the advertisements on television 
mainly stimulate complainants with minor dissatisfaction to lodge a complaint. He 
thinks press release on DI reports is a more effective tool in attracting complaints that 
are related to more fundamental or systematic problems in administration. 
The roles and functions of the Ombudsman 
Ma thinks that the Ombudsman Office performs both control and redress 
functions. The Office helps the complainant to obtain equity and justice in their 
complaints against the maladministration of government departments. The Office 
does both legality and non-legality review when handling cases. It will not only 
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consider whether an action or a decision is legal and follow the right procedures, but 
• 122 • 
also judge whether it is reasonable and in accordance with humanity. Ma points out 
that the purpose of public administration is the serve people, so it should not be 
inhumane. The Office also adopts a human right perspective in judging whether an 
action or a decision of the Administration is compatible with principles of a good 
government too. Ma gives an example: the department that responsible for issuing 
license to people who do business in the restricted areas near the boundary connecting 
Guangdong province, rejected to issue a license to a person due to security reason. 
Since the Office believes that people have a right to work, it suggested the department 
to further assess the background of the complainant to see if he or she is a really threat 
to security. If not, the department should grant the person a license or it is over 
cautious that the person's right to work is exploited. Ma replies the question on 
whether the office has some standards or cases for reference in deciding whether an 
action or a decision is in accordance with humanity that the standards as well as 
people's view change when social condition change, it is difficult to set standards. So, 
it is easier to decide if a decision is legal or reasonable, it is more difficult to judge if 
the decision is in accordance with humanity so that more debate among the colleagues 
is needed. 
The Office also plays a role as mediator between a complainant and a 
department but this role less significant since the Office does not apply mediation 
very often. The method restricted to cases that do not involve maladministration or 
involve only minor maladministration. Moreover, this role is also limited because the 
“ Ombudsman's decision not binding that unlike a judge. In cases that involve money 
compensation, the Office would suggestion the complainant and the department 
122 In Chinese, the review criterion are 合法、合理、合青. 
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concerned to find a mediator instead of doing the mediation itself. Ma thinks also that 
the Office is not an advocate or a lawyer of the complainants; so, it should not 
represent them to claim monetary compensation. 
In Ma's view, the Office plays a main role in monitoring the Administration by 
suggesting ways for to improve the quality of services and administrative procedures 
and practice. He thinks the Office is a facilitator of reform rather then a reformer since 
they can force to Government to carry out reform. What they can do is by 
recommendations. Also, their recommendation is indirect when department is too 
big. It is difficult to deliver the message and pressure to the frontline staff unless their 
clients threaten them that they will be complained in the Ombudsman. So, the Office 
would suggest the department to cultivate a better work culture. In spite of this, Ma 
still believes DI is an important tool to bring about structural change has a wider 
impact on the society and he considers this is the function that the Office should 
perform. The Office becomes more active as it is empowered to conduct DI when 
compare to restricting its jurisdiction to the investigation of complaints. 
To conclude on the function of the Office, Ma thinks the prime role of the Office 
is to uphold accountability of the Administration. It also helps to articulate interest of 
the public, but unlike politicians, it helps to aggregated and then articulates those 
interests that are reasonable and necessary. The Office does bring policy impacts since 
the Office not only recommend on changes or improvement in decisions and 
legislations, but also monitor the implementation of its recommendations. The Office 
chooses a wider interpretation on the concept of maladministration so that they can 
recommend improvements in more areas. For the communication between 
government departments and the public, Ma thinks the existing channels are already 
131 
enough for them to communicate directly. What the Ombudsman does is to facilitate 
communication in the conflicts between complaints and Government departments. As 
for human rights protection, the Office includes a human right perspective in judging 
whether a decision or an action involve maladministration. However, the United 
Nations suggest setting up a human right commission in Hong Kong, it is the 
Government's choice to set up a separate institution or to incorporate the function into 
the Ombudsman. 
4.4 Cases received from the public and the Ombudsmen's own initiatives 
The previous section of this chapter concerns about how the public perceives the 
role of the Ombudsman, their expectation on the Office and the Ombudsman's 
self-perception, this section concerns about the real action took by the Ombudsman. 
The actions of the Ombudsman tell us the roles and functions it took or is taking. The 
tasks of the Ombudsman are largely determined by the complaints received by the 
Office, since the Office has to choose an appropriate method to resolve the cases. So, 
both the complaints and the reaction of the Ombudsman to will be studied. The 
organization of this section will be: first, to study the quantity of complaint received 
by the Office and what kinds of methods were used to resolve the complaints. The 
second part analyzes the nature of complaints. The third part presents some cases 
studies showing the remedies and resolutions suggested or provided by the 
Ombudsman as well as the concrete recommendations on improving the quality of 
public administration. The last part introduces the initiatives of the Ombudsman apart 
from the routine work of investigation. The efforts of the Ombudsman to deal with the 
complaints, together with its own initiatives reflect the regularized pattern of activities 
of the Office. 
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A. Caseload and methods of handling cases 
The cases received by the Office increased steadily over the seventeen years of 
operation. Table 6 shows the caseload and the handling methods for cases of the 
Office from March 1989 to March 2006. The most significant increase in caseload 
happened in the year 1994-1995, which the total number of enquiries received 
increased three times and the number of complaints increased seven times when 
compare to the year 1993-1994. The sudden increase was due to the cancellation of 
the referral system. The variety of methods for handling complaints also increased. 
Methods apart from investigation were developed to handle different kinds of 
complaint. The Internal Complaint Handling (INCH) Scheme, Rendering Assistance/ 
Clarification (RAC) and Mediation were introduced in the mid-1990s to deal with 
simple complaints in a quicker and more suitable way. The content of these three 
methods will be introduced in more detail in a later part about the initiatives of the 
Ombudsman. The development of these methods was mainly demand derived. As 
refer to the Assistant Ombudsman, Mr. Tony Ma, a large number of the complaints are 
about the dissatisfaction of complainants on some issues that involve minor or no 
administrative problems, or are only disputes between the complaint and the 
complainee department. Therefore, these cases are too trivial to be investigated in full 
scale. Another new measure is Direction investigation (DI) that was introduced in 
1994 after the legislative reform. The number of direct investigation is small but the 
resources and time needed in conducting an investigation are relatively large since DI 
seeks to dig into the root of a problem. The number of DI conducted in each year is 
about five cases. The above description provides a general picture on the caseload of 
the Office and available means of handling complaints. The following discuss the 
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application of these methods in resolving cases. 
Enquiries vs. complaints 
The cases received by Ombudsman can be generally classified into two types, 
which are of different aims and thus require different ways of handling. A case should 
either be a complaint that lodged by an individual, a representative of an individual or 
a group, otherwise it will be an enquiry that without intention to complain against a 
department or a statutory body. It is normal to expect the main task of the Office is to 
conduct investigation on complaints, however, the Office play an important role in 
answering enquiry of the public too. The number of enquiries received by the Office 
is at least the double of the number of complaints and it is more than threefold for 
eight years. It is already mentioned in the part about the Ombudsman's self-perception 
that the Office took a directory role or even act as a councilor or social worker in 
directing the callers to appropriate services of government departments. According to 
Ma, the content of enquiries are mainly about where and how can the caller get a 
government services. The Annual Reports of the Office does not provide further 
classification on the content of enquiry. 
Complaints not investigated 
Upon receiving a complaint, the Office has to go through a screening process to 
decide whether a complaint is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and to screen 
out those related to areas restricted by the Ordinance. Among the complaints received 
by the Office over the years，about 20 to 50% are either outside its jurisdiction or 
subject to the restriction of the Ordinance. The average of the percentage of 
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complaints not investigated by the Office is 40% over the years of operation of the 
Office. This means, about 60% of the total number of complaints received will 
proceed to preliminary enquiries. The Office will send the complaints in writing to the 
department concerned for comment and information. 
RAC, INCH, Mediation and Investigation 
After obtaining the comment and information provided by the concerned 
department by preliminary enquiries, the Office will assess if there is a need to 
conduct an investigation into a case or to adopt other methods. The Office can decide 
on using RAC, INCH, Mediation or investigation to resolve a case, which should 
depends on the degree of complexity and nature of the case. RAC should take the 
shortest time to conclude a complaint since it is an extension of preliminary enquiries. 
The Office will explain and clarify to the complainant in writing on the information 
and comments provided the department concerned. The Office mainly facilitates the 
communication between the complainant and the department but also judge whether 
the explanation of the complained department is reasonable. Most cases ^ ^^  that 
resolved by this method are proofed to possess no maladministration. So, the task of 
the Ombudsman is to explanation to the complainant about its understanding and 
decision of the case. The remaining cases are resolved by granting assistance to the 
complainants like recommending remedial actions. The Ombudsman refers cases to 
the complained department for investigation and reply through INCH and takes a 
monitoring role through process. The Office can be a mediator in resolving disputes. 
With reference to the Ombudsman's self-perception and the various measures 
123 Case proofed to possess no maladministration account for 81% of cases resolved by RAC. The 
figure is 83% in 2004 and 84% in 2003. 
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adopted by the Office in resolving cases, the roles and functions of the Office is 
diversifying. Since the role and function performed by the Ombudsman are quite 
different in applying these methods, it is interesting to find out which role does the 
Ombudsman specialized in and how much effort does the Office spend in these 
different tasks. Figure 2 shows the methods adopted by the Office to resolve 
complaints. The total number of complaints resolved is the summation of cases that 
resolved by RAC, INCH, mediation and investigation but excluding the complaints 
that are screened out due to the restriction of Ordinance or outside the jurisdiction of 
the Office. One can find out that RAC is the most frequently adopted method among 
the four. After the service was launched, its application keeps rising. There was a 
sharp increase in the year 2000 to 200land the usage was kept in a high level since 
then that over 70% of the total number of complaints are resolved by this method. The 
area between RAC and the number of complaints resolved equals to the total number 
of cases resolved by INCH, mediation and investigation. The application of INCH had 
been decreasing. It takes some 30% in mid-1990s and decreases to about 10% of the 
total complaints resolved recently. The number of complaints undergone full 
investigation is quite constant over the seventeen years. The number increase as with 
the increase in total caseload especially in the late 90s, however, the absolute number 
of cases maintains at the range of 55 to 360 cases a year since the mid-90s with the 
median of 230 and mean of 225. The role of the Ombudsman as a mediator is limited 
as one may refer to limited number complaints resolved by mediation. The number of 
cases varies from 6 to 29. 
Rendering assistance and clarification to complainants is the prime role of the 
Ombudsman in terms of the proportion of cases resolved by this method. The method 
chosen by the Office to deal with a complaint is heavily depends on the nature of a 
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case. The predominant application of RCA over other means may reflect that most of 
the complaints are related to minor administrative problem and more probably the 
complaints do not contain any maladministration. This assumption is compatible to 
Ma's observation that the quality of complaints is low since many of the complaints 
are out of the complaints' instinct or their dissatisfaction on an administrative decision, 
which is without enough evidence and reason. The Ombudsman also takes a referral 
and monitoring role in handling simple complaints through the INCH Scheme. 
Besides, the Ombudsman plays a constant role to investigate into alleged 
maladministration. Although number of complaints that resolved by investigation is 
relatively small, it requires more effort of the office in the sense of time and human 
resources involved. The time for concluding a case by RAC, INCH or mediation takes 
usually (about 54.1% to 60.9% of cases) less than one month. But about 50% to 60% 
of cases resolved by full investigation take 3 to 9 m o n t h s . A s result, investigation 
is an important task to the Ombudsman as regarding the effort that need to be spent in 
each case. 
Complaints investigated 
Among the complaints that were fully investigated by the Office，the proportion 
of unsubstantiated cases is about 47% in average and with the median of 51%. The 
proportion can be as large as 80% in a single year. The number of partially 
substantiated cases is more than the number of substantiated cases with the exception 
in 1995-96. The relatively small number of substantiated cases further confirms Ma's 
observation. 
124 The Eighteenth Annual Report of the Office of the Ombudsman, June 2006，Table 9 (B). The data 
mentioned is between year 2001-02 and 2005-06. 
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To conclude, after the screening process, more than a half of the complaints 
originally received from the public will be proceed to preliminary screening for 
picking the most appropriate method of handling. Among the complaints resolved, a 
significant proportion of the complaints are resolved by RAC. These cases are 
resolved without any investigation conducted by either the Office or the complainee 
organization. The Office provides clarification and explanation to complainants based 
on the comment and information provided by the concerned department. During the 
process, the Office still to need to judge on the reasonableness and validity of 
complainants' claim and the explanation and information provided by the concerned 
organization as well as to clarify any doubts. The reason for not having a full 
investigation is mainly due to the case nature. On the other hand, mediation is the 
method that adopted least. It may due to the fact that not every case is suitable for 
mediation, the method work best for simple cases that without maladministration and 
contain mainly disputes. Again, case nature restricted the handling method. For INCH 
and full investigation, the complaints are undergone further scrutiny but by different 
organization. The Office refers less complex case for the internal handling of the 
concerned organization and monitors the process, and investigates cases that 
seemingly involved maladministration by itself. The cases concluded by INCH and 
full investigation take only about 10% or less of the total number of complaint each 
year. We may conclude that the real grievances that need to be redressed are very few. 
As the nature of case affects the method for handling, the next part will discuss the 
nature of complaints received by the Office. The part following the next present some 
case studies that discuss the types of remedy, recommendation and resolution 






































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2 Proportion of the methods being adopted to resolve complaints 
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B. Nature of complaints 
The Ombudsmen showed their appreciation on the general quality of public services 
in their Annual Reports since the alleged complaints on maladministration received by 
the Office are mainly related to error or omission of public servants and these problems 
are normal to any kind of work. The category of maladministration that are most 
frequently complained against is "Error, wrong advice/ decision" for almost every year 
since the operation of the Office，which account for about 20% or more of total complaint. 
There are two other prominent types of complaints: "Failure to follow procedures, delay" 
and "Negligence, omission". These two categories together share about 20% of the total 
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complaints. These three types of problems are related to inefficiency or mistakes made 
during the administrative procedure and as a result affected the administration decision. 
Other categories carry quite equal proportion, less than 10%, among the total number of 
complaints they include: "Disparity in treatment, unfairness, selective enforcement", 
“Ineffective control", "Lack of response to complaint", "Staff attitude e.g. rudeness, 
unhelpfulness", "Faulty procedures", "Abuse of power", and "Others e.g. lack of 
consultation, general criticism, opinion)". The Office will adopt RAC, INCH, mediation 
or full investigation to deal with these complaints. For the complaints that are found 
substantiated or partially substantiated the Office may suggest redress actions when it is 
appropriate in the case. At the same time, the Office will recommend ways for improving 
the administrative procedures and practices in order to prevent the same problem from 
happening. The following part will discuss the kinds of remedial action and 
recommendation suggested by the Office in response to these complaints. 
C. Case Studies: remedies and recommendations 
Investigation is a means to find out whether there is a maladministration in a 
complaint and to identify the cause of the problem. The are two aims for this process, to 
redress grievances of complainants by suggesting remedial actions on one hand and to 
suggest ways to improve the quality of public services in order to prevent the same 
problem from happening on the other. The direct investigations initiated by the Office 
itself serve similar purpose, which is to investigate suspected maladministration and 
recommend way for improvements so as to prevent grievances and sufferings of people. 
Remedies and recommendations are core to the functions of the Ombudsman. With the 
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illustration of several cases，I would like to discuss the types of remedy and 
recommendation offered by the Office. 
Remedy 
The aim of making a remedy is to rectify wrong, which is to bring the complainant 
back to the position when maladministration was not occurred. There are four types of 
remedy that are granted to complainants according to the circumstances and gravity of 
the injustice. The first type is clarifications. The complaints resolved through RAC 
contain mainly clarification on misunderstanding and assistance to complainants no 
matter whether maladministration is involved. The second type is apologies. "In cases of 
relatively minor faults, a proper explanation and a sincere apology would suffice"^^^ or 
together with an undertaking to try to avoid similar mistakes in the future. The third type 
of remedy is a specific action. The actions can be to expedite an administrative action in 
any case about delay, omission or disparity in treatment. The concerned department may 
be asked to provide a substantive reply to a complaint, to deliver additional services to 
the complainant or to review a decision which is believed to be an unfair one.^ ^^ The last 
type of remedy could be a financial redress. For complainants who have sustained loss, 
the concerned department will be required to make an ex gratia payment, a remission or 
refund, in whole or in part, of the charge or fees involved. ^ ^^  
126 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman Office, June 1998，paragraph 5.3. 
“ 127 The Third Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1991，paragraph 3 • 12 & The Second Annual Report of 
the COMAC, June 1990，paragraph 3.11. 
128 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman Office, June 1998，paragraph 5.3. 
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Case studies 
In a complaint against the Hong Kong Housing Authority, the complainant accused 
the department for its delay in refunding the extra rental fee collected by Authority 
through the auto-pay system for a year.'^^ The complainant had visited the property 
services office (PSO) twice to request the refund of rental fee. The Ombudsman referred 
the case to the Authority through the INCH scheme. The Authority explained to the 
complaint that it is because the complainant had not asked the Bank or the Housing 
Department to terminate the authorization of auto-pay, so that the bank kept 
transfer rental fee to the department even the complaint had bought the flat. Besides, the 
managing work of that housing estate was out sourced to a management firm but the staff 
there did not submit the case to the HD for follow-up. The complainant finally received a 
written apologies and the refund from the HD after lodging the complaint. The HD also 
instructed the PSO staff to handle tenants' application and enquiries more carefully. 
In many cases resolved through RAC, what the complainants received is only 
clarifications from the Office that explain why the complained issue does not involve 
maladministration. A candidate who took part in the Language Proficiency Assessment 
for Teachers (LAPT) complained the Examination Authority (EA) for its inappropriate 
allocation of seats in the discussion session for oral exam and replied her complaint 
unsatisfactorily. 131 The complainant points out that the desks were removed in the 
discussion session so that the candidates were widespread and making her could not 
129 0MB 2003/1907. 
13° The Housing Department provides secretariat and executive support to the Housing Authority. 
131 0MB 2005/0229 
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receive attention from the examiner. In response to the complaint, the Ombudsman 
explained to the complainant that the EA agreed on giving the discretion to the examiners 
to decide on the arrangement of seats and desks according to the situation of the 
examination room in a briefing meeting before the LAPT. So, there was no bias or 
dishonest in EA's reply to her complaint. The Ombudsman also point to the lack of 
evidence provided by the complainant. The EA had inform all candidates in the 
"Guidance Notes" that all complaint or comment should be made before 9 September 
2004 but the complainant did not file her complaint until the release of examination result 
in mid December. 
Recommendations 
The purpose of recommendation is to suggest ways for the public organization to 
improve their service quality and efficiency as well as to ensure administrative fairness. 
The Ombudsman can make recommendation in cases resolved through RAC, INCH and 
full investigation but not mediation or after direct investigation. The recommendation for 
improvement can be classified into six types. ^ ^^  The Ombudsman may suggest on area 
including: guideline for clarity, consistency or efficiency in operation, arrangements for 
better inter-departmental coordination, measures for better public enquiries or complaints 
handling, training for staff, measures for better service, and clearer information to the 
public. These recommendations should reflect the role of the Ombudsman in enhancing 
openness, accountability, fairness and responsiveness in public administration. 
132 The Eighteenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 2006, Chapter 4. 
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Case studies 
In 1998，the Ombudsman conducted a direct investigation into the internal complaint 
handling mechanism of Housing Department, the Hong Kong Housing Society and the 
Correctional services Department. ^ ^^  The Office suggested on both the measures of 
handling complaints such as better record keeping system, better reporting system to the 
senior management to bring issues to their early attention, clearer guidelines on the 
distinction between complaint and requests to counter staff, increasing the impartiality, 
visibility and transparency of appeal system and more publicity of internal complaint 
handling system, as well as to improve the training to staff such as to strengthen the 
interpersonal communications and complaint handling skills and techniques for prison 
staffs. 
For recommending measures for better service, the Ombudsman commented the 
Housing Department (HD) for being too lenient to a tenant who "seriously breached the 
tenant agreement" that would contribute to unfairness to other rental housing (PRH) 
applicants. 134 A complainant was required to quit her PRH for disturbing other tenants 
due to her frequent quarrel with her neighbors. The HD tried to reallocate another PRH to 
the complainant but was being rejected since the complainant think the rent is to high to 
be afforded. The HD was thus withdrawn the allocation and the complainant lodge her 
complaint. In the conclusion of the Ombudsman, she recommended the HD to impose 
new restriction to ex-tenants with similar background to wait for two year before they 
apply to PRH again. This is to be fair to other PRH applicants. The HD should have 
The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 1998，Chapter 3. 
134 0MB 2005/2297. 
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recovered the complainant's housing unit quickly as a deterrent. 
Another case shows the Ombudsman's recommendation for changes on policy and 
practices so as to enhance transparency and accountability of Government. The 
Ombudsman conducted a direct investigation into the monitoring of charitable 
fund-raising activities, which are partially monitored by the Social Welfare Department 
(SWD) and Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA). ^^ ^ The 
Ombudsman concluded that the control on the fundraising activities organized by the 
non-govemmental charitable organizations was "partial and patchy, fragmented and 
ineffective". It is because the control only covers two kinds of activities: flag days and 
lotteries, but not any other activities and thus the present legislative provisions could not 
"effectively safeguard the public against unscrupulous or irresponsible fund-raisers". The 
Ombudsman suggested drawing up a Code of Practice on good administration and 
management for reference of charities. To enhance transparency and accountability, SWD 
should consider a central register of charities which complied with requirements of the 
Code as well as to display their names for general information and public inspection. In 
long term, the government should review the present policy and practices on monitoring 
charities and their fund-raising activities, to introduce a scheme for monitoring the bona 
fides of registered charities and consider mechanism for deterring abuse and penalties for 
such acts. 
Short conclusion 
135 The Fifteenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 2003，Annex 7，pp. 19-21. 
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The remedies and recommendations make by the Ombudsman should be considered 
as the means to achieve the Office's goals. The Office redresses the grievance of 
complainants and suggests way for improvement after conducting an investigation. For 
direct investigations that aim at identifying and preventing problem proactively, the way 
for the Ombudsman to fulfill this goal lies mainly on the monitoring on the 
implementation of its recommendations. 
D. The initiatives of the Ombudsmen 
Apart from the basic duty of handling complaints and conducting own-motion 
investigation (since 1994)，the Ombudsmen tried to shape or refine the role of the Office 
by introducing some other new initiatives that. So, these initiatives can reflect their view 
and choice on the Office's roles and functions. This part summarizes the initiatives of the 
Ombudsman and to analyze how different measures affects the roles of their Office. 
Proposal to extend jurisdictions and powers 
Before the legislative review in 1994, the Commissioner was only empowered to 
conduct investigation on complaints. Garcia request the Government to review the 
referral system since the first year (1989) of his office and extend the jurisdiction to cover 
more departments and statutory organizations. When he was invited to make 
recommendations for the review in 1992, he suggested nine areas in his proposal. Seven 
areas in the reform proposal were concerning extending jurisdiction and power of the 
I、 
COMAC such as: widening the referral system，extending the jurisdiction to civil 
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servants grievances as well as the administrative act of the Hospital Authority and 
Department of Health, empowering to initiate own-motion investigation, and the finality 
of COMAC's findings and recommendations. The Ombudsman's continue efforts in 
widening his power and jurisdiction reflects his determination to expand the role of the 
Office in tackling more possible kinds of maladministration. The powers to investigate 
complaints on the Ombudsman's own volition would “give the office a high public 
profile and the ability to rectify significant problems when it is used." The cancellation of 
the referral system received support from most of the concerned parties like the members 
of the Legislative Council and the Administration. However, the power to conduct 
own-motion investigation was much more controversial and was not supported even by 
the Councillors. It was totally unexpected that the suggestion was raised again in a 
Legislative Council meeting and passed finally by voting. The effect of the reform of the 
Office is apparent. The role of the Ombudsman is widened in the sense that the 
complaints received by the Office in year 1994-1995 increased eight-fold when compare 
to the last year and it was regarded as the busiest year since the establishment of the 
Office. So, the Office is playing a more important role in handling complaint on 
maladministration in terms of quantity of cases. The publication of direct investigation 
reports received attention from the mass media either and got a higher public profile than 
ever. 
Revising the complaint handling method and resolution 
Although the role of the Ombudsman is diversifying, all Ombudsmen regard dealing 
with complaints remains fundamental to the Office. Different measures were introduced 
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to facilitate effective and efficient handling of complaints. Garcia started using mediation 
of informal resolution in 1993. Mediation services was formally introduced in 1997 and 
written into the Ombudsman Ordinance in 2001. As a mediator, "the investigators of the 
Office act as neutral facilitators who will not make decisions or offer opinions on the 
merits of the matters under disputes"^^^. Besides, So introduced two other methods to 
handle less complex complaints without going through the process of full investigation. 
On is the Internal Complaint Handling (INCH) Programme that was launched in 1996. 
The Office refers complaints to the concerned departments with the consent from the 
complainants and the complaints will be handled through their internal complaints 
procedure. The Ombudsman plays a monitoring role during the process and intervenes "if 
an organization fails to address and/or resolve a complaint satisfactorily" . Another 
service is Rendering Assistance/ Clarification (RAC). After the preliminary enquiries into 
the case, the Office will provide complainant with explanation and clarification in writing 
when it is satisfied with the information and comments provided by the complainee 
1 o o 
organization. The aim of introducing these three services is to resolve simple and 
straightforward complaints in a flexible and quick process. The cases resolved by these 
methods are usually do not possess maladministration or have only minor 
maladministration that are not related to administrative principles. Mediation, INCH and 
RAC are the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods that the Office offers. All 
these methods concern about complaint handling but they deviate the Ombudsman's role 
as an investigator to a mediator, an arbitrator, a referral of cases and even a directory of 
public services. Besides, the Office also introduced complaining by email and telephone 
136 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 1998，paragraph 5.12 (c). 
137 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 1998，paragraph 5.12 (a^ 
138 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 1998，paragraph 5.12 (b). 
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in 2000 and 2001 respectively. 
Promoting good governance 
The year 1997 showed the Ombudsman's efforts in promoting good governance. 
The Ombudsman played a strong advisory or even instructing role on informing the 
public bodies about the desirable standards of public administration and suggesting ways 
to achieve the standards. A number of guidelines were published and sent to all 
government departments and some statutory organizations. These guidelines include 
maintaining administrative ethics and administrative fairness, keeping good standard of 
customer service, introducing effective complaint handling skills and protecting human 
rights in public administration. The Office believes that "complaint handling is an 
important information and management tool in achieving higher service standards in 
public adminis trat ion” 139, therefore, besides setting standard on service quality and 
providing guidelines, the Office also organized workshops and trainings on handling 
complaints to public officers of different departments. Some training programmes were 
developed together with other departments such as the Civil Service Training and 
Development Institute and the Civil Service and Departmental Training Managers to the 
newly recruited or front-line staff since 1996. The Ombudsman's Awards was also 
introduced in 1997 as an attempt to raise the awareness of enhancing the quality of public 
services. The purpose of the Award is to recognize and praise those public organizations 
which have a "positive and supportive stance towards the Ombudsman's investigations of 
complaints to bring about improvement in the quality of service and promote fairness in 
139 The Tenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 1998，paragraph 3.4. 
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public administrat ion” 140. The three selection criteria of the Award are whether the 
organization has effective internal administrative systems which are essential for 
providing quality service to the public, professionalism in handling complaints and 
commitment to improve the quality of service to the public. In the five-year thematic plan 
laid by Garcia in 1995 ⑷，"Improving Quality" is the theme of his third year (1996-1997) 
of office. The measures introduced and reinforced according to this theme helped to forge 
the role of the Ombudsman in promoting good governance and the prevention of 
maladministration. 
Establish public relations and credibility 
Publicity is essential to the Office's successful functioning. It is important to let the 
public think of the Ombudsman when they have any grievance caused by the 
maladministration of public organizations and let them believe in the ability of the Office 
help them or address their concerns. As reflected in the surveys and according to the 
Assistant Ombudsman perception, to seek financial compensation or apologies from the 
concerned department are not necessarily the aims of the complainants. The aim for some 
complainants to lodge a complaint is to solve a problem or to prevent the problem form 
happening again and to improve the general quality of public service. So, publicity would 
mean more than letting the public know the existing of the Office. The Office should 
obtain the public's trust in its impartiality and independence as well as its ability and 
commitment to rectify problem by recommendations. Publicizing the Office is actually 
the routine work of each Ombudsman. Garcia visited the local communities, the urban 
14�The Ombudsman's Awards 2006 leaflet. 
141 The Tenth Annual Report of the COMAC, June 1995，paragraph 5.1. 
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and regional, district boards, and Heung Yee Kuk after the operation of the Office. So put 
"Establishing Credibility" in the second year of his five-year thematic plan. He initiated 
the Justices of the Peace Assistance Scheme, Youth Involvement Scheme and established 
a resource center. Tai keeps meeting the district boards members, NGOs and universities. 
Advertising through the mass media and holding press conference on selected 
investigations are also the routine publicity works of the Office. In the 2004 survey, about 
71.5% of the respondents said they were aware of the advertising materials of the 
Office.142 The Office plays a role in promoting or educating on their right to complaint 
against maladministration through the Ombudsman or the internal complaint channel of 
departments. 
142 The Sixteenth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, June 2004, Annex 13. 
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Table 6 Introduction of new initiatives by the Ombudsmen� 
Ombudsman Year Initiatives 
Arthur Garcia 1992 � Recommendation to the legislative review of the 
COMAC Ordinance 
1993 � Adopting mediation/ informal resolution 
Andrew So 1994 今 Appointment of panels of advisors on legal and medical 
matters 
� Plan to establish an anonymized data bank in relation to 
the profile of complainants for research purpose 
今 Experiment on direct recruitment of staff 
1995 今 Plan to conduct scientific opinion survey to collect 
information in order to determine publicity initiatives 
and map out strategies for future direction and 
development 
� Publication of the "Administrative Fairness Checklist" 
1996 今 Internal Complaint Handling (INCH) Programme 
今 The Justices of the Peace Assistance Scheme 
今 Launching the youth involvement scheme 
� Complaint handling seminar 
� Opening of the Resource Centre 
1997 � Mediation service was launched 
今 Publication of the "Administrative Ethics Checklist" 
� The Ombudsman Awards 
今 Publication of "The Ombudsman's Guide on Good 
Standards of Customer Service" 
今 Publication of "The Ombudsman and the Protection of 
Human Rights in Hong Kong" 
今 Publication of "Maladministration and Redress" 
1998 今 Publication of “Effective Complaint Handling" 
Alice Tai 2000 今 Accepting complain by email 
2001 今 Introducing complain through telephone call 
2004 � Tips for Making a Proper Complaint 
143 Information generated from the Annual reports, publications and leaflets of the Ombudsman in various 
years. 
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Chapter V Conclusion and Discussions 
This study adopts the structural-functional perspective to study the Hong Kong 
Ombudsman in three senses. First of all, by understanding an institution as a structure 
in a political system, it tries to study the Ombudsman by its roles in the Hong Kong 
political system. Secondly, it assumes that the development of the Ombudsman is a 
response to the changes in the internal and external environment of the Hong Kong 
political system. The insufficiency of the existing political structures to deal with the 
society's need for airing their grievances, seeking redress and controlling the 
Administration contribute to the establishment of the Ombudsman Office. Finally, 
during the process of development, the Ombudsman as a mechanism for control and 
redress further specialize and differentiate in its goals and internal structure to better 
perform political functions. 
To study the Ombudsman by its roles 
What does it mean by studying an institution by its role? Role is the basic unit of 
a political structure, which is characterized by some regularized patterns of behaviour. 
In this sense, to study a role, is the study of the activities the institution regularly 
involved in. The study on the role of the Ombudsman would then means to find out its 
behaviour or the kinds of activities that it regularly participated in. The pattern of 
behaviour of the Ombudsman is established by its own expectations and actions, as 
well as those of others. The actors may include the general public who may approach 
“ the Ombudsman when they want to complaint against a maladministration, the 
complaints who used the service, the public organizations within the Ombudsman's 
jurisdiction, and the executive and legislature that the Ombudsman need to report to. 
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These actors interact with the Ombudsman and help to determine its roles. 
One may perceive the Ombudsman as one of the roles in the administrative 
justice system or to treat it as a structure that contains different individual roles. The 
functionalist literature does not provide clear criteria to determine the boundary of a 
structure. However, one may still able to study the behaviour of the Ombudsman 
without making such a strict distinction between a role and a structure if the focus of 
the study is to find out its regularized pattern of behaviour. The primary aim of this 
study is to find out the regularized pattern of behaviour of the Ombudsman by 
identifying its own expectations and actions as well as those of other actors including 
the general public, the complainants and the public organizations. 
The development of the Ombudsman Office 
There are contending forces driving the development of the Ombudsman Office. 
The Office evolved from a committee formed under the Office of Unofficial Members 
of the Executive and Legislative Council (OMELCO) to receive complaints from the 
public and to redress their grievances. The establishment of the committee was mainly 
due to the social unrest in 1967. The government wanted to create channels for the 
better communication between the public and the Administration. However, the 
Government rejected the JUSTICE'S proposal to establish an Ombudsman due to the 
resistance of the civil servants. The development of the Office visualizes the radical 
changes in political, social and economic environment in Hong Kong since the 1970s. 
“ The improved social and economic well-being of people and the political uncertainty 
brought by the 1997 issue raise the Hong Kong people's political awareness as well as 
their demands for a representative, participative and accountable government. Those 
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existing complaint-handling system, particularly the OMELCO, were regarded as 
insufficient, ineffective and not independent. There were increasing urges for the 
establishment for an Ombudsman. The introduction of direct election in the 
Legislative Council is a more direct cause to the pass of the COMAC (later the 
Ombudsman) Ordinance. 
The establishment of the OMELCO in 1969 and the establishment of the 
COMAC in 1989 show the Government's responses to the stress and changes within 
and outside the political system. This is what the functionalist termed "development" 
that results "when the existing structure and culture of the political system are unable 
to cope with the problem or challenge without further structural differentiation and 
cultural secularization". What concerns about the development of the Ombudsman is 
structural differentiation but not cultural secularization. The Ombudsman is a 
specialized structure that was established in order to respond to the public demands. 
So, one may able to conclude that the Hong Kong political system is self-regulating 
since it evolved structurally to perform the functions that are required to maintain its 
proper functioning. 
The roles of the Ombudsman 
The roles of the Ombudsman should reflect the structural characteristics of the 
Hong Kong political system since the creation of the Office is responding to the 
people's needs as well as the changes in social, political and economic environment. 
Moreover, the actors participating in the drafting of the legislation also reflect their 
interests, which shapes the mandate, jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman. 
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The Ordinance defined the Ombudsman on paper. The jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman is restricted to the investigation of maladministrative actions and 
decisions. The Ombudsman is assumed to deal with the implementation of policies 
but not formulation of policies. However, the Ombudsman is given wide power to 
carry out investigation in terms of its access to information, power to request the 
departments for explanation and provision of documents or other files, and the power 
to summon witnesses or informants. Regarding its jurisdiction and power, the Hong 
Kong Ombudsman is a classical model that with a much narrower jurisdiction than 
the countries like some post communist states, Latin American states and African 
Nations that adopted the hybrid model. This reflects the well-established judicial 
system and a rather liberal legislature in Hong Kong as well as the specialization of 
each institution into a smaller area of work. It is addressed in many places that the 
Ombudsman is created to complement or supplement the existing channels of 
complain and redress i instead of replacing them. Organizationally, the Ombudsman is 
executive led. The Ombudsman is appointed and reappointed by the Chief Executive. 
Where in other countries, the Ombudsman is usually reported to the legislature. This 
appointment system also reflects the characteristics of the Hong Kong political system. 
The Office was a parliamentary ombudsman model before the legislative reform in 
1994 that the members of legislature referred cases to the Ombudsman. This referral 
system was modeled on the British Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrations 
(PCA). The Ombudsman was no longer a British model after the cancellation of the 
referral system. The Office was also empowered to initiate investigation on its 
own-volition in legislative reform. This power tends to diversify the Ombudsman's 
“ role as a grievance man. 
1 These channels included the judiciary, the channel in the Legislative Council, the internal complaint 
handling system in government departments and else. 
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While the Ordinance defines the range of the Ombudsman's activities, the role of 
the Ombudsman in practice is determined by more factors. It is pointed out above that 
the general public, the complainants, and the public organizations help to forge the 
role of the Ombudsman through their interactions. The general public places their 
expectations on the Ombudsman, the complaints bring their complaints to the Office 
and the public organizations respond to the requests and decisions of the Ombudsman. 
The Ombudsman itself can also define its role as well as the focus of its work. The 
role of the Hong Kong Ombudsman is diversifying that it involves in activities 
beyond investigation and aims at more than redressing grievances. The Ombudsman 
perceives itself as catalyst in bringing about changes in laws and policies and helps to 
promote good governance that enhances the Administration's openness, accountability, 
fairness and responsiveness. The Office believes that suggesting ways to improve 
service quality and efficiency will benefit not only the complainants but also the 
general public. The Ombudsman emphasized its actual impacts on bringing about 
changes in administrative procedures, practices, decision, policies and even laws. This 
is done by recommending ways for improvement after conducting investigation into 
complaints or direct investigation. Since, 1995 the government reports to the 
legislature on the implementation of the Ombudsman's recommendation in three 
months upon receiving the Ombudsman's annual reports. The role of Ombudsman to 
bring about changes in law and policy is quite different from what the Ordinance 
envisages. 
“ On the other hand, the Ombudsman is passive towards the complaints lodged by 
the complainants. The Office received more enquiries than complaints each year. The 
Office takes roles as directory of services, councilors or social worker in directing the 
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callers to appropriate departments for appropriate services. Also, the Ombudsman did 
a lot of clarification work between the complaints and the complainee departments 
due to the large number of complaints that contain no maladministraion or injustice. 
The Ombudsman does redress people's grievances and rectify wrong but in many 
complaints there is no injustice to be redressed. The small proportion of 
unsubstantiated complaints and the frequent application of RAC can show this trend. 
Generally, the Office performs both redress and control functions. 
The functions of the Ombudsman 
The Office is continual to develop by adjusting its jurisdiction, developing new 
methods of complaint handling, clarifying its goals and reorganizing its structure^. In 
the functionalist perspective these development are purposively directed at 
performing political functions in order to enhance the capability of the political 
system. The Office helps to aggregate demands of the public in the policy function. 
The Office receives complaints from the public, sorts out the problems with the 
administration and than suggests ways to improve the services and practices in 
administration. This enhances the responsiveness of Government to the public's needs. 
These recommendations would bring about impacts on policy formulation and 
legislation, which may affects distribution and extraction of resources as well as 
regulation of people's life. This shows the Ombudsman's policy or output function in 
the political system. The Ombudsman also has influence in the system function. The 
publicity of the Office cultivated a complain culture and people's sense of fair and 
“ responsive government, which help socializing people's attitude and value towards 
2 Reorganizing structure here means the reorganization of structure during the expansion of the Office 
in the number of staff as well as referring to its de-linking from the government by replacing the civil 
servant who are seconded to the Government by directly recruited staff. 
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the administration. The Office also helps to facilitate the communication between 
government and citizens in times of conflict. 
Research limitations 
There are three main limitations in this study. The first one is the difficulty on 
evaluating the intensity and effectiveness of the Ombudsman's works. Although the 
aim of this research is not to evaluate the effectiveness of the Ombudsman system, 
sometimes，there is still a need to differentiate something was done from what was 
done is to have effects or impacts. For example, publication of guidelines to 
government departments and making recommendations to improve a certain practice 
are measures that show the effort of the Ombudsman to promote good governance, 
however, the two measures should have different impact on improving the quality of 
administration but their effects can hardly be compared. Secondly, there is a lack of 
raw data about the nature of complaints. The annual reports only show percentage of 
each nature of complaint, but do not tell the actual number of complaint in each type 
and against what departments. So, it is difficult to have detail study on the nature of 
complaints handled by the Office. Finally, the research relies quite heavily on the 
information in the annual reports but the annual may not contain enough information 
to evaluate the role of Ombudsman comprehensively especially for the self-perception 
of the Ombudsman. Different Ombudsmen may have their preference in revealing the 
needed information. For example, the structure of the annual reports are quite 
different between the three Ombudsmen so that something exist in one report may not 
“ be found in another. 
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Further research possibilities 
To find out the role of the Ombudsman is a preliminary step to further research. 
Comparative studies can be done between Asian Ombudsman to comparable the 
similarities and differences in the design and functioning of the institution as well as 
to sort out if there is any pattern of relationship between the roles of the Ombudsman 
and the structural characteristics of political system as reflected by the Institution. 
Typology may therefore be constructed to illustrate the relationship pattern. Secondly, 
there can be study on the classification of the nature of complaints received by the 
Office. The Office classifies the nature of complaints into ten types. Some types of 
classification are quite abstract or not concrete enough to tell what is the content of 
complaint about. Or, some the classifications are quite similar that cannot are not 
helpful to differentiate one type of complaint from another. One can suggest ways to 
improve the classification system through studying the content of complaints. This 
will be helpful in future comparative study of the Office across time. Thirdly, the 
annual reports and the investigation reports provide rich information on the substance 
of complaints and their resolutions. A quantitative study can be conducted to code and 
generalize the types and content of the suggestions made by the Ombudsman. This 
could serve as an indicator to measure the progressiveness of the Ombudsman on their 
efforts to bring about changes in policies and law as well as to differentiate different 
styles of Ombudsmen in judging and resolve cases. 
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Appendix I Questionnaire for Interview 
This interview concerns mainly about the self-perception of the ombudsman on the 
role and functions of the Ombudsman Office. The questions were being asked as open 
question with out giving the options. Options were given in clarification of questions. 
A. About handling cases: 
1 • What is your perception on your clients' class origins? 
- M a i n l y affluent, mainly poor or even distribution 
2. What is your perception on your clients' education level? 
- H i g h , average, low, an even distribution of three 
3. Is the posture of your office almost entirely passive in that you wait for complaints 
to be brought to you or do you take up a substantial number of complaints on your 
own initiative? Why? How? 
4. If all the citizen inquiries to your office could be divided into the following two 
types, please indicate the relative proportions of each一(A) Requests for the actual 
provision of services or for information about them; (B) Requests for investigation 
of personal grievance against administrative action. 
5. What is the content of grievances brought to the Ombudsman? 
- M a i n l y inefficiency~delay, misplaced of records, and other minor 
procedural errors 
- M a i n l y malfeasance一substantive error, abuse of authority, discrimination, 
arrogance, and other injustice 
- E v e n l y distributed 
6. What is the relative proportion of offensive complaints (client appeals for a review 
of administration's decision not to grant him something he wants e.g., welfare benefits) 
and defensive complaints (protection asked against damaging actions e.g., decisions 
to raise taxes, to incarcerate, and to lower or eliminate a welfare benefit)? 
B. About the Ombudsman's role: 
7. How would you describe your role? 
- M e d i a t o r , broker-negotiator, impartial investigator, arbitrator, reformer, 
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enabler-facilitator, supervisor or controller, political activist, advocator etc. 
- What are your most important duties/roles? 
8. Who exercises authority over the Ombudsman? 
- T h e legislature, the executive, the chief executive, other independent 
government organizations, civil servants or government officials, no 
authority. 
9. How would you understand your office's relationship with courts, legislature and 
the executive? 
-Hie ra rch ica l , equal, supervising, detached, cooperative, complementary, 
supplementary etc. 
- R e l a t i o n s h i p with court: overlapping mandates? What are the differences? 
Nature, mandates, method of handling cases and solution/ impact. 
(The Ordinance doesn't specify that the mandates of the ombudsman should be 
the matter fall outside the competence of court and did not indicate that 
complainants should exhaust other available means before going to the 
ombudsman) 
C. About the functions of the Ombudsman 
10. How would you evaluate the function of your office? 
-Redress，control, direct impact, indirect impact etc. 
- D i r e c t impacts: grievance redressed, remedies made, removal of doubt, 
correction of decision, articulate complainants' interest, bring about changes 
in legislation 
- I n d i r e c t impacts: prevention of future problems, quality of administration 
improved, deterrent, regulate the administrative behaviour 
D. About jurisdiction 
11. Mandate in functional sense (individual acts, administrative decision, general acts, 
factual acts, any dissatisfaction) and review criterion (legality and non-legality) 
- C a n the merit of administrative decisions be reviewed? 
- L e g a l i t y review (law) and non-legality review (good administration) 
- H o w would you handle general dissatisfaction 
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